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The study has employed a political ecology approach to analyse what is driving and 
enabling the rapid pace of hydropower development in the Lao PDR. The Lao PDR is 
the focus of the study but it has been necessary to marshal evidence from the entire 
Mekong Basin because the asymmetric international politics of the basin shape the 
drivers and enablers.  
 
The Mekong Basin is currently experiencing rapid social, economic and ecological 
change. Hydropower is a key component. Lao PDR is at the centre of the Basin’s 
hydropower development. The research employs political ecology to critique the 
narratives, mechanisms, and power relationships and agendas that drive and enable 
hydropower development. The meso-scale analysis highlights the links between the 
political, economic and social mechanisms, macro-political economic forces and local 
level environmental and social change. Recent and current phases of investment and 
development over the last two decades are analysed. The research methods include 
interviews with key informants, document analysis and participant observation. 
Evidence from case studies across Lao PDR is employed together with the case study 
of the Xayaburi dam, the first mainstream dam in the Lower Basin.   
 
The study makes two original contributions. First, it examines the Xayaburi dam, 
which began construction in November 2012. Second, it is the first comprehensive, 
meso-scale, political ecology critique of hydropower development in the Lao PDR. 
Through its analysis the research provides extensive evidence of the mechanisms that 
drive and enable differences between the rhetoric and reality of hydropower 
development in Lao PDR. The research shows that the polarized debate surrounding 
hydropower, the outcome of which is so important for the future of the Mekong 
Basin and its peoples, has been constructed to allow contending actors to legitimize 
their own agendas. It will be shown that in many cases hydropower projects are built 
because they benefit international and regional elites. Their access to political power, 
corrupt practices, policy influence, the patronage of jobs and to regional control more 
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generally come  with serious consequences for the environment and for the 
livelihoods of much of the Basin’s population. These insights provide lessons learned 
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1 Introduction - Drivers and Enablers of Hydropower Development in 
the Lao PDR: The Political Ecology of Mekong Riparians, Investors, and 
the Environment 
 




The purpose of this study is to illuminate the drivers and enablers of hydropower 
development in the Lao PDR1. The Mekong Basin is currently undergoing significant 
economic and environmental change. Hydropower is a key determinant in this 
change. The Basin’s transformation includes plans for 11 mainstream dams and over 
150 tributary dams (King et al., 2007). A number of studies suggest that these dams 
will have far-reaching negative impacts on the Basin’s biodiversity, ecosystem 
services, and the livelihoods of over 60 million people (see Figure 1-1; Kummu and 
Varis, 2007; Barlow et al., 2008; Dugan et al., 2010; Grumbine and Xu, 2011). 
 
Much of the current hydropower expansion is focused in Laos (see Figure 1-1). This 
doctoral study employs a political ecology approach to analyse what is driving and 
enabling the rapid pace of hydropower development in Laos. The study analyses the 
narratives and mechanisms related to the Impact Assessment process (IA) to 
understand what drives and enables hydropower to be developed in ways that 
ignores its potential social and environmental costs. The Impact Assessment process 
is one of the few windows into the hydropower development process that is open to 
the public. Its prominence in the hydropower development process makes it a key 
engagement point for actors contesting and defending hydropower dam 
development. The study focuses on Laos as it is currently experiencing the majority of 
                                                          
1
 Hereafter referred to as Laos 
17 
 
the hydropower development in the Mekong Basin. This study also analyses 
hydropower development in other Mekong Basin countries to provide context for the 
overall development process in the Region. 
 
The drivers and enablers of hydropower development in other regions have been well 
articulated (see Reisner, 1986; Grigg, 1996; Poff et al., 2003). As Reisner (1986) points 
out in his detailed analysis of water development in the American West, politics and 
power often trump environmental and social concerns and costs. The Mekong Basin 
has also been subject to considerable research. White’s (1962) study into the 
economic and social aspects of lower Mekong development was one of the first 
studies of its time to highlight the non-engineering aspects of Basin development. 
Extensive research in the Basin from the 1990s to today has focused on the 
environmental and social impacts of dams (see Hirsch, 1995; Dugan et al., 2010; 
Grumbine and Xu, 2011). This study examines the narratives and mechanisms that 
drive and enable these impacts.  
 
During the first decade of the new century, the drivers and enablers of hydropower 
development have changed in the Mekong and around the world. Rising electricity 
demand in developed and developing countries, a global push for green energy, new 
sources of financing and increased political stability have all contributed to a changed 
dynamic in hydropower development. New actors, drivers and enablers have 
emerged while others have taken on new roles. This change in hydropower 
development has resulted in hundreds of new dams being planned, proposed or 
under construction. These new drivers and enablers have also shaped the way dams 
are built and how their environmental and social impacts are addressed. 
 
Hydropower can significantly benefit economies through income generation, cheap 
electricity and reduced climate change emissions (Bartle, 2002; Demirbas, 2007). 
What is troubling about the Mekong, is that hydropower development appears to be 
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rapidly moving forward with little concern for its potential environmental and social 
impacts (Molle et al., 2009). The recognition, management and mitigation of 
hydropower impacts is vital in the Mekong because it is an area of high biodiversity 
and millions of people rely on these ecosystem services for their livelihoods and 
protein (Hortle, 2007). This study uses a political ecology approach to offer a fresh 
understanding of the drivers and enablers of hydropower development in Laos. The 
aim of this study is to better understand why hydropower in Laos is built in ways that 





Figure 1-1  Operational, under construction, and proposed hydropower dams in the 




Political ecology has been a useful analytical approach in critically examining Mekong 
Basin development (Bakker, 1999; Sneddon and Fox, 2006). Its deductive approach 
makes political ecology appropriate for a study such as this because it illuminates the 
relationships between power, politics, economics and environmental change. As 
Blaikie (1987:17) has stated, political ecology ‘‘combines the concerns of ecology and 
a broadly defined political economy”. 
 
Political economy has also been employed a useful approach in analysing 
development along Mekong Basin rivers (as Mitchell, 1998; Ratner, 2003; Oehlers, 
2006). The strength of using a political ecology analysis over political economy 
however, stems from political ecology’s broad approach and its incorporation and 
prioritization of environmental concerns, which are especially relevant in the Mekong 
Basin where livelihoods and the environment are deeply intertwined. 
 
Political ecology has traditionally examined human and environmental interactions 
beginning at a small scale and their links to macro scale forces and vice versa. The 
contributors in Zimmerman and Basset’s (2003) edited book on political ecology focus 
mainly on smaller scale community and environmental relationships and their links to 
regional and global scales. Blaikie’s (1985) political ecology analysis of soil erosion in 
Africa also links local problems to regional and global scales. 
 
This study will start at a meso-scale by examining the role of private and state actors 
in the current phase of hydropower intensification in Laos. It will show how political 
and economic mechanisms and narratives drive and enable rapid hydropower 
development that ignores its social and environmental impacts while empowering 
powerful actors. By starting at a meso-scale, the study aims to add to the literature 
on the political ecology of hydropower investment and development in the Basin and 




A unique aspect of this research will be the use of the Impact Assessment process as a 
point of inquiry, and as a lens through which we can view and analyse hydropower 
development in Laos. One of the key instances when the hydropower development 
process is thrust into the public sphere and exposed to scrutiny is during the IA 
process. The release of IAs are mandated by law in Laos and a requirement for 
lending from the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
(Alshuwaikhat, 2005). Actors concerned about hydropower development use the IA 
report and process, or lack thereof, as a point of critical engagement with the 
hydropower development process.  
 
This study will examine how actors, narratives, policy statements and mechanisms 
shape the IA process. The study will draw from a number of case studies of tributary 
dams and the Xayaburi mainstream Dam in Laos from 1990 to 2013. The analysis will 
illuminate how actors have constructed narratives to legitimise their agendas, and 
have drawn power from a lack of transparency and accountability within Laos to 
benefit from hydropower projects. By studying how actors have controlled and 
moved within the space surrounding hydropower development and the IA process, 
the study aims to shine light on the broader closed nature of the hydropower 




Figure 1-2 Using the Impact Assessment process to understand the drivers and 
enablers of hydropower development. 
 
In Figure 1-2, the closed doors and black arrow represent the lack of transparency in 
hydropower development in Laos. The square box of the Impact Assessment process 
is surrounded by the actors that engage with it and with each other, as they contest 
or defend the decisions relating to dam development. By examining the power 
relations and politics that shape the highly politicized and non-transparent process of 
the IAs, the drivers and enablers of hydropower investment and construction in the 
Basin come to light as depicted by the yellow sphere. 
 
While this study focuses on hydropower intensification in Laos with insights from the 
Mekong Basin, it does not focus on the entire Basin. The 800,000 square kilometre 
Mekong Basin’s is shared by six riparian states: China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam (Dore, 2003; see Figure 2-1). Researching the drivers and 
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enablers in all six countries was deemed to be impractical due to the Basin’s size, 
diversity and complexity. The focus of the research, given its hydrological and 
geographical significance is in the Lower Mekong Basin, specifically in Laos. Laos 
contributes 35% of the flow to the Mekong River and, as a result, the country is at the 
centre of the active debate on hydropower development with over 100 tributary and 
nine mainstream dams proposed or under construction (Dore, 2003; See Figure 1-1). 
Thailand, China, and Vietnam, along with other regional and international actors are 
key players in Laos’s hydropower. Moreover, the country is home to dozens of 
international consultants and NGOs working on hydropower-related impact 
assessments.  
 
The temporal focus of this study is from the second half of the 1990s to June 20132. 
The second half of the 1990s encompasses some of the earliest hydroelectric 
development in Laos. Attention will also be paid to antecedent hydroelectric 
development and water resource management processes as these established the 
ground for development in the Mekong Basin since the 1950s. The complexity of 
development over the past 60 years means that the Mekong hydropower debate is 
very dynamic. Thanks to work with the Challenge Program on Water and Food 
(CPWF), I have been able to visit the Region frequently to update the thesis during 
the final drafting of the study. 
 
In this chapter, section 1.2 outlines the research problem, the methodology, and the 
theory; section 1.3 briefly introduces the research questions that will guide the study; 
section 1.4 highlights the policy relevance of the research; and, finally, section 1.5 
explains the structure of the thesis. 
 
                                                          
2
 The end point of the study is June 2013 as it is the final research year of the PhD. 
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1.2 Introduction of the Research Problem 
1.2.1 The Research Problem 
 
Over 60% of the planet’s freshwater resides and flows within transboundary rivers 
and aquifer systems, and approximately 40% of the world’s population lives within 
these basins. Within the 263 transboundary basins around the world approximately 
two thirds span developing economies. It is in the developing economies of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America, along transboundary rivers, where most of the remaining 
hydropower development potential exists. According to a 2011 International Energy 
Agency (IEA) report, global hydropower could grow as much as 85% by 2050, an 
increase of 150 to 200 GW of new generating capacity (IEA, 2011). In 2011, Chinese 
state-owned hydropower companies alone, such as Sinohydro Corp. and Dongfang 
Electric Corp., financed by Chinese banks, were constructing approximately 300 
projects in 78 countries worldwide (Hackley and Westhuizen, 2011). The current 
global resurgence in hydropower is being driven by increasing demands for clean 
energy, cheap electricity, and new sources of investment and potential profits (IEA, 
2011; Hackley and Westhuizen, 2011). 
 
Hydropower is a potentially cheap source of electricity with low greenhouse gas 
emissions compared to burning hydrocarbons (Barros et al., 2011). However, dams 
can also have significant negative impacts. They can displace populations, destroy 
cultures, and alter the flow, temperature, water quality, sediment loads, and 
ecosystems that depend on water, rendering it unusable for irrigation, environmental 
services, fisheries, and livelihoods (WCD, 2000). 
 
The Mekong Basin has not escaped the current global hydropower expansion. Up to 
the mid-1990s, the Mekong River and its tributaries had remained one of the least 
dammed large transboundary river systems in the world (Hirsch, 2004). In 1995, the 
Manwan Dam became the first mainstream dam and following the recovery of the 
25 
 
Asian Financial Crisis many tributary dams have been built across the Upper and 
Lower Basin. Current hydropower development in the Basin includes plans for over 
150 dams, including 11 mainstream dams (King et al. 2007). Laos is at the centre of 
the Basin’s hydropower expansion with over 100 tributary and nine mainstream dams 
planned or under construction. 
 
In contributing to the extensive research on the Mekong Basin hydropower, Sneddon 
and Fox (2006) used a political ecology approach to demonstrate that in the Mekong, 
as in many areas of the world, water is a resource that is managed by powerful 
actors. In the Mekong, powerful actors construct geographical scales and narratives 
to legitimize their activities in the Basin. Political and economic mechanisms also 
empower actors and control the space from which debates over development 
emerge. Cooperation between powerful river basin actors often occurs under the 
guise of ‘development’, ‘flood control’, ‘modernization’, or ‘country building’, which 
can lead to the degradation of natural resources and the destruction of livelihoods. 
 
Hirsch (2004), Lebel et al. (2005), and Molle et al. (2009) have all been critical of 
hydropower development in the Mekong Basin arguing that without proper planning, 
mitigation and engineering, the social and environmental costs of hydropower will be 
devastating for the Region. The majority of the literature has dealt with the impacts 
of hydropower on the environment and local people, and on the failures within the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC), the regional basin organization. A review of this 
literature and the main topics covered by it forms part of Chapter 2. 
 
The current era of dam development has changed the hydropower development 
process in the Basin as new actors, drivers and enablers have emerged. As Foran et al. 
(2010) stated, the drivers and structures, which determine where HP facilities are 
located, and how they are developed and managed, are typically obscure in the Basin. 
In the Mekong, the majority of the hydropower decision-making and development 
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process occurs behind closed doors (Kheang and Sokbunthoeun, 2009; McNally et al., 
2008). Furthermore, Foran et al. (2010) identified that little is understood about the 
private sector’s increased role in hydropower development. 
 
This research aims to understand what is driving and enabling the rapid hydropower 
expansion in Laos. For the purpose of this study, ‘drivers’ are the processes or 
elements that influence and motivate actors in the Region to construct, invest in and 
approve hydropower dams. Enablers are understood as structures and mechanisms, 
both within and outside institutions that facilitate actors who are driven to build 
hydropower. This research is informed by an extensive literature review and previous 
work experience in the Basin. Data was collected during comprehensive fieldwork, 
including over two three month long trips to the Region in 2011 and seven, short 
(approximately 2 to 3-week) trips throughout 2012 and 2013. 
 
The original contribution of the thesis is twofold. First, it examines the narratives and 
mechanism that led to the ground breaking ceremony on the Xayaburi Dam, which 
began construction in November 2012. Second, the study provides the first 
comprehensive, meso-scale, political ecology critique of hydropower development in 
Laos. The study illuminates the mechanisms that drive and enable the differences 
between the rhetoric and reality of hydropower development. The research shows 
that the polarized debate surrounding hydropower, the outcome of which is so 
important for the future of the Mekong Basin and its peoples, has been constructed 
to allow contending actors to legitimize their own agendas. It will be shown that in 
many cases, hydropower projects have been built because they benefitted 
international and regional elites. Their access to political power, corrupt practices, 
policy influence, and regional control more generally come with serious 
consequences for the environment and for the livelihoods of much of the Basin’s 
population. These insights provide lessons learned that are relevant to global 
autocratic states developing their natural resources, to policy makers and to civil 
society exploring leverage points to evoke change. 
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1.2.2 The Impact Assessment Process and its Role in the Mekong 
 
The purpose of this paper is not to critique and contribute to the vast literature 
analysing impact assessments tools or processes. Rather, as explained above, this 
study uses the Impact Assessment process as a lens, a key engagement point for 
actors, to understand the drivers and enablers of hydropower development in the 
Basin. Whatever conclusions that emerge on the value of impact assessments will 
contribute at a secondary level to the main analysis of drivers and enablers of 
hydropower development. 
 
Although many definitions of Impact Assessment techniques exist, there are a 
number of common features. Mitchell (1997) states that IAs should: identify the 
objectives and goals of the project; describe the environmental and social changes 
that might occur without and with the development; identify actions to mitigate or 
eliminate negative impacts and highlight areas for monitoring. In identifying impacts 
it is important to remember that they have a temporal dimension, and that 
developments may be modified during the planning stages or changes may occur in 
the social or natural environment. 
 
The dominant form of IAs in the Mekong are Environmental Impact Assessments 
(EIAs). EIAs can be defined as  
“a process for identifying the likely consequences for the bio-geophysical 
environment and for man’s health and welfare of implementing particular 
activities and for conveying this information, at a stage when it can materially 
affect their decision, to those responsible for sanctioning the proposals” 
(Wathern, 1988:6, after Munn, 1979). 
The definition of EIAs encompasses both environmental and social factors. Literature 
and practice, however, suggest that EIAs have shifted away from social impacts to 
primarily focus on measuring biophysical environmental impacts (Jay et al., 2007). 
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According to Jay et al. (2006) a measure of EIAs success can be determined by the 
degree to which environmental considerations are taken in account during decision-
making, and if EIAs result in restoring and maintaining environmental quality. 
 
EIAs have been critiqued widely in the literature (Peets, 1999; Benson, 2003; 
Christensen P, Kørnøv L, Nielsen, 2005 etc.). Jay, Jones, Slinn and Wood’s (2007) past 
and present review of EIAs states that the main critiques of EIA’s are in relation to 
their inconsistent prioritization of factors and the inherent bias in the interpretation 
of impacts. Literature on the concepts, methods and practice of the Impact 
Assessment process is also substantial (Tilleman, 1995; Cashmore, 2004). IAs are 
framed according to scientific principles, however, the issues they address are subject 
to many political and financial conditions that significantly affect their 
implementation (Beattie, 1995). 
 
Although recognized as an imperfect tool. EIAs are widely used in Laos (Campbell et 
al., 2011). Laws and policies in Laos require that the impact assessments are 
participatory and transparent and once completed, that they are released to the 
public (see Chapter 6). The reality is very different. 
 
1.2.3 The Research Questions 
 
First main question 
What are the key narratives that legitimize the political and economic structures that 







What new actors have emerged and how have roles changed in the current phase of 
hydropower transformation in Laos? 
 
Second main question 
What are the key institutional structures and mechanisms at the national and 
regional basin scale that have empowered certain actors over others in the Impact 
Assessment process, project approval and construction of hydropower development 
projects? 
 
1.3 Policy Relevance 
 
The study is topical and policy-relevant. Globally, hydropower produces 
approximately 21% of the world’s energy (Renewable Global Status Report, 2007). 
There are over 45,000 large dams in the world (>15 m and/or reservoir volume > 3M 
m3) holding back 15% of total annual global river runoff and dams contribute 12-16% 
to global food production (WCD, 2000). 
 
Hydropower is slated to grow by over 85% by 2050 (IEA, 2011). Importantly, this new 
wave of hydropower investment and construction is being developed in some of the 
most bio-diverse areas on Earth. The majority of such activity is associated with 
transboundary river systems.  
 
Hydropower is a key part of the Water-Energy-Food Nexus (Falkenmark and 
Rockstrom, 2004). Water is necessary for life, but it requires large amounts of energy 
to lift, move and process. In the developing world, this energy is often derived from 
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human or animal power; however, as societies modernize, mechanical or electrical 
energy is used. 
 
Water is also essential to make use of energy. Nuclear power, oil, gas or coal-fired 
plants, and thermal generation all require vast amounts of water in their operation. In 
2000, thermoelectric power generation accounted for 39% of all freshwater 
withdrawals in the U.S. (USGS, 2004). Hydropower uses water as a direct input into 
the energy process. 
 
Water and energy are also used to grow, transport and produce food. In the Mekong, 
the availability of water and hydraulic head3 in the Basin’s extensive river systems has 
fostered the development of the electricity sector. Hydropower dams have spurred 
the growth of long-distance electricity grids between cities and countries. The 
comparatively cheap energy produced from hydropower have fuelled the 
development of cities like Kunming, Bangkok, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh, making it 
important to the energy security of the Mekong Basin states. 
 
Economic and population growth and urbanization are key drivers in electricity 
demand. With increasing oil prices and concerns surrounding fossil fuel emissions, 
hydropower has been put forward as a green energy. It is currently the world’s largest 
renewable energy source with over 170 GW of hydropower under construction today, 
76% of which exists within Asia (IEA, 2011). 
 
Hydropower development in the Mekong directly impacts food. In the Mekong, up to 
80% of the animal protein is derived from wild fish (Hortle, 2007). Approximately 90% 
of the wild fish in the Basin are migratory (Barlow et al., 2009). These high 
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percentages of migratory food sources flowing through the river means that 
hydropower development can significantly impact the food security of millions of 
people who depend on the Basin’s ecosystem services. It is within the Water-Energy-
Food Nexus that the debate of Mekong hydropower development revolves. 
 
By systematically exploring the political, social, economic and environmental drivers 
and enablers behind hydropower development in Laos the study will be useful for 
advocacy groups, decision-makers, and industry both in the Mekong Basin and 
internationally. NGOs can use the findings from this study to engage more effectively 
with decision-makers, before and after impact assessments processes. Decision-
makers, both in industry, Government and donor organizations, can use the research 
findings to gain a better understanding of who stands to benefit and who stands to 
lose from current hydropower intensification, and why. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
 
The structure of the study has been shaped by the data collected during fieldwork. By 
living in Laos and by being based at the Challenge Program and Water and Food office 
in Vientiane, it was possible to identify a wide range of actors at a ‘grassroots’, 
regional and international level who have been involved in hydropower development 
across the Basin. Interactions with these actors through both formal and informal 
meetings flushed out three key areas of research that form the empirical chapters of 
the thesis: one, the construction and use of narratives to legitimize and define the 
space in which hydropower is debated; two, the structures and mechanisms within 
the Lao state that have allowed hydropower to be built in ways that favours powerful 
groups at the expense of local people and the environment; and three, the unfolding 
debate and controversy surrounding the Xayaburi Dam and its value as a 




The thesis is divided across eight chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the context for the 
study. The chapter overviews the Basin and provides a background to the current 
expansion of hydropower development. This chapter highlights the historical role of 
actors within the Basin providing the backdrop for the changes that are analysed in 
the proceeding chapters. The chapter further provides an overview of some of the 
key existing academic studies into Mekong Basin hydropower and its impacts. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical framework that guides the research. Political 
ecology is increasingly used to examine water management and its relevance in 
examining environmental change, politics and power in hydropower development are 
shown. This chapter shows political ecology’s strengths in critically examining 
narratives, mechanisms and scale. It further demonstrates how the political ecology 
approach is applicable in the meso-scale and how it will be employed to illustrate the 
drivers, enablers, winners, and losers of hydropower development in the Basin. 
 
Chapter 4 explains the methodological framework that accompanies the theoretical 
framework and outlines the methodological constraints of the study. The 
methodology combines case studies, document data analysis, discourse analysis, 
grounded theory, and interviews. Research for the study is designed to be flexible and 
reflexive in order to adapt to the sensitive nature of the topic. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 are the first two empirical chapters. Chapter 5 critically examines 
narratives and the changing role of actors in hydropower development. The chapter 
draws from policy statements surrounding hydropower dams and the Impact 
Assessment process from across the Basin with a focus on Laos. This chapter uses 
political ecology to examine the mechanisms that construct narratives. Chapter 6, 
examines the mechanisms and structures within Laos that enable hydropower dams 
to be constructed with little or no transparency or accountability. This chapter draws 
heavily on interviews from consultants working in the Region. A number of case 
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studies are used to demonstrate the impact of these mechanisms on hydropower 
development. 
 
Chapter 7 is the final empirical chapter. The Xayaburi Dam is presented as a 
representative case study to illustrate the evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
This chapter uses the Impact Assessment process surrounding the Xayaburi Dam 
debate as its focal point. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents an analytical summary of the study by reviewing the 
research questions. Chapter 8 further discusses the research limitations as well as 















2 Context and Background to the Mekong Basin and its Hydropower 
Development 
 
“The hazard of building concrete and steel structures that meet technical 
requirements and fall short in their promotion of a stable life in the Basin is great.” 




Beginning with a snapshot of the importance of the Mekong Basin to its riparian 
states, this chapter goes on to outline the political, economic, and social diversity 
within the Region. Providing an overview of existing water resource development and 
early actors in the Basin helps to shine light on the current state of hydropower 
development. This chapter concludes by providing a brief overview of hydropower 
literature with specific relevance to hydropower development along with a literature 
review of Impact Assessment techniques and practices and their role in the Mekong 
Basin. While the overall study focuses on Laos, the Chapter provides an overview of 
the entire Basin (excluding Myanmar) to provide a context to the analysis. It should 
be noted that the historical record outlined in this chapter is presented as factual 
rather than as a narrative. This was done to avoid a lengthy introduction and focus 
the main analysis on the narratives and mechanisms presented in the empirical 
chapters.  
 
2.2 The Mekong Basin and its Importance to the Riparian States 
 
As the world’s twelfth longest river (and seventh longest in Asia), the Mekong River is 
an iconic river. At 4,300 km in length draining a Basin 800,000 km², the Mekng flows 
from its headwaters in the plateaus of Tibet through China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia, and the southeast of Vietnam before spilling into the South China Sea (See 
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Map 1). The Mekong is a flood pulse river, affected strongly by seasonal flows. The 
total annual flow of the Basin is 475 million m³ of which 80% to 90% is delivered 
during the flood season (Hori, 2000). To put this into perspective, during the flood 
season a journey through its system takes approximately three weeks, whereas that 











Figure 2-1. Map of the Mekong River Basin. Source: World Bank Database.  
 
Known as ‘the rice basket of Southeast Asia’, the Mekong Basin is home to a 
population of 70 million with 90 distinct ethnic groups (Galipeau et al., 2012). With its 
extensive wetlands and floodplains, the Basin supports the largest inland fisheries in 
the world with an annual catch of 2.6 million tonnes and over 500,000 tonnes of 
other aquatic animals (e.g. aquatic insects, amphibians and molluscs) valued annually 
at between $3.9 to $7 billion (Hortle, 2007). Over two-thirds of the Basin’s population 
are involved in fishing for their livelihoods or to support food security (Mekong River 
Commission, 2003b). In the Lower Mekong Basin, aquatic resources make up 




Biodiversity in the Basin is estimated to be second only to the Amazon with over 
1,200 species of fish and a number of endemic and endangered species such as the 
giant Mekong catfish, which can grow to three metres and can weigh over 300 
kilograms, the giant Mekong stingray, and the Mekong river dolphin (Barlow et al., 
2008). To the economies of Southeast Asia, the Basin is a source of wealth and power 
that are underpinned by the hydropower, transport, and irrigation associated with 
the river and its tributaries. 
 
Table 1.1 demonstrates the diversity of the six Mekong riparians in terms of 
demographics, economics and energy. The remainder of this introductory section 
presents a snapshot of the political, geographic, economic and hydraulic diversity 
within the Basin countries. Myanmar is excluded. This snapshot provides an indication 
of the heterogeneity and complexity inherent in the politics and economics of water 
resource management of the Basin that will be explored in further depth in the 
















Table 1-1 Demographic, economic and energy-related characteristics of the six 
Mekong riparians. 




Led by a single party communist Government, and with a population of 1.3 billion, 
China is a political and economic powerhouse. In 2012, China’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) was $5.9 trillion and its per capita income is $7,640 (World Bank, 
2012). In 2012, China’s growth rate was 10.4% with 2.9 % of the population living 




The importance of the Mekong in China is within Yunnan Province where the Mekong 
provides electricity through dozens of hydropower dams as well as water for 
irrigation. Approximately 10 million people live within the Mekong Basin in Yunnan 
Province. In China, where the river and Basin are born, the Mekong River is called the 
Lancang Jiang. As shown in Figure 2-1, the Basin is narrow as it passes through China 
dropping over 4500 metres through deep gorges before beginning to expand and 
slow down once the river reaches past the southern Yunnan Province border.  
 
Although almost half of the Mekong River’s length passes through China, however, 
the contribution to flow is only 16%. This small percentage is important because it 
represents 34% of the flow during the dry season (Nesbitt et al., 2004). As the 
Mekong flows south and the Basin begins to take shape, it skirts the border with 
Myanmar, gaining 2% of its flow before entering into Laos where the mountainous 




Laos is a single party communist state with a population of 6.5 million covering an 
area of 236,800 km². Laos’ GDP is $7.3 billion with a per capita of $2440 and a growth 
rate of 8.5% (World Bank 2012a). Its primary exports, estimated at $2.258 billion, are 
gold, copper, electricity and wood that mainly go to China, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Germany. Approximately 80% of the population 
is rural and 27.6% exist below the level defined by the World Bank (WB) as living in 
poverty (World Bank, 2012a). 
 
The Mekong and its tributaries are the lifeblood of Laos with approximately five 
million people living within the Basin. In fact, Laos is situated almost entirely within 
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the Mekong Basin with the river gaining 35% of its flow within Laos’ borders (Hirsch, 
1995). Laos has a high population of ethnic minorities who live close to the 
mainstream or the Mekong tributaries, relying primarily on wild fish and subsistence 
agriculture for their food security (Nguyen-Khoa et al., 2005). For example, 71% of 
rural households rely on fisheries for either subsistence or as a source of income, 
while fish provided by the Basin are second only to rice for food security and income 
(Nguyen-Khoa et al., 2005). As the Mekong River travels south it forms the border 




Thailand is a democratic upper middle income country with a population of almost 70 
million and a landmass of 513,120 km². The Thai GDP is $318 billion and the country 
sustains a growth rate of 7.8% and a per capita income of $8,190, the highest in 
Mekong Basin (World Bank, 2012b). Thailand plays a pivotal role in South-East Asian 
regional trade, with a 17% share in commercial services, a 20% share in imports and a 
15% share of regional exports (UNESCAP, 2012). Thailand contributes 18% of the 
Mekong’s flow predominantly with waters emanating from the mountainous North of 
Thailand. In the N.E. of Thailand, where the Basin covers a significant tract of 
farmland, the semi-arid climate and intensive agriculture of the Mun and Chi Basins 
drain 15% of the Mekong Basin (Hirsch, 1995). Approximately 25 million people live 
within the Mekong Basin in Thailand. Agriculture, primarily rice, and fishing 
dominates this segment of its rural economy. The Mekong then continues its journey 









Cambodia is a low income country with a population of 14.8 million covering an area 
of 181,035 square kilometres. The Cambodian GDP is $11.2 billion and the country 
sustains a growth rate of 6% and a GNI of $2080 (UNESCAP, 2012). The Government is 
a constitutional monarchy that operates as a parliamentary representative 
democracy, but the Prime Minster of Cambodia, Hun Sen, has held office since 1985. 
In Cambodia, 86% of the country is located in the Basin and this area is home to 
approximately 10 million people. 
 
In Cambodia the river landscape is mainly flat and the river forms into a delta as it 
moves past Phnom Penh. Cambodia contributes 18% flow to the Mekong River. The 
great Cambodian Lake, Tonle Sap, is fed by the Mekong (Kummu, and Sarkkula, 2008). 
Tonle Sap grows seven fold from 2,500 square metres and a depth of 0.5 metres to 
16,000 square metres and depth of seven to ten metres during the rainy season 
(ibid). The lake supplies 15% to 20% of the Basin’s fish catch and is an important 
feeding ground for fish (Lamberts, 2006). The Cambodian population is heavily reliant 
on fish for food security with 80% of the population’s animal protein deriving from 




Vietnam is the furthest downstream riparian. It is a lower middle income country, one 
party communist state with a population of 86,928,000 (World Bank, 2012c). 
Vietnam’s economic growth rate is 6.8% and its GDP is $282.9 billion with a GNI of 
$1,160 (World Bank, 2010). The country covers an area of 331,210 km and 
contributes 11% to the flow of the Mekong River. The importance of the Mekong 
Basin and its water resources to Vietnam’s food and economic security cannot be 
underestimated (Käkönen, 2008). The Mekong Delta contains 37% of Vietnam’s 
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cultivated land area, producing more than 50% of Vietnam’s fishery, 60% of the 
country’s fruit and over 30 million tonnes of agricultural products (ibid). The Delta is 
home to a population of approximately 20 million. 
 
The country profiles above highlight the political, economic, hydraulic and geographic 
diversity within the Mekong Basin and point to the complexity of Basin-wide water 
resource management and hydropower development. These political and economic 
elements have had an extended impact over water resource governance of the Basin, 
which has a long history of development stretching back over a century. 
 
2.3 Overview of the Existing Water Resource Development and Early 
Actors in the Mekong Basin 
 
2.3.1 Pre-development Era of the River 
 
The 1856 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and the 1893 Treaty for 
Regulating the Position of the Kingdom of Cambodia were among the first foreign 
bilateral agreements in the Mekong Basin. These agreements, and subsequent 
treaties in 1926, 1937, and 1950 focused on the role of navigation and established the 
thalweg4 as the precise border between Thailand and Laos. During this period, the 
French colonial authority stressed the importance of freedom of navigation to keep 
open trade routes across the Basin, mainly for timber transport. It was also hoped 
that these river trade routes would eventually provide access to China’s wealth and 
buffer British colonial expansion in Burma (Osborne, 2006). 
 
In 1950, France, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand signed an agreement to use the waters 
flowing in their territory for hydropower and irrigation on condition that these 
                                                          
4
 Thalweg is a fluvial geomorphology term that denotes the deepest continuous inline within a 
watercourse or valley.  
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interventions did not impact the legitimate interest of the other countries, or 
navigation. 
 
As Salman (2007) states, the focus on navigational uses of watercourses was 
prominent during the 19th century as many nations were concerned with trade in raw 
materials. In developing countries the lack of infrastructure meant that rivers were 
sometimes the only way to move goods and people quickly across large land areas. 
With the outbreak of WWII in the Region in the 1940s and increasing demands for 
energy to process materials and supply electricity to growing cities, non-navigational 
uses of watercourses began to take on new importance (ibid). It was during this time 
that the Mekong River’s hydropower potential began to be recognized. 
 
2.3.2 Early Development of the Basin and the Geopolitics Surrounding 
the Formation of the Key River Basin Organization - the 1950s to the 
1990s 
 
The Mekong has a long history of development and dialogue among the lower 
riparian countries dating back over half a century. The first step came in 1957 as part 
of an economic development drive following the end of the first Indochina war. The 
United Nations regional office in Bangkok, the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East (ESCAFE) studied the Basin’s hydroelectric and irrigation 
potential and emphasized the need for cooperative development including the 
establishment of a joint body for exchanging information and development plans 
between the riparian states. ESCAFE employed the services of the US Bureau of 
Reclamation in 1955 to study potential hydropower sites in hopes that the Mekong 
could be developed into an Asian Tennessee Valley Authority (Osborne 2006). 
 
Three key studies guided hydropower development at this time. First, in 1957, the UN 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) released the Development of 
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Water Resources in the Lower Mekong Report. This report recommended the 
development of the Basin’s resources through the construction of a number of multi-
purpose dams to supply irrigation, generate hydropower, and control flooding. The 
report reflected the dominant view of the time that dams were modern and 
progressive (Osborne, 2006). 
 
In 1957, as a result of this initial ECAFE study, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and 
an observer from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) signed an 
agreement, establishing the Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the 
Lower Mekong Basin (Mekong Committee). China was not invited because it was not 
a member of the United Nations at the time and Burma was preoccupied with 
internal politics. From the outset, the Mekong Committee’s task was to ‘‘promote, 
coordinate, supervise, and control water resource development projects in the Lower 
Mekong Basin’’ (Nguyen, 1999:156). The Mekong Committee was the UN’s first 
involvement in the planning and development of an international river basin (Jacobs, 
1995). 
 
Soon after the UN became involved in the Basin they conducted their own study on 
development. This second study, entitled the Programme of Studies and Investigation 
for Comprehensive Development of the Lower Mekong River Basin (United Nations, 
1958). The UN study, also known as the Wheeler Report, was headed by Raymond 
Wheeler of the US Army Corps of Engineers. The Army Corps were active in much of 
the United States dam development in the early 20th Century (Jacobs, 1995). This 
report reaffirmed the Mekong’s huge hydropower potential and outlined an 
ambitious plan to develop both mainstream and tributary dams across the Basin. A 
precursor to this plan, however, was a five-year data collection program to guide 
project planning. This report, to some degree conflicted with the ECAFE report. While 
both reports supported economic development including hydropower dams, the 
ECAFE report was focused more on tributary dams and smaller scale projects. The UN 
study, on the other hand, was more cautious and was informed by existing, detailed 
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studies. As Nguyen (1999:57) states “For some, the Wheeler Report’s goals appeared 
much too ambitious and beyond the member countries’ capacity.” 
 
The third and final report that guided development at this time was a Ford 
Foundation-sponsored report by Gilbert White (White et al., 1962) entitled, 
Economics and Social Aspects of Lower Mekong Development. The White Report went 
beyond the engineering and technical considerations of the previous two reports to 
look at the potential environmental and social impacts of development. For White 
(1962), the report was a way of illustrating Asia’s first large-scale efforts to study the 
potential economic, institutional, and social impacts and benefits of development 
prior to it occurring.  
 
From these reports the Mekong Committee developed an agenda that promoted 
irrigation, hydropower, and flood control projects as a form of poverty alleviation. 
During the 1960s, the United States was heavily involved in the Mekong Committee 
funding as the largest non-riparian donor, with Thailand as the largest regional donor. 
The United States’ interest in funding the Mekong Committee and its development 
projects stemmed primarily from its desire to curb communist influence in the Region 
(Chi, 1997). Hirsch (2006) states that the US was pushing dams as a way to pull the 
economies of the Region out of poverty, thereby stemming the spread of 
communism. 
 
Hydropower development on the Mekong progressed slowly. The Mekong 
Committee completed a small number of minor tributary irrigation, multi-purpose, 
and hydropower dams in Laos and Thailand during the 1960s and early 1970s, but 
many projects were inhibited by a lack of finance within the Region, a lack of detailed 
economic and environmental baseline studies as well as lack of skilled technical 
workers (Jacobs, 1995). The Committee also began flood forecasting and Basin-wide 




The stage was set for hydropower to begin in earnest from the 1970s. At this time, 
the Mekong Committee drafted the Indicative Basin Plan, the first Basin Development 
Plan for the Region. This plan recommended 180 possible projects including four 
mainstream dams. Political tensions, however, in the 1970s including conflict in Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam reduced the Committee’s funding and once again 
constrained the development of projects. 
 
In 1975, the Mekong Committee ratified the Joint Declaration of Principles that 
further defined the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of 
development. This Joint Declaration stated that mainstream waters could not be 
developed without prior approval of the other Basin states through the Committee; 
this gave each member a veto power over mainstream dam development (Mekong 
Committee, 1975). 
 
In 1976 and 1977 Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam representatives were absent from the 
Committee due to a shift in regional governments and disruptions associated with 
armed regional conflicts. Although Laos and Vietnam re-joined in 1978, Cambodia did 
not. Cambodia’s split from the Committee meant that mainstream dam development 
could not legally proceed because of the Joint Declaration required approval from all 
members before mainstream waters were dammed. 
 
From 1978 to 1994, the Committee re-established itself as the Interim Mekong 
Committee (IMC), consisting of Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Moving away from 
Basin-wide development the IMC focused on data collection and domestic projects in 




In 1995, after Cambodia’s re-joining a lengthy negotiation process was initiated via 
the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The MRC was established with the Mekong 
Agreement which, once again, re-engaged the four lower riparian states. During this 
time China and Burma were asked to join the MRC, but they refused to join as full 
members and only became dialogue partners in 1996. The MRC’s mandate was “to 
cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilization, management and 
conservation of the water and related resources of the Mekong River Basin”, and “to 
ensure reasonable and equitable use” of the Mekong River System (MRC, 1995). 
 
2.3.3 The Mekong Agreement and the Mekong River Commission 
 
The lengthy negotiation leading up to the establishment of the MRC saw important 
changes in the capacity of the River Basin Organization (RBO) to manage mainstream 
dam development. The early 1990s marked the rapid growth and industrialization of 
Thailand’s economy. This rapid growth accompanied pressure on Thailand to 
accelerate the development of its hydroelectric power and irrigation resources. These 
developments, which included plans for Mekong mainstream diversions and dams 
were not well received by Thailand’s neighbours. One such controversial project was 
the Khong Chi Mun scheme, a large inter-Basin water diversion project in the N.E. of 
Thailand that proposed to divert large volumes of water from the Mekong, the Chi 
and Mun river systems through canals to ‘turn the Northeast green’ (Sneddon, 2003). 
 
Vietnam and Cambodia were concerned about the Khong Chi Mun project and 
Thailand’s ambitions to develop the mainstream. They contended that diverting the 
Mekong would be harmful to Tonle Sap and the Mekong Delta, the rice basket of 
Vietnam (Makim, 2002). The conflict of interest between Thailand, Cambodia and 
Vietnam contributed to a four-year deadlock in negotiations leading to the 1995 
Agreement. Thailand’s first move was to link Cambodia’s re-admission to the process 
to the re-negotiation of the rules and laws governing the MRC (Posey and Nitsch, 
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2005). Thailand held a powerful position in this negotiation as an upper riparian with 
a strong economy. Vietnam and Cambodia were both downstream with important 
economic and food security (fishing and agricultural) interests to protect. Thailand 
pushed to remove the UNDP as the executive agent of the body. This helped to 
neutralize the leadership of the United States and the international community 
represented by the UN in the Committee (Makim, 2002). Finally, Thailand demanded 
that the new Mekong Agreement dissolve the existing veto power that each nation 
had over mainstream dam development. 
 
This was initially opposed by a collation of the three downstream riparian states, 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. However, Thai bilateral diplomacy eventually won over 
Cambodia and Laos, and Vietnam was forced to accede to the removal of the veto 
and its replacement with a ‘prior notification’ of development. 
 
With the 1995 Agreement the MRC’s institutional structure developed into three 





Figure 2-2. Organizational Structure of the Mekong River Commission (MRC, 2009). 
 
As a result of the new protocols, MRC member countries had to now notify each 
other if they wished to engage in any major infrastructure developments (such as 
hydropower schemes) on the Mekong or tributaries, particularly if those 
developments may have significant transboundary impact for people or the 
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environment downstream. These new protocols are called the Procedures for 
Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) (MRC, 2003). 
 
The PNPCA protocols state that if a country is to build hydropower dams on a Mekong 
tributary, it must first notify the Joint Committee of the MRC. Any mainstream 
development, such as the currently proposed 11 mainstream hydropower dams, are 
subject to notification and a consultation agreement, with the aim of arriving at an 
agreement by the Joint Committee of the MRC. The National Mekong Committees are 
the submitting parties. The PNPCA is triggered when the preparation of a mainstream 
dam advances to the stage where the member country makes a submission to the 
MRC. In considering proposals for mainstream hydropower developments, the Joint 
Committee must avoid inter-state disputes by resolving and determining if the 
development: 
 Optimizes water use; 
 Provides better benefits than can be derived through cooperation and trade-
offs; 
 Has an established right of claim against further proposed uses; 
 Assesses the potential impacts on multi-stakeholder’s rights and interests; and 
 Provides for planning security. 
(MRC, 2003) 
 
During the wet and dry seasons, specific notification requirements are in place on the 
mainstream of the Mekong River. During the wet season, intra-Basin uses are subject 
to notification to the Joint Committee, and inter-Basin diversions are subject to prior 
consultation with the aim of arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee. On the 
other hand, during the dry season, intra-Basin uses are subject to prior consultation 
with the aim of arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee. Furthermore, the 
Joint Committee, prior to any proposed diversion, shall agree upon any inter-Basin 
diversion project. Should there be a surplus of water available in excess of the 
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proposed uses by all member states in any dry season (verified and unanimously 
confirmed as such by the Joint Committee), an inter-Basin diversion of such surplus 
can be made, subject to prior consultation (Burchi and Spreij, 2003). 
 
Although the PNPCA has removed the power of any member state to veto 
mainstream dams or diversions of another, the 1995 Mekong Agreement stresses in 
the statute’s definition of terms that the removal of the veto does not amount to a 
‘unilateral right to use water by any riparian without taking into account other 
riparian state rights’.  
 
Throughout the early 2000s and up to 2012, the MRC has continued to focus on 
monitoring and data collection activities and fisheries and flood control programs to 
develop regional expertise. The MRC has also expanded its mandate to focus on 
IWRM (an integrated Basin Development approach) and as a leader in the debate 
surrounding the Xayaburi Dam. The MRC’s role as a mediator of development is 
controversial. It has been criticized for being ineffective and failing to fulfil its 
mandate. These debates will be examined in greater detail in the empirical chapters. 
 
2.3.4 The Greater Mekong Sub-region Program 
 
Initiated in 1992, the keystone program of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the 
Mekong Basin is the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Programme. The GMS was 
created by Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yunnan Province of the 
People’s Republic of China with assistance from the ADB. The GMS Programme is a 
private sector led economic cooperation program with a long-term goal “to promote 




The nine priority areas of GMS interconnectivity are transport, telecommunications, 
energy, tourism, human resources, development, environment, agriculture, trade and 
investment (ADB, 2012). Projects completed between 1992 and 2011 have totalled 
costs of approximately $10 billion, about $5 billion has been put forward by the ADB, 
with the remaining sum being made up through regional and international 
investment (ADB, 2012). 
 
In terms of hydropower development, the chief initiatives of the GMS Programme 
have been the Mekong Power Grid and the associated support of the Nam Theun 2 
Dam. The Mekong Power Grid is part of the Regional Power Interconnection and 
Power Trade Arrangements of the GMS Programme. The objective of the grid is to 
“promote a commercially-based energy system that reliably and competitively 
supplies electricity to all areas of the Sub-Region in a manner that minimizes 
environmental and social costs”. (ADB, 2011). The grid consists of a series of 
transmission lines and hydropower schemes to allow Thailand and Vietnam to 
purchase electricity from Yunnan Province, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia. The ADB has 
estimated the cost of the grid at $43 billion. 
 
The Nam Theun 2 (NT2) dam is partially funded by the ADB’s program and is a 
component of the Mekong Power Grid. The development of the NT2 (1070MW), 
which opened in 2010, paved the way for private sector financing and construction of 
hydropower in Laos by establishing procedures, contracts and tariffs for large-scale 
investment in the country (see chapter 6). The GMS Program is part of a broader set 
of regional initiatives to bring the diverse nations of the Region together to synergize 
mutual economic growth. The Association of South-East Asian Nations, modelled 
after the European Union, expands beyond the borders of the Mekong Basin to 




2.3.5 The Association of South-East Asian Nations 
 
The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 
between Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. By 1999, ASEAN 
expanded to include Brunei, Laos, Burma, Cambodia and Vietnam encompassing a 
total of ten countries. The aims of ASEAN can be summarized as the promotion of 
economic growth, peace and stability across the Region. The principles governing the 
organization practice non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and 
respect for states’ sovereignty and independence (Tong and Chong, 2010). ASEAN is 
significantly contributing to economic growth in the Mekong Region. In 2010, the 
China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement formed the world’s largest free trade area, 
comprising 1.9 billion consumers and US $4.3 trillion in trade (Tong and Chong, 2010). 
 
In terms of hydropower in the Mekong Basin member countries, ASEAN promotes a 
renewable energy target of 15% among its members of which hydropower is a key 
component and hydropower issues, including the Xayaburi Dam, have been on the 
agenda at regional meetings (Abdullah, 2005). ASEAN has also been a supporter of 
the ADB’s GMS Program and the Mekong Power Grid. 
 
2.4 Current State of Hydropower Development in the Basin 
 
As outlined above, hydropower in the Basin has been under exploration for over half 
a century, but various combinations of insufficient capital, weak technical capacity, 
conflict and political instability impeded its expansion. This section offers a brief 
overview of some of the key issues in hydropower development in the Mekong Basin. 
These issues are examined in further detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In 1995, following 
the ratification of the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the reformation of the Regional 
Basin Organization (RBO), the MRC, it appeared that both mainstream and tributary 
dam development would gather pace. Shortly thereafter, development plans were 
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once again put on hold due to the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis that precipitated a 
serious devaluation of S.E. Asian currencies and eventually led to a global economic 
slowdown. 
 
With the gradual recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis hydropower appeared on 
the development agenda once again. In 2000, however, the influential World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) report (2000) called for a rethink about the risks and 
costs of large-scale dams across the world making hydropower an unpopular target 
for funding. Adding to the financing issues, from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, 
The World Bank (which funded the WCD Report) ceased funding large-scale 
hydropower projects due to environmental and social criticisms levied by the NGO 
sector (Park, 2005). 
 
From the mid-2000s, a number of factors contributed to a reawakening of the 
hydropower agenda both globally and in the Mekong Basin. The hydropower 
resurgence emerged in part due to a global push for clean, renewable energy sources, 
increased availability of capital, potential profits, and rising electricity demands. 
 
In 2005, the World Bank returned to large-scale infrastructure development in the 
region with its funding, along with the ADB, of the Nam Theun 2 project in Laos. In a 
2006 influential policy report, the World Bank called for regional hydropower to be 
expanded and estimated that only 10% of the Mekong Basin’s hydropower potential 
was in use (WB/ADB, 2006). These estimates further state that the Basin has the 
'flexibility and tolerance' to handle an increase in hydropower development including 
mainstream dams (WB/ADB, 2006). 
 
In 2005, there were an estimated 25 hydropower projects completed on the Mekong 
tributaries with approximately 35 in planning or feasibility stages with two 
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mainstream dams complete on the upper Mekong River in China; a relatively small 
number considering the size of the Basin. By 2012, at least 28 more dams were under 
construction, five mainstream dams were completed in China, and a further 150 
projects were identified as probable development sites including 11 mainstream 






Figure 2-3. Operational, under construction, and proposed hydropower dams on the 





2.4.1 China - Yunnan Province 
 
At the time of writing, the only existing mainstream dams are on the Mekong River 
were in China. The Lancang Jiang cascade is a series of eight dams, of which five have 
been completed and two are currently under construction (see figure 2-4.). When 
completed, the total installed capacity of the Lancang Jiang cascade will be 15,550 
MW. The electricity from these dams is slated for eastern China and Thailand through 
the Mekong Power Grid. There are a further 20 dams planned or under construction 
on the Lancang Jiang’s tributaries (Kummu and Varis, 2007). 
 
All of these dams were completed unilaterally without downstream consultation 
spurring intense protest from downstream riparian states. Protests culminated in the 
dry season of 2010, when significantly reduced river levels on the Mekong 
mainstream below China coincided with the filling of these mainstream dams (Hirsch, 
2010). China blamed the low river levels on unusually dry weather patterns, but did 
agree to increased data sharing and dialogue with the lower riparian states. Although 
China’s contribution to the flow of the Mekong is 16% in gross terms, this represents 
35% of the dry season flow and over 55% of the sediment flux, which is vital to the 




Figure 2-4 Map of Mekong River mainstream dams located in China 
(Source International Rivers, 2010). 
 
Goh (2011) posits that China’s development of the Lancang Jiang Cascade has political 
and ecological consequences for the downstream riparian states. Ecologically the 
dams, which are built in an earth quake zone, impound large volumes of water. It has 
been estimated that the Xiowan and Nuozhadu dam will take up to 10 years to fill 
holding back 50% of the water flow during this period. The filling of the Manwan Dam 
in 1993 prompted Thai authorities to bring forward complaints and demands to 
Beijing in order to reduce downstream impacts that occurred during the dry season. 
 
Politically, the Lancang Jiang cascade allows China to control the quantity of water 
reaching the Lower Basin. This is extremely important for livelihoods, food security 
and for the economies of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Räsänen et al. (2012) found 
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that the Lancang Jiang cascade increased the dry season discharge by 34% to 155% 
and decreased the wet season discharge by 29% to 36% thereby altering river flood 
pulse timing and characteristics. The impact the current dams are having on the 
fisheries, hydrology in the Basin, and the delta are still not fully understood, but will 
undoubtedly be closely watched by lower riparian states over the coming years. No 
formal agreements exist between China and the lower riparian states on the 
management of the Basin, and China has stated that the Lancang Jiang cascade is a 
national issue refusing to discuss its development.  
 
China’s development of the Lancang Jiang provides useful examples of the hydro-
political relations in the Basin. This development also highlights the lack of Basin 
planning and the importance of transboundary impacts. Further downstream, 
Mekong politics have resulted in Thailand’s hydropower development coming to a 




Thailand’s domestic hydropower development took place primarily from 1960 to 
1990 (Hirsch, 1995). In the 1960s and 1970s, avoiding much of the conflict of its 
neighbouring countries and with the support of the Mekong Committee, Thailand was 
able to construct a number of large hydropower dams across the country, the 
majority of which were located in the Mekong Basin (see Table 2-2.). Thailand’s 
domestic hydropower ambitions; however, came to an end with the development of 







Table 2-2 Existing Hydropower dams in Thailand over 30 MW.  
(Source: Pongtepupathum, 2012) 
Name Completion date  Installed capacity  
Bhumibol Dam 1964 749 MW 
Chulabhorn Dam 1972 40 MW 
Lam Takhong Dam 1974 500 MW 
The Pak Mun Dam 1994 136 MW 
Rasi Salai Dam 1994 MW unknown 
Queen Sirikit Dam 1974 500 MW 
Sirindhorn Dam 1971 36 MW 
Srinagarind Dam 1980 720 MW 
Vajiralongkorn Dam 1984 300 M 
 
The Rasi Sali and Pak Mun Dam were developed in the North-east of Thailand as part 
of the Kong-Chi-Mun Water Diversion Project. Their purpose was to supply 
hydroelectric power, irrigate land and reduce flooding in North-eastern Thailand 
(Molle and Floch, 2008b). Perhaps the most controversial of the Mekong Committee’s 
projects, the Kong-Chi-Mun project was intended to install a series of over 20 dams 
and weirs designed to produce hydropower and irrigate an area of 796,800 ha across 
15 provinces (ibid). The project included controversial plans to divert the Mekong 
River into the Chi and Mun rivers. This plans raised a number of concerns from 
downstream Cambodia and Vietnam. The project’s aim was part of a larger 
Government plan to turn the dry and relatively poor Northeast Region of Thailand, 




The first two significant dams of the Kong-Chi-Mun project, the Rasi Sali, and Pak Mun 
Dams caused significant controversy. The dams failed to live up to a number of 
promises from the Thai government. They displaced thousands of people, destroyed 
the local fisheries and ruined a large portion of agricultural land due to salinization 
brought about by reservoir flooding from the dam (see Figure 2-5).  
 
The environmental and social impact of the dams invoked massive civil society 
protests in the country and culminated in a 99 day protest in Bangkok by the 
‘Assembly of the Poor’ that won major concessions including opening of the sluice 
gates of the Pak Mun Dam (Missingham, 2003). The Assembly of the Poor’s success in 
protesting against the Kong-Chi-Mun project significantly contributed to domestic 
hydropower becoming politically unpopular in Thailand (ibid). 
 
Figure 2-5 Expectation and Real Situation of the Pak Mun Dam.   
Source WCD, 2000 
Expectation 
 Cost $135 m 
 Mitigation cost $11m 
 Dry Season HEP: 136 MW 
 Irrigation 29,500 ha 
 Displaced families 241 hhs 
 Reservoir fisheries 100kg/ha/yr 
 Natural fisheries: fish ladder, first 
for a Mekong dam 
 
Real situation 
 Cost $233 m 
 Mitigation cost $32 m 
 Dry season HEP 40 MW 
 Irrigation None 
 Displaced families: 1700 hhs 
 Reservoir fisheries 10kg/ha/yr 
 Wild fish 169 of 265 species 




As a consequence of this major civil opposition to dams Thailand’s domestic 
hydropower development is currently off the political agenda. The Thai state and its 





Laos began its hydropower development in the late 1960s when the Mekong 
Committee developed the 30 MW Nam Ngum Dam (Jacobs, 1995). Completed in 
1971 and expanded in two phases, 1976 and 1996, to its current size of 155 MW, the 
Nam Ngum Dam inundated an area of 450 km² and displaced 800 families (ibid). The 
dam’s impacts, which were exacerbated by wartime conflict, included no 
compensation for affected villagers and no clearing of the flooded area, which 
ultimately resulted in reduced fish yields in the reservoir with negative impacts on the 
food security of the Region’s 80,000 inhabitants. The Nam Ngum was a contentious 
dam for Laos, but also provided an important revenue stream for the country. During 
much of the 1990s, the dam produced one-quarter of the country’s foreign exchange 
income in electricity sales to Thailand (ibid). 
 
As a consequence of regional conflict and lack of financing, only four dams over 30 
MW were constructed in Laos between 1970 and 2003 (Haas, 2008). These include: 
The Nam Mang 3 (50 MW), the Nam Leuk (60 MW), Houay Ho (150 MW), and the 
Nam Theun Hinboun (210 MW). Until 2007, existing dams in Laos accounted for 
approximately 2% of its hydropower potential as estimated by the MRC (Haas, 2008).  
 
Since 2007, hydropower development has been increasing rapidly in Laos, with at 
least 65 dams planned or under construction (See Table 2-3).  
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Table 2-3 Existing hydropower projects as well as new projects planned for 
domestic consumption and for export. 
 Source Department of Water Resources and Environment Administration (DWREA) 
(2008). 
      
Project Name  Location MW (Planned) Progress 
  (Province)  Year of  
    Commercial  
    Operation  
      
 Selabam   5 1960 Operational 
Nam Dong   1 1960 Operational 
Nam Ngum 1  Vientiane 155 1971 Operational 
Se Xet 1  Saravane 45 1990 Operational 
Nam Phao   1.6 1995 Operational 
Nam Ko   1.5 1996 Operational 
Theun- Hinboun  Khammouan 210 1998 Operational 
Houay Ho   150 1999 Operational 
Nam Leuk  Vientiane 60 2000 Operational 
Nam Mang 3  Vientiane 40 2005 Operational 
Se Xet 2  Saravane 76 2008  Operational 
Nam Theun 2  Khammouan 1070 2009 Operational 
Sekamane 3  Xekong 250 2010 Operational 
Nam Ngum 2  Vientiane 615 2010 Operational 
 Nam Ngum 3 Vientiane 460 2013 
 Contract Agreement 
(CA) and Power 
Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) under 
     negotiation, tariff 




Project Name Location MW (Planned) Progress 
     
 Nam Ngiep 1  Bolikhamxay 260 2013  PPA 
    
under negotiation, 
tariff 
    concluded 
 Theun Hinboun  Bolikhamxay 350 2011 PPA 
Expansion    under negotiation 
 Nam Theun 1  Bolikhamxay 520 2013 CA and PPA under 
    negotiation, tariff 
    concluded 
Sepian- Xenamnoi  Attapeu and 390 2014 MoU 3.8.2006 
 Champasak    
 Nam Mo  Xieng 105 2012 MoU 3.4.1997, PDA 
  Khouang   18.11.1999, CA and 
    PPA under negotiation 
 Nam Mang 1 Bolikhamxay 50 2012  MoU 8.2.2007 
Nam Ngum 5 
Vientiane 
and 120 2011 CA 10.4.2007 
 Xieng    
  Kouang    
Nam Lik 2 Vientiane 100 2011 CA 30.10.2006 
Nam Ou Cascade Phongsaly 680  Under Construction 
 Sekong 4 Xekong 440   MoU 3.9.2006 
 Sekong 5 Xekong 250   MoU 22.12.2005 
Sekaman 1 Attapeu 468  MoU 17.3.2006 
Nam Kong 1 Attapeu 238  MoU 22.12.2005 
Nam Kong 3 Attapeu 35  MoU 22.12.2005 
Dak Emeule Sekong 185  Research study 




Project Name Location MW (Planned) Progress 
 Prabang    
Tat Saleng Savannakhet 3.2  MoU 22.7.2005 
Xepone Savannakhet 70+30  MoU 10.11.2004 
Houay Champi Champasak 2  MoU 29.9.2005 
Houay Yen Champasak 2   MoU 26.5.2006 
Nam Ham Sayaboury 2.5  MoU 6.4.2005 
Nam Hao Huaphanh 5.1  MoU 18.8.2004 
Houay Katam Champasak 33  MoU 5.4.2006 
Nam Tha 1 Oudomxay 263   
Nam Beng Oudomxay 50  MoU 19.6.2006 
Nam Ngum 4 Xieng 250  Research study 
Nam Sane 3 Bolikhamxay 60  MoU 30.6.2006 
Xe Katam Champasak 61 2011 MoU 30.9.2004 
Houay Lamphan Gnai Champasak 75  Research study 
Xe Kaman 4 Xekong 155  MoU 19.12.2006 
Xe Kaman 2 Xekong 135  Research study 
Nam Nguio Xieng 20  MoU 12.10.2004 
 Kouang    
Xe Kong 3 Xekong 150  Research study 
Xedone 2 Salavanh 54  Research study 
Xe Sou Attapeu 95  Research study 
Xe Neua Kammuan 40  MoU 16.5.2006 
Nam Sim Houaphanh 8  MoU 14.2.2003 
Xe Bang Nouane Salavanh 80  MoU 28.8.2005 
Nam Theun 4 Bolikhamxay 80  Research study 
Nam Ngiep 2 Vientiane 155  MoU 16.11.2006 
Nam Mouane Bolikhamxay 137  Research study 




Project Name Location MW (Planned) Progress 
Nam Bak 1 Vientiane 115  MoU 11.4.2007 
Nam Bak 2 Vientiane 80  MoU 11.4.2007 
Nam Ngum D Vientiane 60  MoU 28.1.2008 
Nam Lik 1 Vientiane 60  MoU 7.7.2006 
Nam Long Luangnamtha 2.5  MoU with province 
Nam Khan 1 Luang 115  Research study 
 Prabang    
Nam Khan 2 (EdL) Luang 130  MoU 13.10.2006 
 Prabang    
Nam Khan 3 (EdL) Luang 95  MoU 13.10.2006 
 Prabang    
Nam Seuang 1 Luang 41  MoU 4.5.2007 
 Prabang    
Nam Seuang 2 Luang 134  MoU 4.5.2007 
 Prabang    
Nam Pha Luangnamtha 70  MoU 2.4.2007 
Nam Phak  40  MoU 31.5.2007 
Pak Lay (Mekong 
mainstream) 
Xayabuly and 
Vientiane 1,320  MoU 11.6.2007 
Nam Mung 1 Vientiane 60  MoU 8.2.2007 
Don Sahong Champasak 240  MoU 23.3.2006 
Tha Kho Phongsaly 35  Research study 
Tat Somphamit Champasak 56  Research study 
Xayabury (Mekong Sayaboury 1,260  MoU 4.5.2007 
main stream)     
Luang Prabang Luang 1,410  Research study 
(Mekong main 




Project Name Location MW (Planned) Progress 
Upstream Nam Emun Sekong 23   
Midstream Nam Emun Sekong 115   
 
 
As of 2012, Laos had 14 operational hydropower dams with combined installed 
capacity of approximately 2,500 MW (Vientiane Times, 2012c). All the existing dams 
in Laos are on tributaries of the Mekong, however, the Xayaburi Dam, the first 
mainstream dam on the lower Mekong, is currently under construction. Laos has 
signed MoUs to provide 7,000 MW of electricity after 2015 to Thailand, and 3,000 
MW of electricity to Vietnam by 2020 (as well as a number of others to IPPs). China 
and Cambodia have also signalled their desire to purchase electricity from Laos. A 
detailed discussion of the key dams in Laos and the political ecology surrounding their 
development and operation will follow in the empirical chapters. Just downstream of 
Laos, Cambodia also has a large hydropower potential. Like Laos, Cambodia’s 




On account of the violence and conflict of the Khmer Rouge regime from the 1970s to 
the 1990s, Cambodia’s hydropower had been relatively unexplored. A 2008 study 
supported by the MRC estimated the country’s potential at approximately 10,000 
MW with 50% deriving from Mekong mainstream development (Sovanna, 2010). 
Cambodia currently has four existing or nearly completed hydropower dams over 30 
MW. The Kamchay (193 MW), Stung Atay (120 MW), the Lower Stung Russey (235 
MW), and the Stung Tatay (246 MW), all of which are being developed by Chinese 
interests (Sovanna, 2010). There are plans for at least a dozen more large dams in 
Cambodia, primarily funded by Chinese and Vietnamese investors. The Stung Treng 
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Dam and the Sambor Dam are the two proposed mainstream dams under 
investigation.  
 
Vietnam plays a dual position of both an upstream and downstream riparian in the 
Basin. Vietnam has developed its hydropower in much of the country, but extensive 
potential exists upstream of Cambodia in the highlands. As highlighted in the country 
profiles above, however, Vietnam has important agricultural assets in the Mekong 
Delta. These assets are under threat as they are downstream of other major planned 




From 1959 to 1999, Vietnam had approximately 500 dams and weirs in the country 
for hydroelectric and irrigation purposes (Dao, 2011). From 2000, however, the 
Government implemented an intensive program of hydropower and irrigation 
development, raising the number of dams to 1967 by 2009 (Dao, 2010). By 2025 the 
Government is planning to develop total hydropower capacity to 20,178 MW 
(Vietnam Institute of Energy, 2006). Currently, hydropower accounts for about 40% of 
the country’s total electricity production (VUSTA, 2007). Although dams in Vietnam 
are spread across the state primarily throughout the highlands, the ones of concern 
to the Mekong Basin are located in the southern part of the country known as the 3-S 
Basin. 
 
The Sesan, Sre Pok and Sekong River basins forms the 3-S Basin. The 3 –S Basin, which 
covers an area of 78,650 km² is shared by, Cambodia 33%, Laos 29%, and Vietnam 
38% (Wyatt and Baird, 2007). The Sesan and Sre Pok rivers originate in the 
Vietnamese highlands and join the Sekong river from Laos about 40 km before 
meeting the Mekong River. The 3-S Basin is the Mekong River’s largest tributary 




Vietnam currently has three hydropower dams (over 30 MW) in operation within the 
3-S Basin. Yali Falls (720 MW), Se San 3 (260 MW) and Se San 3A (96 MW) (Dao, 
2011). There are currently, five more dams under construction. The Yali Falls dam is 
perhaps the most controversial of the Vietnamese dams in the Mekong Basin. 
Completed in 2000, the Yali Falls dam is located in the Vietnamese central highlands 
just 80 km from the Cambodian border and is the second largest dam in Vietnam. 
Construction funding was provided by Russia and the Ukraine with the World Bank 
funding a transmission line. The 720 MW dam required the resettlement of over 
8,500 people upstream in the catchment area with little to no compensation paid to 
affected villagers (Wyatt and Baird, 2007). 
 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) only considered impacts 6 km 
downstream of the dam, which when completed significantly altered the hydrology of 
the river thereby impacting river communities and their livelihoods in Cambodia 
(Wyatt and Baird, 2007). In 2009, poorly planned water releases from the dam that 
included no notification to downstream villages resulted in the loss of life, livelihoods, 
and livestock affecting about 55,000 people downstream in Cambodia (Hirsch, 2010). 
Yali Fall’s track record as a poorly planned and operated dam has attracted much 
criticism from NGOs (see. International Rivers 2000, Oxfam, 2013 etc.). Vietnam was 
pressured by the ADB to conduct a second EIA on the dam as a prerequisite for 
funding the Sesan 4 dam (360 MW). Even with completion of the second EIA, 
Vietnamese and Russian investors have decided to fund the project, essentially 
bypassing the ADB requirements (G3, 2011). The Sesan 4 is currently under 
construction. 
 
At the time of writing there is a committee formed with the purpose of coordinating 
and informing future releases of water from the dam, but reports from a member of 




While hydropower development and decision making in the Basin is not as extensive 
as other major river basins, it has attracted a significant amount of research and 
numerous critiques. The next section briefly explores the literature surrounding 
hydropower development in relation to this research. 
 
2.5 Brief Overview of Hydropower Development Literature 
 
Extensive literature has examined natural resource development and decision-making 
(See Mitchell, 1998; Smith and McDonough, 2001; Cheng et al., 2003). The literature 
surrounding natural resource development often focuses on how to improve the 
equity and outcomes of the process. The literature emphasizes the importance of 
fairness and public participation as well as concepts of place and scale. By contrast 
there has been a very narrow focus on the issue from a social science or geographical 
perspective, and very little analysis of what drives and shapes the politics that enable 
hydropower development. 
 
Allan (2005) identified five water management paradigms that have characterised a 
sequence of approaches to water resource development in neo-liberal political 
economies. These five paradigms are: pre-modern, industrial modernity, and three 
stages of reflexive modernity - including green, economic, and political and intuitional 
reflexive modernity (see figure 2-6).  Allan (ibid) argues that during the industrial 
modernity paradigm, economies are inspired by priorities captured in the term 
hydraulic mission. In other words, they secure water and seek to control and exploit it 
as a resource. Although the global North has moved past its hydraulic mission phase 
and is well into the phase of reflexive modernity, typified by politics and institutional 
management-led approaches and environmental concerns, it can be argued that 




Hydraulic missions are typically characterized by engineering-led, large-scale 
infrastructure projects such as dams. Phases of hydraulic missions spawn hydraulic 
bureaucracies, sometimes called ‘hydro-cracies’, which are often headed by 
influential decision makers (Molle, 2008). Such hydro-cracies are often a mix of 
private and state actors, including ministries/departments of irrigation, energy, 
water, politicians, land elites, development, state and private banks, and construction 
companies (ibid). Decision-making by these alliances is not transparent, nor are 
decisions made in open, public forums. Often these actors’ processes are accused of 
lacking transparency. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, this outcome is especially the 
case in political systems and states that tightly control freedom of the press, 








Over the past decade, focused primarily on the Mekong Basin, a number of 
researchers have used a geographical lens to gain deeper understandings of the 
hydropower development process. Koch’s (2002) analysis of the politics of water and 
energy discusses the inherent complexity in decision-making surrounding large-scale 
projects such as dams. Koch (ibid) further emphasizes that the potential benefits and 
costs of hydropower create a political climate that influences the impacts and 
outcomes of development. Magee (2006) developed the idea of ‘power sheds’ as a 
way of understanding how politics and economics legitimize and delegitimize 
discourses and actors across different scales in hydropower development in Yunnan, 
China. Magee’s (ibid) analysis of hydropower development in the upper Mekong 
Basin highlighted the actors, steps and overlap within the process and the 
“geographic imaginaries in formulating legitimizing, implementing, and in some cases 
contesting development strategies” (ibid:143). Magee identified that Chinese 
hydropower development firms were increasingly driven by market incentives as 
opposed to political directives. The increasingly influential role of the private sector in 
hydropower development in the Mekong Basin will be explored further in the 
Chapter 5 and 6. Magee (ibid) reaffirmed the difficulty of studying hydropower 
development processes due to their closed nature and lack of transparency. 
 
While Hirsch published over 85 reports and papers on Mekong Basin development 
(1995; 2004; 2006; 2010 etc.).  His research tends to focus on the MRC and the 
impacts of hydropower development. A very broad summary of Hirsch’s almost two 
decades of research in the Mekong Basin would highlight that hydropower 
development in the Basin prioritizes economic growth and development goals over 
environmental and social concerns. Hirsch’s work further highlights the increasing 
role of the private sector, competing versions of national interest and the weakness 
of the MRC in fulfilling its mandate. 
 
Grumbine et al.’s (2012) broad analysis of the drivers of change and governance 
challenges in the Mekong Basin suggest that hydropower development and decision-
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making has been influenced by demographics, human development, water and food 
security, economic integration, and climate change combined with new financing and 
inadequate governance. They conclude that the Region suffers from a lack of 
politically-aware, transboundary institutional structures for water governance and 
participatory development that incorporate the multiple uses of water. 
 
Research into the meso-scale drivers and enablers of hydropower development in the 
Mekong Basin appears to be limited in its analysis by the closed nature of the process. 
The increasing role of the private sector, new finance, a lack of transparency, and 
poor governance and participation are re-emerging themes. This particular doctoral 
research aims to use a political ecology approach and the Impact Assessment process 
as a starting point. Ultimately, this research will push past the closed nature of the 
development process in order to gain a more detailed understanding of the meso-
scale mechanisms that have driven and enabled hydropower development in Laos. 
  
Within hydropower development, the Impact Assessment process is a key point of 
engagement for actors to defend and contest hydropower development. This 
outcome is partly a result of the legal requirement of impact assessments and the 
expectations of the process; it is a consistent, internationally-recognized, feature of 
large-scale developments around the globe.  International, regional and, increasingly, 
local actors have expectations on outcomes of the process and the level of 
information they will disclose. There are some common elements of impact 
assessments carried out in developing economies where the state’s ability to require 
and carry out impact assessments is often dependent on the support of international 
donors. Advocacy groups will suggest that poor hydropower development processes 
are illustrated by cases in which the Impact Assessment (IA) process is carried out 
after construction (or when it did not take place). For example, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, International Rivers has criticized the Houay Ho project for its lack of an IA 
process before construction started. 
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The IA process is important because it offers a public forum in which contested 
information can be discussed with reference to hydropower development. The IA 
process is designed to predict and mitigate the social and environmental impacts of 
hydropower. Where impacts cannot be mitigated, hydropower developers, such as 
governments and industry, will often downplay the IA process’ predicted impacts and 
elevate the benefits of the development. 
 
Of course, the science that informs the IA process, like all science, is subject to 
critique and it is often a point of contention between advocates and proponents of 
hydropower. The IA process is highly political. Moreover, the IA process is seen as one 
of the few opportunities for participation, whether encouraged or forced, in 
hydropower development. NGOs and advocacy groups are often excluded from the 
hydropower development process, especially in the politically closed states of the 
Mekong Basin. The IA process for hydropower projects is one of the few 
opportunities for civil society to engage in dialogue with decision-makers. 
 
This study uses the hydropower Impact Assessment process as a means of exploring 
the cross-scalar linkages and mechanisms that drive and enable hydropower 
development in the Mekong Basin. IAs implementation across the meso-scale helps 
to provide links to mechanisms at regional scales and their impacts at local scales. The 
following section highlights the importance of impact assessments in the evaluation 
of Mekong Basin hydropower development. 
 
2.6 EIAs and their Relevance to Hydropower in the Mekong 
 
This study uses the Impact Assessment process as a point of departure for the 
examination of meso-scale drivers and enablers of hydropower development in the 
Mekong Basin. However, the study has not attempted to add to the existing literature 
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on impact assessments. The literature review below is included primarily to provide 
context and understanding for those reading this study. 
 
IAs are understood to be recommendations or reports on development proposals or 
other major actions that may have social or environmental impacts. The primary 
purpose of IAs is to allow the relevant stakeholders, including Government officials, 
developers, funders and all concerned populations to understand and identify 
measures that could mitigate the negative potential environmental and social impacts 
of a proposed project in order to promote sustainable development (Salzman and 
Thompson, 2006).  
 
The most widely practised form of Impact Assessment is the EIA. The EIA process 
originated in 1969 with the passing of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
in the United States (Canter, 1996). EIAs emerged because of the growing concern of 
environmental impacts of development that began in the 1960s and further 
developed into the environmental movement of the 1980s (ibid). The first EIAs stated 
that “any action by federal Government agency likely to have some impact on human 
environment had first to be subjected to a balanced, interdisciplinary and publicly 
available assessment of these outcomes” (Goldman and Baum, 2000:544). 
 
Since the development of EIAs in the United States after 1969, similar guidelines have 
spread across the globe. Currently, the EIA is a well-established practice for large 
development projects and is practised in more than 100 countries and by numerous 
international funding agencies (Cashmore et al., 2004). In 1989, in response to 
concerns about the impacts of worldwide development projects, the WB introduced 
an environmental assessment policy requiring an EIA to be undertaken for 
development projects funded by the WB (Alshuwaikhat, 2005). Much later, in 2002, 
the ADB formally recognized the need to incorporate environmental considerations 
into national and sub-national development planning (King et al., 2007). 
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Although EIAs are still widely practised around the world, the term ‘Impact 
Assessment’ has emerged to include a number of processes that focus on more than 
environmental concerns. These include social impact assessments, life cycle impact 
assessments, and Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA). Although 
many types and definitions of impact assessments exist, there are a number of 
common focal points. When identifying the objectives and goals of the project, 
Mitchell (1997:86) states that IAs should: 
 Describe the environmental and social changes that might occur with or 
without the development. 
 Identify actions to mitigate or eliminate negative impacts and highlight areas 
for monitoring, and 
 Identify impacts that have a temporal dimension so that developments may 
be modified during the planning stages or changes may occur in the social or 
natural environment. 
 
The focal points of IAs such as identifying and mitigating impacts are only one 
element of the process. There are a number of important elements that need to be 
considered during the implementation of IAs. Gibson (1993:16) has identified seven 
key principles to improve the design of impact assessments. These principles highlight 
the complexity involved in a detailed IA process: 
1. An integrated approach: It is important to understand the costs and benefits 
of impacts it is important to look at them on both spatial and temporal scales. 
Impact analysis must take into account local, national, and global scales as 
well as short medium and long-term implications. The integrated approach 
further highlights a need to focus on social, cultural, and economic impacts as 
well as environmental. 
2. All initiatives should include environmental, social, and economic 
considerations: This applies to public and private sector initiatives. Policies 
and programs as well as projects should be subject to IAs. 
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3. Impact Assessments should focus on identifying the best options – Options 
identified as `acceptable` often involve unacceptable environmental and social 
costs. It is important to identify options that mitigate impacts even at the cost 
of the project. 
4. Impact Assessments should be based in law and be enforceable: The IA 
process can be a key determinate in a project’s success and investors financial 
returns. Under this backdrop of money, the IA process becomes vulnerable to 
outside influences. Well-defined laws and strong enforcement mechanisms 
ensure the IA will stand up to potential attacks. 
5. The assessment and decision-making process must be open and participative: 
An open and participatory process will encourage greater acceptance among 
stakeholders. Participatory processes further allow for scrutiny and a diversity 
of opinions to be considered. 
6. After the approval process, monitoring must be conducted and terms and 
conditions must be enforceable: Without monitoring of the project the IA 
process becomes a hollow bureaucratic step with no value. 
7. Efficient implementation is imperative: IAs that are overly time consuming or 
cumbersome will breed hostility. The process should be completed in 
organized and efficient manner so as to encourage confidence and 
compliance. 
 
Gibson’s principles for IAs set a high standard for the IA process. This high standard is 
important in IAs because they play such a key role in protecting livelihoods, cultures, 
and the biodiversity that is often not given due consideration during planning or 
implementation of projects. 
 
The dominant form of IAs in the Mekong is EIA. Despite its name, which draws 
attention to environmental factors, EIA can be defined as a process that identifies the 
likely environmental and social impacts of development. According to Wathern 
(1988), for the EIA process to be effective and legitimate it must be completed before 
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the development begins and its findings should be conveyed to all stakeholders. The 
EIA process is designed to ensure that development projects are both sustainable and 
that they properly mitigate impacts they impose on people and the environment. As 
with all tools, there are many limitations to impact assessments. 
 
EIAs have been widely criticized in the literature (Peets, 1999; Benson, 2003; 
Christensen P, Kørnøv L, Nielsen, 2005). Jay, Jones, Slinn and Wood’s (2007) past and 
present review of EIAs states that the main critiques of EIAs are in relation to their 
inconsistent prioritization of factors and the inherent bias in the interpretation of 
impacts. EIA’s are often considered as value laden as they are scientific. Furthermore, 
EIAs have been criticized for being too singularly-focused on ecological impacts to the 
relative neglect of social impacts. This is part of the reason for the emergence of 
other processes such as the social impact assessment. 
 
Although the definition of EIA encompasses both environmental and social factors, 
literature and practice suggest that EIAs have shifted away from social impacts to 
primarily focus on measuring biophysical environmental impacts (Jay et al., 2006). 
According to Jay et al. (2006), a measure of an EIA’s success can be determined by the 
extent to which environmental considerations are taken into account during decision-
making and whether or not EIAs are resulting in restoring and maintaining 
environmental quality. 
 
The success in the deployment of EIAs has been reviewed extensively in the literature 
in case studies and broad reviews and reports. Cashmore et al. (2004) meta-study of 
EIA effectiveness concluded that EIAs made only a moderate impact on project 
decisions. Wood’s (2003) study of seven EIA systems from around the world found 
that EIAs were often conveniently circumvented by decision-makers. Wood (ibid) also 
found that political factors often marginalized the findings of EIAs. 
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In Laos IA are mandated by law and strong policies exist to regulate IAs. These include 
the Environmental Protection Law (1999), the Water and Water Resources Law 
(1996), the Electricity Law (1997), and the Forestry Law (1996). All of these laws and 
policies mandate EIAs for all development projects that will potentially impact the 
environment. The EIA Decree (2010) specifies the components and process of an EIA 
and requires all investment projects in Laos to undertake an EIA (Campbell, 2011). 
 
Although IAs are framed on the basis of good practice and scientific findings, there is 
a set of additional, political and financial issues that often underpin their 
implementation. Beattie (1995) goes further by identifying three characteristics of all 
EIAs explaining that EIAs, 
 1. “…are not science, 
2. …always contain unexamined and unexplained value assumptions”, and 
3. “…will always be political” (109). 
Beattie (ibid) posits that by recognizing the political nature and bias within EIAs they 
will become stronger tools. Often, however, these characteristics are ignored by 
actors. This is because of the power that is vested within the IA process. The power 
implicit in IA deployments has attracted the attention of outside interests and made 
them susceptible to many outside forces. Foran et al. (2010) found that, within the 
Mekong, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments are affected by politics and 
issues of corruption. To varying levels, IAs are also subject to different standards of 
quality control. Furthermore, the current IA concession system in Lao has little 
transparency. Foran et al.’s (2010:18) study revealed that “hydropower concessions 
appear to be assigned to concessionaries on an ad hoc basis by Lao Government 
officials, rather than in a competitive or merit process …”. 
 
In the Mekong, as in many other places, there is an inherent bias in the EIA process. 
According to Karjalainen and Jarvikoski (2010), EIAs should provide an unbiased 
79 
 
analysis. In most cases, EIAs are written by a consultant hired by the lead developer 
with occasional input by the Government. This creates a serious potential source of 
bias and a conflict of interest as both the developer and the Government are paying 
the EIA consultant to write a report for a development in which they have vested 
interests. In the case of large hydropower developments, these vested interests can 
represent billions of dollars. Furthermore, the consultant that writes the EIA has often 
been hired by the project developer to manage the social and environmental impacts 
of the project. The EIA contracts themselves are also worth millions of dollars. 
Therefore, the consultant has multiple reasons to write EIAs that downplay the social 
and environmental costs of hydropower developments such as dams 
(O’Faircheaallaigh, 2010). 
 
Other problems are also apparent. As the EIA consultant is working directly for the 
developer and indirectly for the Government, they both have an opportunity to 
review the EIA before, or if, it is made public. This opportunity allows them to affect 
the process, enabling them to apply pressure on the consultant to change the EIA to 
suit their needs.  
 
As McCully (2001) states the consultant has a vested interest writing EIAs that 
appease their developers and ensure they will be hired for future work. The bias and 
conflicting interests that impact the EIA process have the potential to steer the EIA 
process, creating inaccuracies and possibly downplaying the social and environmental 
impacts of dams. Examples of how this bias has played out in the Mekong will be 
explored in the empirical chapters. 
 
Over the past decade, there have been increasing calls from academics and NGOs in 
the Region for more holistic IAs that incorporate the social impacts of hydropower 
dam construction. The desire for a shift away from EIAs to a more inclusive 
assessment has come about because EIAs have not effectively mitigated the social or 
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environmental costs of hydropower dams. EIAs often do not take into account the 
number people displaced from dam projects or the livelihoods lost as a consequence 
of the changed hydrology of the river and Basin. In response to these criticisms, 
Environmental Social Impact Assessments (ESIA), which include socio-economic 
aspects in the assessment, are increasingly being lauded by the MRC and donors as a 
more comprehensive form of Impact Assessment. Despite this outside pressure for 
ESIAs, EIAs remain the dominate tool. As will be explored in Chapter 6, the political 
nature of the IA process and the degree to which mechanisms influence means that 
adjusting the type of IA used may improve influence its effectiveness.  
 
Well documented critiques and analysis of EIA application and their value in global 
and local development have not led directly to an examination of their role in 
Mekong Basin hydropower development. Xikun and Min’s (2008) Transboundary 
Environmental Impact Assessment of Hydroelectric Resources Exploitation in Multi-
Jurisdictional River: A Case Study of the Lancang-Mekong River only emphasizes the 
need for transboundary EIAs and does not problematize EIAs in the Region. 
Campbell’s (2011) analysis of EIAs in Laos and their implications for hydropower 
development is one of the first studies to challenge EIAs in Laos, linking them to 
issues with hydropower decision-making. Campbell concludes that the roots of EIAs 
are not suited to the Laos context. EIAs draw from western structures and influences 
that are not easily adapted to political and economic realities of developing countries. 
She further states that EIAs are often conducted as token procedures to fulfil basic 
funding requirements. 
 
Initial research by Foran et al. into EIA processes in the Mekong seems to reflect the 
general findings of Wood (2003) and Cashmore (2004) and the more specific regional 
findings of Campbell (2011). EIA processes in the Mekong appear to be influenced by 
a number of political and economic factors that have marginalized their findings and 
influenced the Impact Assessment process. As stated previously, the aim of this study 
is not to contribute to the extensive literature surrounding impact assessments or 
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EIAs. Rather, it seeks to use IAs as a window to understand how hydropower 
development has been influenced in Laos by drivers and enablers at the meso-scale 




The Mekong Basin is one of the world’s most important river basins. It is home to 
millions of people and its water ecosystems enjoy a rich biodiversity. It also has a long 
history of dialogue regarding its water resources development, especially with 
respect to hydropower. Over the last 60 years the Basin has undergone significant 
transformations, both within its individual member states and across the Region. New 
actors have emerged, and through the politics, conflicts, and economics of 
hydropower development, some actors have benefited while others have not. As a 
result of the region’s recent, violent conflicts and turmoil, there has been limited 
development of a Basin-wide hydraulic mission. During the past decade, however, 
there has been a surge in interest in investment and activity surrounding large-scale 
hydropower dams. Actors have emerged to occupy funding gaps and push 
development forward at a rapid pace.  
 
This new era of dam building is occurring in a Basin where the riparian states are as 
politically and economically diverse as ever. The rapidly growing and rich economies 
of Thailand, China, and Vietnam are leading this surge. The key RBO, the MRC, 
appears to be struggling to keep pace. Within this rapid expansion of hydropower 
planning and development, the Impact Assessment process is one of the few 
windows through which to access the world of hydropower development. The IA 
process has also emerged as a point of contestation over hydropower. It is considered 
a key engagement topic for civil society and actors concerned about the social and 
environmental costs of the Basin’s rapid hydropower expansion. However, the 
process is susceptible to bias and influence of those stakeholders that enjoy political 
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power. Resulting asymmetries are inherent in large-scale infrastructure development 
that occurs in non-transparent circumstances. It is through the window of the IA 
process that the following chapters will view the political and economic forces that 
drive and enable rapid hydropower development in Laos. The next chapter presents 
the theoretical framework for the study along with insights from geography’s role in 



















3 Political Ecology and Geography’s Role in Analysing the Mekong Basin 
Hydropower Debate 
 




The chapter begins by introducing political ecology, the theoretical approach 
deployed in this study. Theory helps to make it possible to see the facts; it shapes and 
structures knowledge.  This chapter examines the emergence of political ecology 
theory and shows how the theory treats narratives and scale, before analysing its 
application to water resource allocation. Specifically, the chapter will examine how 
the ecological elements of the allocation of resources is in itself a political process. 
This study focuses on the political ecology of hydropower in the Mekong Basin. The 
chapter concludes with a literature review of the contributions that geography has 
made to understanding the Mekong Basin hydropower debate. 
 
Political ecology initially emerged in the field of geography and has since developed 
into an interdisciplinary and diverse approach that draws from evolving ideas in 
geography, anthropology, human ecology and environmental history. Political ecology 
is explicitly normative. It generally focuses on issues such as justice and human rights. 
It tends to be pro-poor and concerned with marginalized groups, and tends to 
promote environmental priorities. Critically, political ecology attempts to explain the 
“complex relations between Nature and Society through careful analysis of social 
forms of access and control over resources” (Watts and Peet, 2004:4). Political 
ecology draws from both politics and economic theory to understand who stands to 
win and who stands to lose from environmental change across different scales. The 
cross-scalar analysis focuses on linking the local to the global with respect to 
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competition and conflict over natural resources. It aims to explain the rationale of 
actors in political, social and environmental contexts. 
 
Political ecology also analyses power. Power has many definitions. Dahl (1957) posits 
that power is the ability of one actor to force another actor to do what they would 
not have otherwise done. Keohane and Nye (2000:11) assert that power can ‘also be 
conceived in terms of control over outcomes’. While political ecology can politicize 
environmental change, its critical analysis of scale and narratives also helps to 
illuminate the mechanisms that result in power asymmetries. The approach has been 
found to be very useful in this original study which analyses the meso-scale drivers 
and enablers of hydropower development in Laos and the Mekong Basin. 
 
In the Mekong Basin, people and the environment are inextricably linked. 
Approximately 80% of the Basin’s population lives in rural communities deriving their 
animal protein and livelihoods from wild fish and other very important water 
ecosystem services of the Basin. The politics and economics that shape hydropower 
development often have direct and immediate impacts on the environment, 
livelihoods and on the food security of millions of people. By drawing attention to the 
winners and losers in human induced environmental change processes in the Mekong 
Basin, political ecology provides a way to analyse critically the power relations at play 
in the particular economic, political and environmental contexts of the Basin. In 
hydropower development there are often significant environmental impacts and 
substantial opportunities for actors to increase their power, either monetarily or 
politically. By analysing the meso-scalar structures that enable and drive the 
distribution of power and impacts, political ecology can enable the identification of 





Ultimately, it is argued that the politics surrounding the definition of scales are 
fundamental to identifying the winners and losers in the current phase of 
hydropower intensification. The analysis aims to fill an existing gap in political 
ecology’s analysis of scale. Instead of starting at a local scale and examining how 
international and national politics and economics impact local resources, this analysis 
begins at a meso-scale. The mechanisms between the state and global influences and 
between the state and local impacts have been examined. 
 
3.2 Political Ecology as an Emerging Theory 
 
Political Ecology first appeared in a book title by Bruce Russett International Regions 
and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (1967). Russett used the 
term ecology to understand how systems worked together. He defined political 
ecology as “the relation of organisms or groups of organisms to their environment” 
and stated that “I have attempted to explore some of the relations between political 
systems and their social and physical environment.” (p. vii). Russett’s early use of the 
term did not encompass conservation or the natural environment. Over the years the 
definition of political ecology has taken on new meanings. Subsequent analysis of the 
term occurred through the 1960s and 70s (see Russett, 1967; Wolf, 1972; Miller, 
1978; Cockburn and Ridgeway, 1979). However, our current understanding of the 
approach draws primarily from its application during the 1980s. 
 
In the late 1980s the term political ecology was employed by scientists studying 
natural resource management as an approach to move beyond apolitical and neo-
Malthusian explanations of environmental change (Watts and Peet 2004). 
Conventional wisdom often blamed farmers, or local practices and over population 
on the degradation of resources (see Hardin, 1968). Incorporating an approach that 
brought together politics and ecology allowed researchers to think “about questions 
of access and control over resources” and “how this was indispensable for 
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understanding both the forms and geography of environmental disturbance and 
degradation, and the prospects for green and sustainable alternatives.” (Watts and 
Peet, 2004: 6). 
 
Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) used a largely structural, empirically oriented, political 
ecological approach with ‘chains of explanation’ to identify that soil erosion in African 
farming villages was driven by broader political economic forces. Blaikie and 
Brookfield’s approach to political ecology relies heavily on ecological perspectives. 
The chain of explanation offers a method to examine the structures, actors, 
relationships and asymmetries of power across different scales. According to Blaikie 
and Brookfield the chain of explanation  
“… starts with the land managers and their direct relations with the land (crop 
rotations, fuel wood use, stocking densities, capital investment and so on). 
The next link concerns their relations with each other, other land users, and 
groups in the wider society who affect them in any way, which in turn 
determines land management. The state and the world economy constitute 
the last links of the chain. Clearly then, explanations will be highly conjectural, 
although relying on theoretical bases drawn from natural and social science.” 
(Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 27). 
 
In Figure 3-1, below Blaikie and Brookfield’s chain of explanation is applied to a 
hypothetical hydropower development in the Mekong Basin. Although the chain of 
explanation draws from conjecture, it offers a method of theorizing relationships 
between different scales from the ecosystem through to the larger political economy 





The chain of explanation 
in political ecology 
The chain of explanation 





 Forest cleared 
 Riparian settlement moved off-
site 
 Physical dam structure 
constructed 
 Reservoir filled 
 Power lines established 





 Livelihoods disrupted and/or 
 destroyed 
 Fisheries collapse 
 Agricultural collapse 
 Non-tradable forest product  
collection collapse 
 Increased erosion/siltation 




 Dam operation for maximisation 
 New communal natural resource 
management 
 New catchment management 
 systems 
 Lack of cascade management  
systems 






 New resource interests 
 New political relationships 
 High development intensities 




Figure 3-1  Chain of explanation applied to a hydropower site.  








 Access rights to resources 
 Gender divisions 
 Corporate rights, de facto  





 Official land tenure laws 
 State ability to enforce law 
 State administrative ability 
 State HE, water and human rights 
policies 




 Energy markets 
 Water allocation agreements 
 Regional agreements 
 Rate of development 





 Market behaviour 
 International treaties 
 Interests of other countries 
  Oil prices 
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By examining how the chain of explanation is adapted to hydropower development 
we are able to see the structures, actors and scale involved. For example, as the 
structure is developed at a local scale in activities such as forest clearing and 
resettlement the linkages to livelihoods are transparent. Furthermore, starting at the 
end of the chain we can trace back how oil prices and market behaviour eventually 
impact on local economies and ecosystems. These chains of explanation are useful in 
regions like the Mekong Basin, where livelihoods and the environment are deeply 
interlinked. When applied to hydropower development the chain of explanation helps 
to demonstrated how local level agents are influenced by maco-level scales. The 
chain of explanation has been criticized as being hierarchical (Rangan and Kull, 2009), 
but it offers a starting point for discussions about power and avenues for further 
research. 
 
Another early political ecologist, Bassett (1988) used a political ecology approach to 
understand what was driving local conflicts in Northern Ghana between migrating 
Fulani pastoralists and sedentary Senufo agriculturalists. Bassett found little evidence 
to support the conventional wisdom that blamed conflict on resource scarcity and a 
tragedy of the commons. Using a political ecology approach to analyse political 
systems he was able to show that conflict was occurring because there were politics 
that favoured the Fulani’s access to resources. This political favouritism granted the 
Fulani large areas of land access including that of the Senufo. 
 
Stemming from their work in 1987 Blaikie and Brookfield provide one of the most 
cited definitions of political ecology as combining “the concerns of ecology and a 
broadly defined political economy.” (1987:17). They reasoned that “together this 
encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based 
resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself.” (ibid:17). This 





Since its growth in popularity in the late 1980s political ecology has taken on many 
different strands and definitions (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). It has moved between 
structural and post-structural explanations and incorporated varying degrees of 
analysis on political institutions, environmental change, environmental narratives and 
political economy (Robbins 2004). Political ecology has drawn from cultural ecology, 
radical development geography and hazards/natural disasters research (Bryant, 
1998). 
 
Political ecology also has roots in Marxist theory such as relations of production 
theory and peasant studies (Bryant, 1988). O’Connor (1988:82) uses a Marxist 
analysis to state that the study of political and ecological concerns arises from the 
“second contradiction of capitalism”. According to O’Connor (ibid), the first 
contradiction of capitalism is its mismanagement of labour and the second is its 
failure to consider a functioning environment a condition for its perpetuation. Some 
prominent political ecologists have suggested that part of political ecology’s rise in 
popularity was because it offered an opportunity to rebrand unpopular Marxist 
theories in the post-cold war era (Watts, pers. comm., 2010). 
 
Neo-Marxist political ecology perspectives have used the approach to engage in 
debates about materialism and nature in capitalist society. Watts (2000) defines 
political ecology as a tool “to understand the complex relations between nature and 
society through careful analysis of what one might call the forms of access and 
control over resources and their implications for environmental health and 
sustainable livelihoods” (ibid:257). Lipietz (2000) takes the definition further by 
stating that “Political ecology, like the Marxist-inspired workers’ movement, is based 
on a critique—and thus an analysis, a theorized understanding— of the “the existing 
order of things”. More specifically, Marx focused on a very precise sector of the real 
world: the humanity-nature relationship, and, even more precisely, relations among 
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people that pertain to nature (or what Marxists call the “productive forces”) (ibid: 
70). In the Marxist interpretations of political ecology, capitalism is the primary cause 
of environmental degradation. I argue that, following the Marxist view of political 
ecology, in the Mekong it is capitalism’s growth in China, Thailand and Vietnam (the 
wealthier nations in the Basin) and the subsequent demand for electricity this growth 
feeds that is one of the elements that causes environmental degradation through 
hydropower development that ignores its social and environmental impacts. Using a 
Marxist analysis in political ecology allows for a critical engagement of development 
narratives. 
 
In the 1990s, political ecology began to take on post-structural approaches (Escobar, 
1996; Baghel and Nusser, 2010). Post-structuralism is concerned with explanations of 
discourse as they change material relations. These new approaches examined 
unequal power relations and how they manifest themselves in environmental change 
across different scales (Escobar, 1996: Baghel and Nusser, 2010). Escobar (1996) 
states that nature is socially constructed and carries multiple meanings. Using a 
historical materialist approach, Escobar posits that nature has two forms of capital; 
an extractive form and a postmodern form. An example of the extractive form is the 
selling of timber from forests while the postmodern form centres on the 
commodification of nature, such as using rainforests for pharmaceuticals. Escobar 
(1996:49) argues that ‘nature is reinvented as environment so that capital, not nature 
and culture may be sustained’. Using Escobar’s approach, hydropower development 
in the Mekong Basin appears to encompass both forms of capital. Dams can be 
destructive in their environmental impacts on water resources, but the generation of 
electricity from water can also offer postmodern forms of capital. 
 
An increasing focus on narratives and discourses further accompanied the new 
approaches in political ecology. Robbins’ (2004) Political Ecology A Critical 
Introduction states that political ecology is both a hatchet and seed. In its approach as 
a hatchet, political ecology deconstructs myths, narratives and discourses linked to 
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the control of natural resources. In the Mekong, this hatchet approach is useful for 
analysing the development narratives from powerful actors that state hydropower 
brings benefits to the whole Region and those from NGOs that emphasize the 
‘pristine’ environment. The seed is political ecology’s attempt to develop new 
knowledge that will influence policy and natural resource management to be more 
equitable. The seed represents the goals of this study. 
 
Peet and Watt’s Liberation Ecologies (2004) links political and social movements that 
resist environmental change to their linkages to state and international political 
economies. These liberation ecologies highlight the defence of and the struggle over 
land and rights against powerful actors from the governments or the private sector. 
Peet and Watts (2004:10) state that ‘political ecology opened the possibility of a 
serious discussion of how Nature and environmental problems were represented and 
how discursive formations shaped policy and practice’. Political ecology began to 
examine how actors use social constructs of environmental problems to legitimize 
their positions. As Bryant (1998:87) states ‘conflicts are…as much struggles over 
meaning as they are battles over material practices.’ This strand of inquiry is 
especially important in the Mekong Basin. In terms of hydropower development in 
the Mekong, actors socially construct the impacts and benefits of hydropower across 
different scales and use these constructions as an important justification for their 
decisions. The struggles of social and political grassroots movements against 
environmental change - or in the case of Laos, their lack of existence - help to 
highlight who stands to win and lose from environmental change and why. Using a 
political ecological analysis at the meso-scale helps to understand the political 
struggles over participation in meaning-making and decision-making processes. 
 
Forsyth (2003) uses a critical political ecology approach that understands the social 
and political influence on science as the starting point in understanding 
environmental change. Although all political ecology should be considered critical, 
Forsyth stresses that environmental knowledge and facts are constructed as part of 
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political and economic debate. Critical political ecology considerations are important 
in the Mekong Basin hydropower debate. Kakonen and Hirsch (2010) point out that 
politics often define what and how the Mekong River Commission researches and 
evaluates water governance in the Basin. Impact assessments that downplay the 
potential impacts of dams and NGO documents that portray the impacts as 
‘enormous’ also speak to a political ecology understanding of narratives and the 
influence of politics on science. 
 
Until 2000, much of political ecology’s focus was in the developing world. Bryant 
(1998:89) states that political ecology ‘seeks primarily to understand the political 
dynamics surrounding material and discursive struggles over the environment in the 
Third World.’ While Bryant and Bailey’s (1997) edited volume on Third World Political 
Ecology is useful in highlighting the role of the state and its relationship with 
development agencies, the value of creating a distinction between First and Third 
World political ecologies is put into question (Walker 2003). Furthermore, Bryant and 
Bailey’s (1997) text emphasizes the role of politics in shaping ecology in the Third 
World, but offers little in the way of specific discussion of what defines ecology. In 
Political Ecology: Where is the ecology? (2005), Walker’s review of the political 
ecology literature demonstrates that although some political ecologists engage with 
politics more than ecology, they are still concerned with ecology as an important 
aspect of their research. These concerns of ecology “become primarily questions of 
power, struggle and representation...” (2005:78). As outlined above, Peet and Watts 
(2004), state that political ecology defines and understands the term ecology through 
the lens of politics and as a result it introduces different perspectives than those 
deployed by natural scientists. Political ecology’s treatment of the term ecology has 
been adopted by other groups seeking to incorporate ecological concerns into their 
arguments. 
 
Although political ecology has primarily focused on the global South, its application in 
the developed world context has continued to expand since the late 1990s. Atkinson 
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attempted to link political ecology with social movements in the United States by 
stating: “Political Ecology is both a set of theoretical propositions and ideas on the 
one hand and on the other a social movement referred to as the ‘ecology movement’ 
or, latterly, the Green movement” (1991:18). Robbins and Sharp (2003) take the 
application of political ecology analysis to the heart of America in analysing the moral 
economy of the American lawn. Bakker (2000) uses a political ecology approach to 
analyse drought in England and later in 2003 uses the approach to analyse the 
privatisation of water in the United States, England and Wales. More recent work by 
Ubokudom and Khubchandani (2010) uses a political ecology approach to analyse 
health care in the United States while Horowitz (2012) employed the approach to 
look at grassroots movements protesting against industry in the global North.  
 
To illustrate political ecology’s usefulness in global issues, Peet et al. (2011) have 
produced an edited volume entitled Global Political Ecology. This book casts a 
political ecological lens across issues such as over-fishing, climate change and waste. 
The authors develop a post-structural view of political ecology to examine how 
knowledge is produced and legitimized in environmental governance. By examining 
climate change through a political ecological lens they draw out its links to capitalism, 
expert knowledge, as well as to common discourses and narratives. 
 
3.3 Political Ecology on Narratives 
 
In the Mekong, narratives are often employed by politicians, industry, or NGOs to 
frame problems and orient actions. However, as Roe (1991) states, they can also be 
employed to justify interventions and marginalize or blame actors for environmental 
degradation. For example, Neo-Malthusian arguments have often been used by policy 





Cronon states that narratives are particularly powerful in environmental history 
because they ascribe order and agency to human induced environmental change 
(Cronon 1995). Narratives are often grasped by actors to further their agendas. Actors 
can frame solutions within persuasive narratives and promote narratives that are 
beneficial to their agendas (Leach and Mearns, 1996). Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the 
commons narrative has often been used by policy makers in S.E. Asia, and around the 
world, to remove local people from forested areas and place those areas under state 
control. Extensive evidence, however, demonstrates that common, private and state 
resource management options are all viable options and often politics and economics 
are the real drivers of resource degradation (Feeny et al., 1990). Roe (1991) states 
that, like Hardin’s narrative, other popular narratives persist because they buttress 
and endorse decision-making, thereby lending authority to actions and policies. 
 
Narratives surrounding electricity scarcity, an abundance of hydropower potential, 
and poverty alleviation are all prevalent in the Mekong Basin. These narratives are 
reinforced by constructed and contested knowledge around the benefits and costs of 
dams. In the Mekong Basin hydropower debate, narratives have been employed by 
various actors as a disguise for their agendas and to legitimise their activities. For 
example, as will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 7, states developing hydropower often 
talk of benefits such as flood control and income. On the other hand, International 
Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) in the Region often talk of loss of food 
security and livelihoods. Political ecology’s focus on narratives has critically explored 
the multiple meanings of the environment and development (Watts and Peet 2004).  
 
By understanding how power influences narratives at the meso-scale in Laos’ 





Narratives surrounding hydropower in the Mekong Basin often emerge during the 
Impact Assessment process as this is a key point of engagement in hydropower 
development. Chapter 5 and 7 will explore some of the more pervasive narratives 
employed by various actors concerned with hydropower development in the Basin. 
 
Narratives are also often framed at particular geographic scales. In the Mekong, these 
geographic scales can emerge as common scalar referents such as local, provincial 
and basin, or more political and contested ones such as the Greater Mekong Sub-
region or the Mekong Delta. Political ecology’s analysis of scale is important in 
understanding narratives in that the scale at which narratives are employed is often 
constructed and intertwined with power relations as much as the narratives 
themselves. 
 
3.4 Political Ecology on Scale 
 
Understanding environment and natural resource exploitation and management 
between different geographical scales, that is local, state, regional - and how scalar 
constructs interlink between structures and systems is crucial in analysing 
hydropower development processes in the Mekong Basin. For the purpose of this 
study, scale can be understood in three different contexts. Firstly, as a physical 
measure of space; secondly as a space in which knowledge and power exist and 
change; and finally as a social construct mobilized by actors to lend credence to their 
agendas (Molle, 2007). 
 
Geographers have extensively analysed the politics of scale. The politics of scale can 
be understood as the processes within, and the emergence of, scalar constructs 
(Castells, 1996; Smith, 1984; Swyngedouw, 2001). Gandy (2002) in his examination of 
New York City (NYC) analysed how political economic processes shaped the ‘nature’ 
of the city. Political ecology examines the production and operation of the politics of 
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natural resource allocation at regional and national scales. In Gandy’s examination of 
NYC he discusses how the scale of the city is constructed and how Nature has been 
constructed within this scale. Escobar (1996) further states that capital redefined 
Nature as an environment. This new definition ultimately dismisses ideas of nature 
and culture, so that the power of those who control capital can maintain their status. 
Lefebvre (1990) highlights how geographical spaces and their scalar concepts should 
be considered as socially produced. Much of the geographic literature on scale and 
space link them to the survival of capitalism and its expansionist tendencies. 
Geographic literature provides a foundation on which political ecology theory and its 
analytical approach has advanced the understanding of scale. 
 
Zimmerman and Bassett (2003) state that political ecology is concerned with how 
geographic scale is constructed and how actors use it to legitimize or delegitimize 
environmental change. Political ecology analysis argues that environmental and social 
change is the result of how the processes and mechanisms between local, national 
and international levels interact (Marston and Smith, 2001; Rangan and Kull, 2009). 
Actors and actions at one scale may have impact on activities at another. As Bryant 
and Bailey (1997:33) state ‘different actors contribute to, are affected by, or seek to 
resolve, environmental problems at different scales’. Political ecology can help to 
illuminate how actors at one scale can construct and disseminate a version of scale 
that advances their agendas. Political ecology can help to highlight how powerful 
actors define the scale of environmental change and use these definitions to 
legitimize their actions. In the Mekong Basin hydropower debate, hydropower 
developers and states often claim that the scalar benefits of hydropower, which are 
often measured at meso or national scales, are larger than the costs, which are often 
measured at local scales. For example, Sneddon and Fox (2006) contend that the 
World Bank scaled support for the Pak Mun Dam at a national scale. By constructing 
the benefits of the Pak Mun Dam around an economic development narrative (i.e. 
that the dam will benefit the country as a whole) the WB de-emphasized the local 
costs of the dam on fisheries and livelihoods. 
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Rangan and Kull’s article, What makes ecology ‘political’?: rethinking ‘scale’ in 
political ecology (2009), highlights the different ways scale is constructed to explain 
ecological and social change. A political ecology analysis shows that scale is socially 
constructed and that the politics of scale are defined through institutions, events, 
technologies, politics and measurements. In the Mekong Basin, the benefits and costs 
of hydropower development are dependent on definitions of scale. I argue that the 
politics surrounding the definition of scales are fundamental to identifying the 
winners and losers in the current phase of hydropower intensification. A political 
ecology analysis of how scales interact can be used to locate environmental change in 
political economic systems and state relations (Paulson et al., 2005). For example, in 
Chapter 5 I show how in Mekong hydropower development, environmental change is 
often debated at a meso-scale between states and unequally balanced against 
economic growth. 
 
Political ecology has a long tradition of detailed local scale case studies that link to 
national scale politics and economics. This traditional political ecology approach links 
detailed local level surveys to global agents. For example, political ecology uses the 
chain of explanation to examine the structures between scales often concluding that 
national or international politics and economics influence local environmental 
change. The analysis in Chapter 6 shows that political and economic mechanisms and 
systems within Laos are important drivers and enablers of hydropower development 
that negatively impacts local resources. These mechanisms are influenced by meso-
scale narratives and political, economic and historical factors that are discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
 
The Impact Assessment (IA) process is also used as a tool in meso-scale analysis. IAs 
fit within the meso-scale in the Mekong Basin because they are important for both 
the political economic systems and the state organizations that are investing in 
hydropower development. In Chapter 6, I show that the IA process is influenced by 
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both international and state actors. The outcomes of this process have direct 
implications on the socio-economic impacts of hydropower development. 
 
It is contended that by starting at a meso-scale we can analyse how broader regional 
forces impact the environment of the Region. While also focusing on illustrating the 
mechanisms that allow these forces to operate (see figure 3-2), the Impact 
Assessment process is used as a pathway to understand these mechanisms and how 
they enable local, state and regional scales to connect. These mechanisms, or drivers 
and enablers, are essential factors in determining what is driving the hydropower 
development processes in the Basin. 
 
 




In Figure 3-2, the traditional analysis of scales within political ecology is highlighted by 
the curved arrows. Political ecology traditionally examines the links between local 
scales and the environment and macro or international scale politics and economics. 
This research aims to illuminate the mechanisms that drive and enable the political 
and economic forces between the scales (illustrated by the arrows in the opaque box 
in the middle of the above diagram). 
 
Perhaps one of the reasons why this type of research is not well covered in political 
ecology is due to the difficulty in researching the meso-scale within a political ecology 
approach. Ultimately, we face a challenge in collecting data that will elucidate the 
complex, confidential and/or contentious mechanisms that drive meso-scale 
decisions. Meso-scale data, such as the drivers and enablers of hydropower 
development, is often linked with individual or institutional power. These data may 
include sensitive company or Government information or it may point to issues of 
corruption or transparency. To illuminate these mechanisms and uncover the drivers 
and enablers of hydropower development in the Basin this research uses the Impact 
Assessment (IA) process as a starting point for analysis. The analysis will be discussed 
in the methodology section of the paper. The research that underpins this analysis 
benefited from extensive networks in the Region built up over the last 7 years. For 
example, while working in the Region in 2009 I began to engage contacts with 
consultants and Government officials who would prove to be extremely useful 
sources of data. During my fieldwork in 2011 and 2012, I was able to strengthen these 
relationships and develop a level of trust that enabled rich interviews and access to 
important data. 
 
Watts’ (2001; 2004) work on the political ecology of oil extraction in Nigeria is a 
notable example of using political ecology to examine the mechanisms that drive and 
enable environmental change from a meso-scale. In examining the agendas, actors 
and mechanisms that drive and enable environmental and social change, Watts uses 
a meso-scale analysis to capture the complexity and nuanced story of Nigeria’s oil 
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extraction. Watts’ analysis demonstrates how actors in the Region both win and lose 
from environmental change. Watts’ political ecology analysis of Nigeria’s oil 
extraction has some similarities to Laos conditions. Both countries are highly 
dependent on natural resources (oil for Nigeria and hydropower for Laos) for income. 
Both states have had on-going low levels of transparency and participation in political 
systems, natural resource dependent groups and extensive poverty. And both states 
have been the focus of extensive international interest from organisations such as the 
World Bank and the United Nations.  
 
By examining the mechanisms embedded within the meso-scale of oil extraction, 
Watts was able to demonstrate the sophisticated linkages and mechanisms that drive 
and enable change across international, state and local scales. In this way, Watts’ 
insights have helped to illustrate the ways in which actors from across the Basin 
construct narratives across scales to support their competing agendas. This study, like 
Watts’, shows that a variety of actors, including The World Bank, INGOs and states 
construct narratives surrounding hydropower to legitimize and disguise their 
activities within the Basin. It is also shows how neo-liberal agendas that encourage 
private sector investment combine with mechanisms such as lack of transparency and 
weak accountability to allow actors to construct hydropower that avoids including its 
social and environmental costs. 
 
Political ecology’s contribution to geographical understanding of scale is ongoing and 
continues to contribute to our understanding of water issues. In general, political 
ecology is not used to interpret or analyse water resources to the same degree as it is 
used for general natural resource analysis (such as land degradation and forest 
resources). However, political ecology can effectively examine water issues because 




3.5 Towards a Political Ecology of Water Resources 
 
Early uses of political ecology (i.e. before the late 1990s) did not address water 
resources issues. In fact, Bryant and Bailey stated in 1997 that political ecologists 
have been ‘relatively negligent’ in analysing water, hydropolitics and ‘how control 
over water is linked to unequal power relations’ (1997:193). It was not until the late 
1990s that political ecology began to analyse water issues with useful results 
(Swyngedouw, 1997; Bakker, 1999; Sneddon and Fox, 2006). 
 
The political nature of water issues means that political ecology can be useful in 
analysing issues related to the use, distribution and conflict over water. As Bakker 
states, political ecology offers a more nuanced perspective than political economy on 
water issues because the approach “acknowledges the materiality of nature” thereby, 
“re-theorizing resource regulation; and interrogating the role of the state from a 
different perspective than that of much political economy.” (Bakker, 2010; 52). In 
other words, political ecology critically examines the process of resource 
commodification and regulation. Bakker further states that by “acknowledging the 
coproduction of socio-economic and environmental change” political ecology helps to 
“generate new insights into contested and complex periods of transition” in water 
governance. 
 
The utility of the approach becomes apparent when political ecology is applied to 
Mekong Basin water governance. First, in the Mekong Basin, a complex period of 
transition between modes of regulation has emerged. The transition has involved a 
shift from state and development bank to private sector hydropower development. 
Bakker states that “The quotidian practices of regulation develop within and reinforce 
but also sometimes contradict broader macroeconomic patterns of resource 
regulation.” (2010:53). As the actors and regulators transition to the private sector 
mode in the Mekong Basin, new political and economic mechanisms have emerged 
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while others have gained influence or disappear. The political ecology approach is 
useful in analysing the political and economic forces that drive and enable these 
transitions. For example, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, in line 
with neo-liberal trends, encouraged private sector investment in the Basin. This 
private sector investment brought with it new requirements for confidentiality which 
has resulted in less transparency and in some cases have increased instances of 
corruption. 
 
In Modernity and Hybridity: Nature, Regeneracionismo, and The Production of the 
Spanish Waterscape, Swyngedouw (1999) uses a political ecology approach to 
demonstrate how nature and society are meshed together. Many people living in the 
Mekong Basin depend daily on the fish they catch and the non-tradable forest 
products (NTFP) from the Basin. For example, 80% of the animal protein in the 
Cambodian diet is from wild fish resources (Van Acker, 2003). For many people in the 
Mekong nature and society could be considered as inseparable. In order to 
understand and analyse water governance in the Mekong it is necessary to examine 
both political and ecological factors. 
 
Using a political ecology approach to understand environmental change in 
Bangladesh, Bradnock and Saunders (2000:67), usefully point out that “politics itself is 
not self-explanatory or uncontested.” Environmental change occurs within interlinked 
combinations of environmental and human systems (ibid). In Laos, arguably more 
than many developed countries, environmental and humans systems are deeply 
intertwined and each influence environmental change in significant ways. This study 
uses a political ecology approach that focuses on political, social and economic forces 
to understand the drivers and enablers of hydropower development because 




Second, by including the principles of both social and environmental justice, political 
ecology can offer a more in-depth understanding of the winners and losers in the 
current hydropower intensification in the Mekong. As Bakker (2010) states, this is 
because political ecology “begins from the assumption that socio-economic and 
environmental change are co-produced, but also broadens the set of actors-non-
humans, as well as humans-who are considered both as objects of study, and also as 
holders of legitimate claims to equitable treatment.” (2010:54). An effective analysis 
of the processes of evaluation and implementation in Laos hydropower projects 
requires consideration of hydropower’s impacts and advantages on the regional and 
international actors and the environment. 
 
Finally, political ecology may provide an additional and complementary analytical lens 
when it comes to International Relations. In the Mekong Basin, the private power 
producer model has changed the role and relationships between various states, the 
nature of the market and citizen relations, and the allocation and use of water and 
other natural resources. By acknowledging the role of the state in resource 
management, a political ecology approach helps to understand both state and private 
sector motivations, shifts in responsibilities and the nature of the evolving 
relationships (Bakker, 2010). In this study it will be shown that the changed market 
dynamics that accompanied private sector investment altered the ways in which 
hydropower was built and its potential social and environmental impacts. These new 
models also further empowered elite actors while disempowering local people. 
 
A Sneddon and Fox (2006) paper on the critical hydropolitics of the Mekong is a very 
useful example of the application of the political ecology at the Basin scale. Sneddon 
and Fox (2006) demonstrate how in many areas of the world and particularly in the 
Mekong, water is a resource that is managed by elites. They demonstrate that 
political ecology helps to identify how actors represent rivers and how institutions 
and systems legitimize these representations. They propose that such contextual 
analysis has helped to illuminate the dark corners in previous transboundary 
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hydropolitic studies. They remind us that cooperation in river basins can lead to 
exploitation of natural resources and the people who depend on them. In the case of 
the Mekong, the lack of mainstream dams is partially due to war and poor 
cooperation among the Basin riparian states. The current shift to the independent 
power producer model and the influx of private sector investment has reduced the 
need for cooperation in the hydropower development of the Basin and been a driver 
in the current intensification. 
 
The contribution of political ecology to understanding environmental change 
discourses, representations of scale, power, politics and economics within a frame of 
environmental change are extensive. However, as with any approach it is not without 
criticism. 
 
3.6 Critiques of Political Ecology 
 
While the contribution of political ecology to understanding environmental change 
discourses, representations of scale, power, politics and economics within a frame of 
environmental change are extensive and generally positive, its broad-based nature 
can also create challenges and invite criticism. Despite its widespread adoption over 
the past 30 years there have been some significant critics (Vadya and Walters, 1999; 
Walker, 2006). One specific area of criticism emerges as researchers struggle to find a 
consistent definition of political ecology (Mustafa pers. comm., 2010). Robbins (2006) 
in his book Political Ecology A Critical Introduction, provides ten definitions, none of 
which are very concise. But while political ecology is criticized for being difficult to 
define, its lack of defined boundaries can be seen as one of its strengths. 
 
The fact that political ecology allows a broad conversation about environmental and 
political change means that it is expansive enough to incorporate new ideas. Political 
ecology’s broad approach is useful for this study because it allows a focus on political 
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and economic forces driving and enabling change on both people and the 
environment. Attempting to find a fixed definition of political ecology is a territorial 
game that will weaken its applicability. 
 
Vayda and Walters (1999) offer the most citied critique of political ecology. They state 
that political ecology is “biased, normative and question begging” (1999:67). They 
further criticize political ecology, primarily the work of Watts, as over-analysing 
politics and neglecting the environment. Vayda and Walters (1999) suggest that 
researchers should observe environmental change and then determine the causes 
instead of assuming they are political. 
 
Peet and Watts (2004) address these criticisms by stating that political ecology 
deploys a broad toolkit to explain the world. Political ecology “examines relations 
between events structures and mechanism …” (2004:18). Peet and Watts (2004) 
further state that political ecology analyses beyond what Vayda and Walters 
understand as the meaning of the term environment. Political ecology has allowed 
researchers to understand the environment in a number of “multiform 
representations” (Peet and Watts, 2004:19). Multiform representational 
understanding suggests that people view the environment in an inherently political 
way. Acknowledging this analytical framework or perspective is fundamental to 
explaining the relationships surrounding the environment. For example, in Laos the 
environment provides livelihoods and food security. Despite these essential 
environmental services, actors from the Basin states, including Government officials 
and industry, view the environment and water as the key to state economic growth 
and power. This view defines their relationship to the environment and how they 
manage it. 
Furthermore, Vayda and Walters (1999) claim that political ecology should observe 
environmental change and then determine the causes instead of assuming they are 
political is not valid in examining hydropower development. Hydropower 
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development is proven to create immediate and long-term environmental change. 
The political ecology approach recognises that the environmental change from 
Hydropower is due to political and economic forces.  
 
A final critique of political ecology is its limited application in terms of geographical 
scale and the politics of scale. As Paulson and Gezon note in their edited volume, 
Political ecology across spaces, scales, and social groups (2005), identifying an 
appropriate scale to begin analysis can be difficult in political ecology. In 2005, Brown 
and Purcell, critiquing literature from the 1990s and early 2000s, stated that political 
ecology often fails to engage with the geographic politics of scale. They state that 
political ecology often falls into a ‘scalar trap’ by describing local scale policies, 
institutions and initiatives as being more environmentally sustainable. Previous 
political ecology literature has at times fallen into this scalar trap; however, more 
recent work in the field has critically analysed local scalar constructs, treating scale as 
a dynamic and complex concept (Zimmerman, 2003; Neumann, 2009; North, 2010).  
 
This discourse has confirmed the argument that political ecology can be subordinate 
to political economy. In the Mekong it is evident that some economies have achieved 
a level of economic development that enables them to re-appraise their approach to 
mis-managing water resources. A feature of this study includes a comparison of the 
social, economic and political capacities of the riparians and the options available to 
them as a consequence. The Mekong Basin is rich in diverse economies enjoying 
different endowments and with a different suite of evolved social, economic and 
political capital. 
 
In terms of geographical scale, the majority of political ecology research that involves 
case studies has focused on issues at the local scale (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; 
Hecht and Cockburn, 1989; Zimmerer, 2004). While Sneddon and Fox’s (2006) 
application of political ecology to the Mekong Basin provides a strong example of 
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how the approach of political ecology can be applied to larger scales, there is 
currently no research that shows why political ecology cannot be used on an 
international scale. Despite these gaps in research, the question remains - why has 
political ecology been primarily used at local scales?  
 
One explanation can be found in the challenges created by historical inertia. As 
demonstrated above, a strong influence on political ecology’s early development was 
Marxism. Marxist-inspired research in the political ecological tradition has 
conventionally been more attentive to structural explanations in which states are 
seen as an institutional conduit for other structures to emerge. In the Mekong Basin 
hydropower debate, the political economy of Laos is not immune to the influences of 
international structures, but the Basin itself also has its own unique structures and 
mechanisms that emerge from its culture and history of development. By analysing 
these meso-scale mechanisms it is possible to glean a clearer understanding of the 
complex forces that drive and enable hydropower development. 
 
A second explanation may be found in the suite of research methods used in political 
ecology. I argue that political ecological analyses distance themselves from positivist 
inquiry. Rather the concern is how power is constructed. International Relations 
theory on the other hand tends to be positivist in nature. This may explain why 
political ecology focuses its analyses on sub-national scales as opposed to looking at 
state relations. In spite of political ecology’s limited application to larger scales (as 
demonstrated by Sneddon and Fox (2006)) the approach has been found to be useful 
at the Basin scale. Political ecology’s utility in helping elucidate power relations at the 
Basin level is illustrated by this study and further supported by recent research on the 
Mekong Basin (Matthews, 2012; Kuenzer et al. 2012).  
 
Political ecology is one of the few theories that has emerged from the discipline of 
geography. Political ecology is well suited to geography’s interdisciplinary bridging of 
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social and physical science because it is a fusion of social and biophysical conditions. 
In analysing Laos hydropower development, interdisciplinary perspectives are 
essential for understand both the political and economic forces that drive 
environment change, but also how this environmental change impacts local people 
and the ecosystem services of the Basin. 
 
3.7 Analysis of Mekong Hydropower by Geographers 
 
Over the last five decades, extensive geographical research has been carried out on 
Mekong Basin hydropower development. White’s (1962) study was the first in the 
Region to focus on the social and environmental impacts and benefits of mainstream 
and tributary hydropower development in the Basin. White’s integrated approach to 
hydropower and Basin management came at the same time as the environmental 
movement was establishing itself. This movement was the first widespread 
recognition that society and its technologies could have serious, lasting and 
widespread effects on the Earth’s environment including its water resources. White’s 
study, which was funded by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (ESCAFE), was the first detailed analysis in the Region that linked 
cooperative Basin management of hydropower development to flood control and 
economic growth. White emphasized the need to implement flood control, irrigation 
and hydropower in a way that ‘tangible social transformations that must accompany 
them if they are to serve their purpose.’ 
 
From the 1960s to 1990 the majority of social science research on Mekong Basin 
hydropower weighed the impacts of mainstream dams against the benefits and need 
of hydropower dams. This research draws from the environmental movement and 
White’s calls for integrated water management. Wheeler’s (1970) research into the 
‘International Multipurpose Water Resources Development in the Lower Mekong 
Basin’ discusses the importance of water for life and the need for data and planning 
in river basin development. Wheeler emphasizes the strength of cooperative 
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approaches of the Mekong Committee. While the study outlines the plans for 
multipurpose mainstream and tributary dams, and highlights the importance of 
environmental protection, the paper contains broad and optimistic statements. When 
discussing mainstream dams, Wheeler states that “benefits to all the Basin states 
would seem to outweigh by far any adverse effects.” (1970:38). These statements 
speak to a lack of understanding of transboundary social and environmental impacts 
and the power of economics and politics to drive hydropower development that 
remain over 40 years later to the present day. 
 
Wah’s (1985) research entitled ‘Oil Substitution in ASEAN: Problems and Prospects’ 
states that hydropower development in the Mekong Basin is becoming increasingly 
cost effective compared to oil production, but is hampered by political tensions 
among the riparians. Halbertsma’s (1987) study of the legal aspects of the water 
resources development in the Mekong stated that although there was an effort to 
incorporate environmental and social impacts in the Mekong Committee’s plans 
“international integrated river Basin development, such as the equitable utilization of 
water resources, the priority of uses, allocating costs and benefits, and developing 
legal and administrative frameworks for the construction and operation of 
mainstream projects, have largely been left in abeyance.” (ibid: 28). Halbertsma was 
perhaps the first to identify the need to solve a number of legal and institutional 
arrangements around mainstream projects and their impacts before they proceed. 
 
Piper et al. (1991:51)’s analysis of how the Mekong’s flow regimes would change with 
mainstream dam developments discussed the need to ‘balance the demand for 
hydropower and rice production with environmental considerations’, including 
fisheries, flood control, navigation and forestry. Piper et al. (ibid) emphasized that the 
development of the Basin requires agreement between countries and more robust 




Prior to the 1990s, social science research on Mekong hydropower development 
incorporated environmental concerns, but generally concluded that the benefit of 
dams outweighed their costs (See Wheeler, 1970). From the 1990s, however, social 
science research incorporating strong critical geographical and political elements 
began to analyse the political and economic impacts of hydropower development on 
livelihoods and local and transboundary environments. This new wave of research 
often questioned whether the cost of dam construction, in terms of impacts, 
outweighed its benefits. 
 
Much of this new research formed around the controversy surrounding the Pak Mun 
and Rasi Salai dams in Thailand. Roberts’ (1993) study linked the impact of the Pak 
Mun Dam on local fisheries and livelihoods while Hirsch’s (1995) geopolitical study of 
Southeast Asia showed that the dam breached the political limits of hydropower 
development within Thailand. Hirsch also projected that the future may see 
Thailand’s building extensive projects in neighbouring countries where they appeared 
to have a lack of concern for the environmental impacts of these developments. 
 
Mitchell (1998) and Radosevich and Olson (1999) use political economy arguments to 
analyse the past half century of water use and hydropower development. These 
researchers remind us that power and economics in water management is not as 
straightforward as the large state versus the homogenous community. Mitchell’s 
(1998) analysis of the political economy of Mekong Basin development focuses on the 
political aspects of decision-making and how the benefits and impacts of decisions 
have uneven distributions. Mitchell also begins to analyse some of the geographical 
scales and their linkages looking at global influences on development and how these 
translate into changes in regional and local scales. Importantly, Mitchell identified the 
emergence of conflict between Basin-wide coordination, promoted by the MRC and 
its donors, and the individual national agendas. The conflicting agendas of the MRC 
and individual Basin states gained pace during the 1990s as the Region stabilized and 
financing availability increased. As will be explored in Chapter 7, Mitchell’s (ibid:79) 
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statement that the MRC is ‘constrained by the political environment within which it 
functions’ is as true today as it was 20 years ago. 
 
During the 1990s, research on Mekong hydropower was highly critical of the World 
Bank’s role in funding hydropower dams. Huyser (1994) and Rich (1994) argued that 
the World Bank’s role in funding Mekong hydropower neglected environmental and 
social concerns instead prioritizing economic growth to the detriment of local 
livelihoods. As noted above, this research combined with global criticism of the WB’s 
large-scale infrastructure projects resulted in its temporary suspension of WB funding 
for these projects. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, an increasing number of researchers from within the field of 
geography began to focus on analysing issues of scale and power within the Basin. 
Usher’s (1996) examination of hydropower development in Laos examines the issues 
of power and decision-making by the state, developers and private consulting firms 
across regional and local scales. Usher highlights the growing influence of private 
consulting firms and the conflict of interest in hydropower expansion. The private 
consulting firms act as a ‘go between’ among the Government and developers and 
are often hired to complete the Impact Assessment, but also to design the projects. 
Usher (ibid:87) states that ‘this dual role…..practically ensures that negative effects of 
projects are systematically glossed over’. 
 
Bakker’s (1999) examination of Mekong hydropower politics examines the 
constructed scale of the Mekong ‘watershed’ and the development of the ‘corridor of 
commerce’ within the Basin. Bakker’s further analyses the emergence of the private 
sector as a new and opaque form of governance. Bakker posits that the increased role 
of the private sector in hydropower development will further decrease transparency 




From 2000 to 2012 the literature, from both social and physical sciences, analysing 
Mekong Basin hydropower has continued to expand in breadth and gather pace. 
International relations theory has framed Basin development in state-centric focused 
research analysing water cooperation and conflict. Other IR researchers have 
analysed China’s role as a hegemon employing regime theory and have looked at 
securitization to explain how water resources are shared (See. Backer, 2007; Makim, 
2002; and Meninken, 2007). Mirumachi’s (2011) useful political economic 
examination of Thailand’s domestic water policy highlighted the transboundary 
impacts of Thailand’s securitized and politicized water allocation and utilization 
discourses. 
 
Lebel et al. (2005), Sneddon and Fox (2012) and Suhardiman et al. (2012) have 
analysed the scalar strategies and scalar disconnections between actors contesting 
and promoting hydropower development in the Basin. Lebel et al.’s (2005) analysis of 
the politics of scale, position and place in the Mekong draws out a number of key 
points. In terms of scale, Lebel et al. suggests that impacts of poorly managed water 
governance are often local, yet the decisions that address and determine these 
impacts often take place in meso-scales such as state or even regional contexts. Local 
impacts caused by hydropower dams often occur in mountainous areas confined to 
natural resource dependent groups, who are often ethnic minorities. The people and 
the environment impacted by dams are often without voices while the hydropower 
decision-makers and the people in charge of mitigating the impact of these decisions 
(both environmentally and socially) often exist at scales very different to the people 
and environment in which their decisions take effect. 
 
Lebel et al. (2005) further discusses the scale of social justice within the Mekong 
Basin. The Asian Development Bank’s labelling of the Region as the Greater Mekong 
Sub-region raises the scale of water resource planning to the Basin level away from 
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individual states or rivers. This rescaling has the potential to diminish the importance 
of regional or village level environmental and social impacts of development. By 
examining the benefits of hydropower and interconnectivity via roads and power 
grids the Greater Mekong Sub-region dismisses the individual nature of Basin states 
and the diversity of people and environments within those states. 
 
Dore and Lebel (2010) and Sneddon and Fox (2012) discuss the ‘many Mekongs’ and 
how each is constructed by powerful actors’ framing of the River and Basin. The Basin 
can be understood as geopolitical, biophysical, developmental or a plurality of these 
understandings. How the Basin is perceived provides an input into how it is managed. 
As will be discussed in upcoming chapters the framing of the River is contested by 
various groups within and outside the Basin each pursuing their own objectives. 
 
Suhardiman et al.’s (2012) scalar analysis demonstrates that donor objectives 
surrounding the promotion of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) and 
presented through the MRC often conflict with individual nation state water 
management objectives. The disconnect between regional Government agendas and 
donor objectives causes an impasse in project development and has contributed to 
decreasing the MRC’s effectiveness as a River Basin Organization. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 6, this disconnect may also serve to delegitimize other efforts at IWRM 
and Basin-wide water management plans, increasing the lack of transparency. 
National governments may view any efforts introduced by outside actors concerned 
with the environment or social issues as something they must pay lip service to, but 
that are counter to national efforts to quickly modernize or develop their water 
resources. 
 
In The Anti-Politics of Mekong Knowledge Production, Kakonen and Hirsch (2010) 
discuss the lack of transparency surrounding knowledge production within the Basin 
and the MRC. To understand the importance of knowledge production in the Mekong 
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it is necessary to question the drivers and enablers that shape the knowledge and 
interpretations of it. Kakonen and Hirsch (ibid) posit that the hydrological models that 
the MRC relies heavily on for its Basin plans and decision-making are driven by state-
centred agendas that simplify the complex nature of the Basin to make it more 
malleable to hydropower development agendas. 
 
Drawing from the physical and social strengths, geographical research in the Mekong 
Basin has greatly contributed to a critical understanding of both the benefits and 
costs within hydropower development. Political ecological research has built on the 
strengths of physical and social geographical analysis in the Basin and has contributed 





This study aims to take the political ecology research beyond an analysis of local to 
global linkages to a nuanced understanding of the meso-scale mechanisms and 
narratives, both political and economic, which drive and enable environmental 
change. The approach of political ecology is appropriate for this study because, like 
geography it is an interdisciplinary approach. The incorporation of ecological and 
political economy perspectives is essential in understanding hydropower 
development in the Mekong Basin, an area where much of the Basin’s population is 
directly reliant on ecosystem services for both their livelihoods and their food 
security. The deconstruction enabled by the political ecology approach and the critical 
analysis of narratives will be shown to enable the interrogation of the agendas behind 
hydropower actors in the Region. Finally, when used in a meso-scale analysis, the 
political ecology approach draws out the political and economic mechanisms that are 
driving environmental change within the Basin. These mechanisms connect the state 
to regional and international forces as well as to local ones. Combined, these insights 
result in a revealing picture of who stands to win and lose from hydropower 
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development and why. The next Chapter, will explain the methodological approach 






















4 Methods Chapter 
 
4.1 Introduction and Brief Background to the Methods 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodologies deployed to answer the 
research questions.  The chapter begins by examining the history and motivations 
leading up to the start of the study. It then briefly discusses the use of methods in 
political ecology, before exploring the research approach, which interprets the role 
and effectiveness of the Impact Assessment process. It proceeds with an explanation 
of the multiple methods used in the research including interviews, both formal and 
informal, documentary research and participant observation. Using a multiple 
methods approach triangulated research findings, which in turn increased confidence 
in their validity. This verification by multiple methods further helped to uncover and 
reduce bias that may exist in the research (Creswell, 2009). The chapter then 
examines the research stages and data collection methods before discussing the use 
of case studies, narrative analysis and grounded theory. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the methodological limitations. 
 
Personal experience is a key component of the qualitative research process (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2005). Behind the theory, analysis and methodology personal experience 
situates how the researcher approaches the world (Silverman, 1999). The personal 
experience of the researcher, however, must always be understood to be influenced 
by gender, social class, race and ethnicity (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). This dissertation 
draws from seven years of work and research experience in the Mekong Basin 
starting in 2006.  
 
In 2006, while studying for a master of International Development and Environmental 
Analysis at Monash University, I was employed as a consultant by Oxfam Australia to 
research and write a report on the negative impacts of development in the Mekong 
118 
 
Basin. This report entitled “Hidden Costs. The underside of economic transformation 
in the Greater Mekong Subregion” focused on ADB led hydropower development and 
environmental change in the Basin. While presenting this report in 2007, at the 
University of Sydney at an Australian Aid (AusAID) conference entitled A Greater 
Mekong? Poverty, Integration and Development, I began to develop a wide network 
of professional and research contacts, which helped to inform my knowledge of the 
nature of hydropower development in the Mekong Region.  
 
From 2008 to 2010, while working as the Education and Research officer at the 
International WaterCentre (IWC) in Brisbane and an Adjunct Lecturer at the 
University of Queensland, Australia, I taught integrated water management courses 
which covered Mekong Basin water governance. I also led a two-week trip to Vietnam 
to meet with senior Government officials to discuss collaboration opportunities 
relating to water research. In 2009, I was invited to join a UNESCO-IHE working group 
on Water, Cultural Diversity and Global Environmental Change as a result of my 
experience in the Mekong Basin. As a member of this group, I presented material on 
Mekong Basin hydropower development at a UNESCO symposium in Kyoto Japan in 
2009. In 2010, building from these experiences and knowledge, I began my PhD.  
 
4.2 Methods in Political Ecology 
 
Early political ecology relied heavily on using “chains of explanation” as a method for 
the approach (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; See also Chapter 3). As political ecology 
developed and the approach broadened, however, political ecology’s interdisciplinary 
nature began to rely on multi-dimensional methods of analysis. This history of mixed-
methods has made for a wide degree of choice of methods from the suite of political 
ecology approaches (Bassett and Crummey, 2003; Batterbury et al., 1997; Fox et al., 




Hydropower development in the Mekong has been impacted by many historical and 
contemporary conditions that involve a large number of actors, asymmetric power 
relations and diverse narratives. The study is concerned with the examination of 
political, economic and social mechanisms and narratives associated with the Impact 
Assessment processes, which influence the trajectory of hydropower development 
and the distribution of its benefits and impacts at a meso-scale. These mechanisms 
are examined using a combination of case study analysis, interviews, participant 
observation and field work.   
 
The political ecology analysis of agendas behind narratives and policy statements 
from the Region help to highlight the key mechanisms while demonstrating the 
existence of the nuanced impacts of asymmetric power relations (Bassett and Zueli, 
2000). Hajer (1995) posits that the institutional context behind statements is as 
important as the statements themselves. Actors often interpret stories differently 
and across different scales. Their perspectives are determined by their backgrounds 
and the resulting interests and agendas. Furthermore, the existence or absence of 
state structures, the rule of law, regulations and transparency all influence how 
hydropower projects get on the agenda and are installed and who stands to benefit 
and lose from their construction. 
 
The mixed method approach is appropriate for political ecology because it allows the 
researcher to analyse and draw from a broad set of data to uncover the often non-







4.3 Methodological Considerations: Multiple meanings, inductive and 
deductive reasoning and scale 
 
4.3.1 Multiple Meanings 
 
Throughout the research process, the data collected were analysed in terms of 
multiple meanings, patterns, anomalies and types. The study recognizes that 
knowledge and facts cannot be separated from the researcher’s experience and 
expectations or the social and political contexts in which they are collected (Alversson 
and Skoldberg, 2000). Although the focus of this research is based on qualitative data, 
quantitative data have been used to establish other viewpoints and interpretations 
where possible. For example quantitative data was examined to measure the 
potential social and environmental impacts of dams in Laos. 
 
4.3.2 Inductive and Deductive Reasoning 
 
This research uses both inductive and deductive reasoning in its approach. As stated 
by Fine (2004), we are both inductive and deductive theorists as we learn from new 
situations and our exposure to ideas and theory increases, and then use this learning 
to produce new ideas and concepts. By using this reflexive approach the researcher 
continually reflects on the research questions and data collected to refine conceptual 
frameworks and, if needed, collect new data. Throughout this research, research 
questions were progressively checked against the data and information being 
assembled. If the data invalidated them they were adjusted. For example, the initial 
research questions were focused on the problems inherent in impact assessments in 
Laos. After my first scoping trip and reinforced by my intensive field work data, I 
realized that impact assessments were often just a rubber stamp for development. I 
found that asking what drives and enables the shapes and outcomes of the impact 
assessment process were more relevant to how hydropower was being constructed in 






A defining characteristic of political ecology is its analysis of scale (See Chapter 3). 
This research operates at a meso-scale to analyse the mechanisms that drive and 
enable hydropower development across the Basin, with a particular focus on Laos. 
The meso-scale allows the research to draw from influences in broad macro, meso 
and local scales. The Impact Assessment process sits within the meso-scale as it is 
influenced by both regional and local factors. Grounded research was also used to 
verify the data collected. Exploring research across these scales allows for richer, 
more meaningful findings. The importance of scale from a political ecology 
perspective is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.       
 
4.4 Research Stages 
 
The research comprised six stages that were continually revisited throughout the 
thesis. Adapted from Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) this five stage approach included: 
(1) setting the research questions; (2) developing the analytical framework; (3) 
developing the methodological framework; (4) collecting data and (5) analysing data. 
The research adopted a non-linear approach. Figure 4-1 shows how each stage of the 




Figure 4-1  Research stages Source: Author 
 
4.4.1 Five Stages of Research 
 
The following section outlines the interconnected stages of the research following 
from the inductive and deductive research process outlined above. 
 
Stage 1: Setting the research questions: The research questions were informed by 
insights and professional experience gained in the Mekong Basin prior to the 
inception of the study and by an extensive literature review conducted prior to 
commencing fieldwork. The questions were also influenced by my interest in how 
social power was being employed through hydropower development. During this 
stage, I reviewed the academic literature surrounding hydropower and had my 
research questions critiqued by a number of experts who work in the Region. This 
reflexive process helped to strengthen my initial questions and to improve my 
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research focus. The upgrade process and a presentation to the geography 
department at KCL provided further feedback. 
 
Stage 2: Developing the analytical framework: Stage 1 helped to frame the research 
and inform the development of the analytical framework. A strong analytical 
framework was essential as very little previous analysis has been conducted at a 
meso-scale into the mechanisms that drive and enable hydropower development 
across the Mekong Basin. The development of the analytical framework has been 
reflexive. With very little evidence available into the mechanisms that drive 
hydropower development across the Basin, I was motivated to seek feedback on the 
robustness of my research questions and findings throughout the PhD process. To 
meet this objective I presented my research at a number of seminars and conferences 
during the three years of the study. These presentations gave me opportunities to 
receive critical feedback and new sources of data from key informants across the 
Region and internationally. For example, during a presentation at the World Water 
Congress in 2011 in Brazil I received feedback from a lawyer working with the World 
Bank and a number of hydropower developers in the Region. I was able to meet with 
him for a more detailed discussion in Stockholm at the World Water Week in 2012. 
He provided a number of key insights into Government capacity in the Region. This is 
an area that I had not previously looked into in detail. The subsequent investigations 
turned out to be extremely fruitful for the research.  
 
As a participant observer, while asking questions and observing international and 
local meetings on hydropower and Mekong development, I have also been able to 
strengthen my research networks and collect data. Finally, I was able to test my 
findings by publishing a book chapter with Springer and a paper in Water 
Alternatives. These publications raised the international profile of my research and 
resulted in interviews with the Reuters, The Bangkok Post, and the LA Times and the 
environmental writer Fred Pearce. All this engagement extended my science and 
professional networks and provided ample opportunities for both positive and critical 
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feedback on my approaches. Table 4-1, lists the meetings and presentations attended 
for reflexive feedback during PhD research and the purpose of my participation.  
 
Table 4-1 Meetings attending during the PhD process and purpose of attendance.  
Source Author 
Meeting Type                           Primary Purpose of Participation. 
5th International Hydro-Hegemony Wokshop, 
King’s College London & University of East 
Anglia 8th – 9th May 2010 
Participant Observer: Discussions on research 
questions and networking.  
Stockholm World Water Week, Conference – 
September 1st – 7th 2010 
Participant Observer: Discussions on research 
questions and networking. 
XIVth IWRA World Water Congress, Porto de 
Galinhas, Brazil 24th – 28th September 2011 
Presenter: Using impact assessments as a 
lens to understand hydropower development 
in the Mekong Basin: 
Case study Lao PDR.  
University of Brunei Darussalam, Department 
of Geography 1st February 2012 
Presenter: The Mekong Basin Water and 
Energy Nexus. 
World Water Forum, Marseille, France.  
12th – 17th March 2012 
Presenter: Understanding the drivers and 
enablers of hydropower deve;p[,emt. 
UNESCO-IHE, Delft, Netherlands. 17th May 
2012 
Full day guest lecture: Water Planning and 
IWRM in the Mekong Basin. 
Stockholm World Water Week, Conference – 
26th – 31st August 2012 
Participant Observer: Discussions on data 
analysis and networking. 
King’s College London, 30th October 2012 Guest Lecture: Water and Energy in the 
Mekong Basin. 
The Challenge Program on Water and Food, Presenter: Managing Controversy in 
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Mekong Hydropower Forum, 13th – 14th 
November 
Hydropower Development. 
6th International Hydro-Hegemony Wokshop, 
King’s College London & University of East 
Anglia 11th – 12th January 2013 
Presenter: Tipping the Scales of Justice: 
Understanding notions of debt and justice in 
the Mekong hydropower debate. 
University of East Anglia, Norwich, 16th 
January 2013 
Invited talk: The political ecology of Mekong 
Hydropower. 
The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Oikos Society 1st March 2013 
Presentation: Impediments to sustainable 
hydropower in the Mekong Basin. 
Stockholm World Water Week, Conference – 
1st – 7th September 2013 August 2012 
Panelist: Achieving Justice Through 
Transboundary Water Cooperation. 
 
Stage 3: Developing the analytical framework: Stage 1 and 2 informed the 
methodological framework through the identification of appropriate and available 
research objectives. Political ecology was chosen as the overarching analytical 
framework because of its incorporation of political and ecological concerns. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, these two concerns are essential to the Mekong Basin, where 
people’s livelihoods and the environment are deeply intertwined. Political ecology is 
appropriate for this study because of its critical analysis of scale, discourses and 
mechanisms (see Chapter 3).  
 
The methods used for data collection and analysis were defined as case studies, 
document analysis, interviews, narrative analysis, participant analysis, grounded 
theory and triangulation. Each of these methods is discussed further below. Stages 1 
to 3 were constantly reviewed and refined throughout the PhD research as part of the 




Stage 4: Collecting Data: Guided by the research questions and the analytical and 
methodological framework, and informed by feedback from presentations and 
networking, the majority of data was collected between January 2011 and December 
2012. Data were collected through interviews, both informal and formal and from 
documents and secondary data sources. Through presentations and networking, the 
data was continually tested with international and domestic audiences.  
 
Stage 5: Analysing the data: Data collected in the field along with that from desk 
studies was used for analysis of the research questions. Interviews were transcribed. 
The theoretical framework of political ecology framed the analysis of the data in a 
critical light.  
 
4.5 Data Collection Methods 
 
The three primary methods used for data collection and analysis were: document 
analysis, interviews, and participant observation. Case studies, narrative analysis, 
grounded theory and triangulation were used reflexively to test or strengthen the 
data collected from the three primary methods. This rigorous form of data collection 
helped to remove bias while uncovering useful information.  
 
 
4.5.1 Document Analysis 
 
Document analysis is useful for qualitative research at two scales. At the micro scale, 
document analysis can help to understand the image that an organization wishes to 
portray (Travers, 2001). For example, a report from a hydropower developer helps to 
understand the type of image they wish to project to potential clients and critics. At a 
macro level, document analysis can be used to determine the extent that policies and 
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laws are being implemented and reflect the agenda of actors involved in the process 
(Travers, 2001). For example, in Laos, the analysis of laws and policies surrounding 
impact assessments was compared to the actual practice of developers to 
demonstrate that the practice and agenda of the Government was different than the 
one it promoted.  
   
Detailed document analysis consisted of both primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources included, memorandum of understandings, environmental impact 
assessments, minutes of meetings and negotiations, legal documents including 
agreements and reflections from consultants involved in the Impact Assessment 
process and websites and company reports. The reflections from consultants involved 
in the IA process provided valuable first-hand commentaries into the process and its 
perceived drivers and enablers. These sources helped to identify further points of 
research inquiry. Recognizing that reflections often include a degree of personal bias, 
I carefully checked the validity of these documents with other secondary sources.  
 
Secondary sources included published papers books on political economy, political 
ecology, political geography and analyses of the hydraulic development of the 
Mekong Basin. Secondary sources also include quantitative research studies of the 
environmental impacts of hydropower.  
 
Media articles were particularly useful to identify policy statements and narratives. 
This element of the research was significant as the media in the Mekong Basin are 
often controlled or heavily influenced by the state allied to private sector interests 
which together control the media. For this purpose I examined major English 
newspapers published in across the Basin as well as systematic searches using Google 
News. Grey literature was also used. This included brochures, newsletters, reports 
published by governments, NGOs, UN agencies, research institutions and consultancy 
firms. These were both printed and online documents. Some of the grey and media 
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literature was found in personal collections from long-term actors living in the Basin. 




Interviewing was one of the primary sources of research methods used. Interviews 
helped to strengthen and add colour to the document analysis. The research 
employed a combination of elite and non-elite interviews.  
 
By using elite interviewing the interviewee is free to highlight important events or 
incidents related to the research topic. A key benefit of elite interviewing is that ‘an 
exception, a deviation, an unusual interpretation may suggest a revision, a 
reinterpretation, an extension, a new approach’ (Dexter, 2006: 19).  
 
Elite interviewing can be particularly useful in transboundary water situations where 
there are many sensitive security issues. Elite interviewing can uncover previously 
unknown information or provide unique insights (Tansey, 2007). Elite interviewing, 
however, like any method has its limitations. It places emphasis on the interviewees’ 
interpretation of the topic. During elite interviewing there is a degree of flexibility in 
responses to the questions and the interviewer must decide when to intervene and 
when to ask for clarification and more information. As Berry (2002:680) states 
‘Interviewers must always keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject to be 
objective and to tell us the truth’. 
 
Successful elite interviewing requires that those using the method understand its 
limitations. Interviewers must remember that the subject is under no obligation to 
tell the truth (Berry, 2002). When conducting elite interviews, interviewers have 
sometimes to make snap decisions on when to intervene or steer the discussion. To 
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help to validate data collected through elite interviewing I used the triangulation 
methods discussed below.  
 
Elite interviewing is widely used in data collection. The sensitive political nature of 
hydropower, made even more sensitive by the announcement and ultimate start of 
construction of the Xayaburi dam (the first mainstream dam in the Lower Basin), 
resulted in elite interviewees being somewhat reluctant to participate in the research. 
Nonetheless, elites who did respond to interview requests provided valuable 
information. Access to elites for this research was facilitated by the networks 
established by the researcher in previous work in the Basin. These network facilitated 
contact with a number of elites in the Region, especially in Laos - the main focus of 
the study. As stated by Berry (2002) elite interviewing lends itself to open 
interviewing. “The best interviewer is not one who writes the best questions. Rather, 
excellent interviewers are excellent conversationalists.” (2002:4).  
 
When conducting elite interviews it is best to guide the conversation, but allow the 
interviewer as much freedom as possible (Dexter, 2006). Elites are used to being in 
charge. By providing them with the ability to control the interview, to a degree, you 
allow them the opportunity to speak freely. Dexter (2006) states that when 
conducting elite interviews, the interview should take into account the following 
special considerations: 
1. stressing the interviewee‘s definition of the situation, 
2. encouraging the interviewee to structure the account of the situation, 
3. letting the interviewee introduce to a considerable extent (an extent which will of 
course vary from project to project and interviewer to interviewer) his notions of 
what he regards as relevant, instead of relying upon the investigator‘s notions of 




Elite interviewees were identified by their prominent positions within organizations 
relevant to hydropower development. Through snowballing techniques and 
recommendations more interviewees were identified throughout the research 
process.  
 
The interview type was semi-structured using small sets of open ended questions.  
The semi-structured interview format takes into account the knowledge and 
expereince of the interviewee in shaping and conducting the interview. The questions 
focused around case studies and key events associated with hydropower 
development. Questions were adapted depending on the basin states and the 
background of the interviewee. For example during interviews with Laos Government 
officials questions concerning mainstream dams were often asked towards the end of 
the interview due to the sensitive nature of the subject. In interviewing these officials 
I discovered that questions surrounding older dams put the interviewee at ease and 
were a good lead into more difficult questions. In the case of Chinese actors they 
appeared much more open to discussing projects and strategy when they were 
outside of China than inside the country. The questions were designed to encourage 
the interviewee to offer thick descriptive explanations and their own interpretation of 
events. Interviewees were given freedom to discuss other topics related to the 
research. The majority of interviews were carried out face-to-face in the Mekong 
Region, with some conducted by telephone and Skype. Several interviewees were 
interviewed mutliple times.  
 
Triangulation provides the research with a method to verify findings through 
“―convergence, corroboration and correspondence of results from different 
methods” (Darlington and Scott 2002: 121). For this research, triangulation was 
conducted between primary and secondary data sources and from interviews. This 





Interviews included senior Government officials, senior employees of dam 
developers, political advisors, diplomats, consultants, local people, NGO staff, 
ministers, and senior and ordinary officers of the Mekong River Commission. These 
individuals were often intimately involved in the Impact Assessment process and in 
some cases directly in the hydropower decision-making process. The interviewees 
were initially selected on the basis of experience within the Basin and then on their 
availability to be interviewed. Interview groups are identified below in Table 4-2.   
 
 
Table 4-2 Interviews and Descriptions  
Source Author 
Interview Groups                           Description 
Hydro-cracy  Bureacrats from the Minisitries of 
Environment and Water Resources 
 River basin organization managers and 
project/program officers 
 Local politicans 
Academics  University research staff, research 
centres 
NGO Activists  Activists from local, regional and 
International NGOs focusing on water 
resources 
Consultants  Current and past consultants both 




Officers of international lending bodies 
and international organizations 
Project and programme officers from the 
World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank  
 
Before conducting interviews, I gathered as much information as possible on the 
interviewees. This helped to identify actual and potential bias in the data by situating 
responses in the context or previous experience (Berry, 2002). In many cases I verified 
data collected by asking same questions to other experts in the Region.        
 
English was used for the majority of interviews. The countries of the Lower Mekong 
Basin use English as a regional working langauge and when dealing with external 
actors. Furthermore, English has been the working language of the MRC and lower 
Mekong cooperation since the inception of the Mekong Committee in 1957. In the 
few cases where the interviewee did not feel uncomfortable a local researcher 
interpreter was used. The interpreter, had experience as a social science researcher 
and was aware of interview bias. I also rephrased questions to check for accuracy 
(Corbetta, 2003).  
 
The majortiy of interviews were not recorded in audio format. Instead shorthand 
notes were taken during the interview and more detailed notes were written up after 
the interview had concluded. This method allowed the interviewee to feel 
comfortable when discussing sensitive information. This was esepecially important 
for my study on account of the sensitive and controversal nature of hydropower 
development in the Mekong Basin. Furthermore, all interviewees were told that the 
data collected during this study was for academic research purposes and that they 
would be kept completely anonymous to avoid statements being attributed to any 
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indivudual. Many interviewees expressed concerns that previous academic studies 
had not done enough to protect interviewees or data.  
 
In order to prevent the identification of interviewees, interviews have been 
referenced by the year of the interview and under the following categories, where X 
corresponds to a number in the Appendix: Government official (GX), Private Sector 
Consultant (PSX), Development bank representative (ADBX or WBX), Civil society 
individual (CSX), Hydropower industry official (INX), MRC offical (MRCX), Media 
Individual (MX), Hydropower Lawyer (HLX), Fisheries Expert (FX) and Reporter (RX). 
 
Interviewing primarily in English had some analytical and methodolgocial 
consequences. Interviews were mainly conducted with experts and informants that 
were confident in their English ability. In elite interviews, the majority of Government 
officials who participated in the research were from the national level as most 
provincial and local officials did not speak English, nor were they willing to 
participate. This may have overly focused research findings on meso-scale issues. 
However, throughout the research process many informal conversations and 
meetings with local people and non-elite actors were used to verify the data collected 
in the elite interviews. Finally, as interviews were conducted in the participants’ 
second language there is always the possibility of misunderstanding. To minimize this 
I rephrased questions to ensure validity. Furthermore, my previous experience in the 
Mekong Basin was useful for understanding the cultural norms and meanings that 
emerge through language.  
4.5.3 Participant Observation  
 
Participant observation is one of the most comon forms of data collection in 
qualitative research. Participant observation allows the observer closer contact with 
others than shorter interviews may entail (Bryman, 2004). Longer time with others 
has the advantage of allowing the participant observer time to participate in the 
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same activities as the people being studied and understand the social setting in which 
the research is situated in detail (Bryman, 2004).  
 
Participant observation was utilized at a range of meetings and consultations in the 
Mekong Basin between January 2011 and December 2012. I partcipated and 
observed meetings involving civil society and the MRC as well as between state 
officials and consultants. I further participated and observed meetings with a range of 
water experts including NGOs, academics and researchers. Partcipant observation is 
an important area of data collection in the study of politics (McNabb, 2004). It is 
particularly useful in encouraging relfexive research when analysing case studies 
(Jorgensen, 1989). By observing meetings with a range of actors I was able to see how 
narratives clashed and how actors constructed narratives to support their own 
agendas. In the 2012 Mekong Hydropower Forum, for example, I observed a 
International Rivers (IR) representative attempt to critique an employee of Lancang 
Hydropower regarding their development plans for the Lower Sesan 2 dam in 
Cambodia. The juxtaposition of the two narratives, with International Rivers 
promoting a pristine undammed Basin needing protection and the Lancang 
Hydropower representative stating that development would bring important benefits 
with few environmental or social costs, was illustrative of the narratives that emerged 
in the media and my interviews.  Furthermore, partcipant observation was  useful for 
the study as it helped to inform the researcher about where to look for data and who 
to contact for interviews. Through participant observation I was also able to gain 
useful feedback on my observations.  
 
4.6 Case Studies 
 
Case studies are an appropriate research method for this study because they have 
provided in-depth descriptions and insights into the Impact Assessment process and 
grounded it with real examples. They are particularly useful for descriptive, 
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explanatory and exploratory purposes (Yin, 2009). Schramm (1971:23) states, “The 
essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it 
tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions …”.  During research, case studies 
helped to link narrative analysis and interviews with specific examples. For example, 
the study used the Xayaburi Dam as an exemplary case study with a number of 
smaller individual dam case studies to inform the empirical research. The Xayaburi 
was chosen as an exemplary case study for three reasons. First, because the 
controversial Environmental Impact Assessment process and the decision to build the 
dam unfolded during the period of my research. Second, because it was a new 
development very little or no research had been conducted into it previously. Third, 
the case study involved a number of actors and controversies associated with other 
hydropower developments in the Basin. The repetition logic of combining a detailed 
examination of the Xayaburi Dam case with smaller case studies helped to determine 
whether the case study findings were generalizable (Yin, 2009). The research 
questions helped to identify appropriate case studies and insights gained from them 
were linked to theoretical framework and then to the analytical framework.  
 
Dams in Laos were chosen based upon their size, prominence and data availability. 
The sensitive nature of hydropower and restrictions on visiting some sites made it 
impossible and unsafe to examine all dams in detail within the time constraints of 
PhD study. The dams examined, however, provide a range of examples from privately 
funded and developed through to World Bank and Asian Development Bank assisted 
projects.  
 
4.7 Narrative Analysis 
 
A narrative is broadly defined as telling a story (Berger, 1997). Narrative analysis 
enables researchers to examine the broader social and spatial relations that influence 
and inform policy positions and statements and interviews. Interpreting narratives is 
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an important skill where qualitative research is a significant element of a study (Limb 
and Dwyer, 2001). In interviews, narrative analysis provides an opportunity for 
dynamic perspectives to be introduced into the research topic. The challenge for 
researchers is to decide how to interpret and record these perspectives. Coding has 
been proposed as an effective method in analysing research (Coffey et al., 1996). A 
reliance on the highly structured nature of coding, however, often means that the 
layers of meaning within the interview are lost. For this reason, coding was not used 
in the study.  
 
For this study, narratives were analysed for their meanings. Narrative analysis focuses 
on the embedded meaning behind a particular story or statement. Narratives are 
generally presented as a presentation of connected events with a temporal structure 
(Labov, 1972). However, narratives also mirror culture, perceptions and agendas 
(Cortazzi, 1993). Labrov (1972) states that the narrative’s evaluation is essential to its 
analysis; in the evaluation of the narrative lays the information on how the story 
should be interpreted. For example, in the Mekong Basin, the pro-hydropower 
narrative and the policy statements behind it state that hydropower is good for the 
environment and essential for development. This is the story that developers and 
states want to emphasize to legitimize their decision-making. It also attempts to 
delegitimize other stories. Narratives emerge in ways that are meant to shape the 
impact on the audience. They are dynamic rather than passive descriptive statements 
(Cortazzi, 1993).  
 
Description itself is also subject to interpretation and stories are relayed in the way 
that the narrator wants the audience to see or relate to it. The narrator also attempts 
to explain a story in a way that is plausible and relevant to the audience (Labov, 
1972). By critically examining narratives we are able to begin to understand what 
motivates the narrator. When we combine this with an understanding of the larger 
political and social factors that frame narratives we can begin to develop a clearer 
picture of the agendas and meanings behind them. It will be discussed in Chapter 5, 
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how narratives are used by different actors across the Basin to legitimize their 
agendas while delegitimizing contesting agendas.    
 
There are some limitations to narrative analysis, however. Narrative analysis provides 
no guidance on where to focus. The researcher is left to decide what part of the 
narrative is the most important. This choice will be influenced by the researcher’s 
perceptions of the story and the political, economic and social frame in which it sits. 
Narrative analysis is one important part of the geographical methods, but it not the 
only method. This study has used narrative analysis in the Mekong Basin hydropower 
debate to draw out some of the nuances in meaning and hidden agendas behind 
actors who support or criticize hydropower development. In this study narrative 
analysis is especially useful for analysing policy statements that emerge from actors in 
the Region via reports and the media. By analysing the narratives and agendas behind 
these policy positions and combining this with an understanding of mechanisms 
within the state that allow powerful actors to benefit from hydropower we begin to 
see the differences behind the rhetoric and reality surrounding hydropower 
development.  
 
4.8 Grounded Theory 
 
Grounded theory is an inductive method used to develop theory and verify data from 
facts on the ground (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Although this research was conducted 
on a meso-scale the data were analysed against case studies and realities on the 
ground as a form of verification. Grounded theory was also used to help guide the 
research plan and assumptions formulated at the beginning of the study (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). For example in Chapter 6, the study first presents a broad discussion 
of political and ecological mechanisms that drive and enable hydropower in Laos. 
These mechanisms are then grounded with specific case studies that demonstrate 
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their social and ecological impacts. This reflexive approach strengthened the research 
process and the data collection methods.  
 
4.9 Potential Methodological Limitations 
 
Although care was taken to ensure that research methodologies were appropriately 
selected and critically examined throughout the research process, methodological 
limitations remain. First, the nature of hydropower development is a politically 
sensitive and sometimes a highly controversial topic linked to millions or billions of 
dollars in investment, and to security issues and political power. These links make 
data collection difficult for a postgraduate researcher. In some cases potentially 
useful information proved to be unverifiable and therefore had to be dismissed. The 
use of expatriate consultants in hydropower development in the Basin is widespread 
and there is a very high turnover of experts. Occasionally it was not possible to track 
down appropriate professionals and in other instances institutional or personal 
memories were lost. Rigorous analysis through triangulation and grounded theory 
was applied to ensure a high accuracy of data analysis and collection; however, 
should other interviews and documentation be available more comprehensive data 
may be collected.  
 
Second, this study’s focus is on Laos as it is the centre of hydropower development in 
the Mekong Basin. Despite this appropriate focus other hydropower developments 
are occurring across the Basin, including dam development in China, Myanmar, 
Cambodia and Vietnam. These were excluded due to data unavailability, security 
issues and time constraints. Laos, however, provided rich data for some elements of 
the analysis and is representative of broader basin drivers and enablers. Although 
Laos was the focus of the case study, some analysis of the other Basin countries, 
excluding Myanmar, is included to help frame and strengthen the argument. 
Myanmar was not included for any research both because of its small territory within 
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the Mekong Basin and because at the time of starting the research it was not deemed 
as a safe destination. Furthermore, there is limited data from Vietnam due to the 




This chapter has provided the methodological framework developed for the analysis. 
The methodological framework was informed by the theoretical and analytical 
framework presented in Chapter 3. The study uses case studies, document analysis, 
interviews and participant observation as the primary methods for data collection. 
These methods helped to guide the research path. In order to verify the data 
collected and to strengthen the analysis grounded theory, triangulation, case studies 
and narrative analysis were employed. This rigorous mixed method approach enabled 
the researcher to reflect constantly on the way the evidence base was evolving and 
where necessary adjust the research agendas. The methodological limitations of the 
study are reflected in its scope, the availability of data and the sensitive nature of the 
subject. The methods outlined in this chapter are presented in the following empirical 
chapters exemplified in case studies and data analysis. The next chapters present the 











This chapter uses a political ecology approach to examine the meso-scale narratives 
constructed by hydropower proponents and the changing roles of these actors in Laos 
and the Mekong Basin’s hydropower development since the 1990s. Bryant (1992:18) 
reminds us that “state policies are not developed in a political and economic 
vacuum.” (Bryant, 1992: 18). The chapter demonstrates that in the Mekong Basin, 
hydropower narratives form a key part of the agenda-driven development discourse. 
For example, a neo-liberal development discourse drives many of the state and 
multilateral development bank policies in Laos and the Region. At the same time, the 
analysis shows that narratives and policy statements also shape the political and 
economic nature of the hydropower development process. This process includes the 
complexities of project identification, investment, installation, and impacts. In all 
cases, narratives help us to recognize discourses across varying scales. 
 
There are multiple definitions of the term ‘discourse’. For the purpose of this 
research, discourse is defined as “a collection of concepts, ideas and categories 
through which meaning is given to phenomena” (Hajer, 1993:45). In this analysis, I 
apply this definition of discourse to hydropower development and its narratives. 
Various discourses can be based on historical references, or they can be constructed 
from ideologies and myths. Discourses contextualize and underpin the narratives and 
create a foundation for analysis (Hajer, 1995). 
 
Narratives and policy statements also help to identify changing roles amongst actors. 
Examining narratives and policy statements within the Basin’s broader political, 
economic and ecological frame, demonstrates which actors have taken on new roles 
since the rapid expansion of hydropower in the 1990s. These new roles provide 
important insights into how and why actors legitimise their activities in the 




The geographical emphasis of this chapter will be on China, Thailand, and Laos with a 
specific focus on China’s and Thailand’s active investments in hydropower within 
Laos. Although the focus of this study is on Laos, narratives from Thailand and China 
are also incorporated because many actors from these countries are active in, or 
linked to, hydropower development in Laos.  It should be noted that the omission of 
Cambodia from this analysis is because of Cambodia’s lack of hydropower 
development in Laos. Also, while Vietnam is active in some hydropower development 
in Laos, information on Vietnam proved to be limited, unavailable, or outside the 
capacity of the research resources available. 
 
Narratives from all hydropower actors are constructed around different scales. These 
scales legitimize or support the agenda of the actors while delegitimizing competing 
agendas and narratives. Hydropower narratives and discourses often converge during 
the Impact Assessment process as actors debate and contest the potential social and 
environmental impacts of dams. As identified in previous chapters, this study uses the 
Impact Assessment process as a focus of engagement to analyse where actors 
construct narratives that critically engage with the economic and social benefits and 
costs of hydropower development. The main scale of the analysis in this chapter is at 
the meso-scale. Hydropower development proponents predominately deploy 
narratives at the meso-scale because hydropower is framed to bring national and 
regional scale benefits.  
 
In the Mekong Basin, many of the narratives surrounding the environmental and 
social impact and benefits of dams appear in the state-controlled media and official 
documents from hydropower proponents. This chapter uses a combination of 
interviews, quotes from regional media, and official documents to critique the 
underlying narratives, agendas, and discourses on hydropower development. In much 
of S.E. Asia, the media is tightly controlled or heavily influenced by the state. The 
state uses the media as a signboard for its narratives, broadcasting policy statements, 




Chapter 3 demonstrated how a political ecology approach can enable a critical 
examination of narratives and scale. Political ecology helps to develop a critique of 
both the material and discursive drivers behind hydropower policy. Proponents of 
hydropower tend to frame hydropower development narratives around regional scale 
benefits while disregarding local scale impacts. The political ecological analysis of 
these narratives reveals that the narratives and policy statements in the Basin are 
driven by political, economic and historical factors that are more powerful than the 
regional scale benefits proclaimed by hydropower proponents. A political ecology 
approach also highlights how narratives and mechanisms influence hydropower 
development.  
 
Chapter 2 introduced the key actors in hydropower development in the Region 
including the MRC, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and each of 
the riparian states. Chapter 2 further revealed the diversity of the Mekong riparians, 
both in terms of geography and in their political economies. It also served as a 
historical background to hydropower development, demonstrating that there have 
been some enduring narratives since the 1950s. Chapter 4 highlighted the 
methodology used in this research, demonstrating how the Impact Assessment 
process will be used as a starting point to analytically frame the research. 
 
Two research questions guide the analysis in this chapter. First, what are the key 
narratives that legitimize the political and economic structures that drive and enable 
hydropower development in the Mekong Basin at the national and basin scale? 
 
It is hypothesized that under a neo-liberal discourse, narratives centred around 
poverty reduction through economic growth are key to legitimizing actors advocating 
hydropower development. Will to accumulate greater power and profits at the meso-
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scale, however, are the other hidden motivating and influential factors, which often 
go unexamined.  
 
The second question is, what new actors have emerged and how have roles changed 
in the current phase of hydropower transformation in Laos? 
 
It is hypothesized that due to neo-liberal discourses encouraging private investment, 
and due to political and economic changes in the Region, the private sector has 
assumed the role of primary hydropower funder and developer. This has resulted in 
the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) redefining their roles as 
knowledge experts through narratives and policy statements.  
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first four sections will examine, in turn, 
how development banks, China, Thailand and Laos each construct narratives and 
policy statements promoting hydropower development across different scales to 
legitimise their agendas. These four sections will also critically analyse the changing 
roles and relationships between these actors over the last decade of hydropower 
expansion. These sections will focus on the increased involvement of the private 
sector, and how these roles and relationships changed the landscape and narratives 
surrounding hydropower development across the Region. The actors mentioned 
above are not the only actors involved in hydropower development in the Basin. They 
have been selected based on their visibility, relevance to the aims of this study, and 
their identification during research. Finally, this chapter will critique the hydropower 
narratives evident in the Region. It should be noted that the majority of the Xayaburi 
Dam-related evidence and an analysis of INGO narratives is omitted as it will be 




5.2 Development Banks 
 
During the last 10 years, roles have shifted among the the key actors funding and 
developing hydropower projects in the Mekong Basin (Middleton, 2008; WB1, 2011). 
Prior to 2000, the WB and the ADB were the key funders of hydropower across the 
Mekong Basin. This was due to both the expertise that the WB and ADB had in 
developing large scale dams and the financing that they could mobilise.  As part of a 
neo-liberal development discourse, in the early 1980s, both the WB and the ADB 
encouraged countries in the Mekong Basin to accept increasing amounts of private 
sector support to develop their hydropower. This was part of the WB and ADB’s plan 
to use hydropower as an economic driver to bring the Basin out of  poverty 
(Middleton et al. 2009). In this way, the goal of poverty alleviation has underpinned 
the dominant narratives and much of the political agenda surrounding energy 
development in the Region for the last 30 years. 
 
The ADB has been working in the Mekong Basin since 1966 and all the lower riparian 
states are founding ADB members (ADB, 2012). Through the Greater Mekong Sub-
region (GMS) Programme, the ADB is currently sponsoring a number of large-scale 
infrastructure projects that it claims “help generate employment and significantly 
reduce poverty” (ADB, 2009: 2). The WB and the ADB have also been instrumental in 
establishing environmental and social guidelines for hydropower development within 
the Basin (King, Bird and Haas, 2007). 
 
In terms of facilitating hydropower development, the ADB has funded the 
construction of the GMS power grid, a network of high voltage transmission lines (See 
Chapter 2) to link hydropower dams with power markets in the Region. The ADB has 
also been active in directly funding hydropower dams including the Nam Theun 2 
Dam, the Theun Hinboun Dam, and the Nam Ngum 3. The ADB’s website and project 
documents consistently refer to hydropower development as “environmentally 
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sustainable renewable energy” and that income generated from these dams will 
assist the host country with “socio-economic development” (ADB, 2012). The ADB has 
often worked in collaboration with the WB in the Basin. 
 
The WB started working in the Mekong Region shortly after its inception in 1944. In 
1977, the WB began to provide assistance to Laos (Phraxayavong, 2009). The World 
Bank’s investment in hydropower is closely aligned with the ADB’s GMS Programme, 
including the co-funding of the Nam Theun 2 hydropower Dam. Like the ADB, the WB 
also links hydropower development to economic growth, sustainable energy, and 
poverty alleviation. In 2006, the WB and ADB collaborated with the MRC to produce 
the influential Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy (MWRAS). The MWRAS 
estimated that only 10% of the Mekong Basin’s hydropower potential was being 
utilized and argued that the Basin had the “flexibility and tolerance” to develop much 
more of its hydropower potential. The MWRAS report promotes a narrative of 
hydropower as essential for economic growth that the WB and the ADB used to 
support their activities in the Basin. 
 
Crucially, the MWRAS completely ignores the multiple uses of water. By suggesting 
that water unused for hydropower is ‘not reaching its potential’, the strategy ignores 
the well documented impact of hydropower on fisheries and livelihoods. Water is a 
fundamental part of culture and livelihoods in the Mekong Basin (Cornford and 
Matthews, 2010; Matthews, 2012 etc.). The MWRAS report focuses solely on 
evaluating the potential monetary and economic impacts that water has on countries 
in the Region. It does not account for the fact that hydropower impacts water quality, 
quantity, livelihoods of the poor, and ecosystems’ health upstream and downstream. 
The MWRAS further ignores the fact that fisheries in the Mekong are primarily 
migratory and closely linked to the flood pulses of the river (environmental trends 




For decades, the WB and the ADB have pushed policy statements that de-emphasize 
hydropower development’s environmental impacts while emphasizing its potential 
economic benefits (See Chapter 2). The MWRAS report builds on these arguments, 
criticizing previous development in the Region as being too cautious and risk averse 
(MWRAS 2006:4). Statements from the report recognize that impacts will occur, but 
compare them with what are stated to be the larger benefits associated with 
hydropower, suggesting that “development and the ensuing changes in water use 
may have negative but also important positive impacts” (MWRAS, 2006:4). The 
MWRAS had far-reaching influence as a guide for policy makers. Policy makers are 
encouraged to form decisions around trade-offs with negative impacts that can be 
resolved through regional cooperation. Furthermore, the report makes no attempt to 
define key terms such as trade-offs or sustainability as they relate to hydropower 
development. 
 
Sneddon and Fox (2012) use a political ecology approach to argue that narratives 
from the WB and the ADB frame the Mekong as a Region in need of economic 
development through the construction of large dams. This framing places the benefits 
of large dams at regional or grand scales. It emphasizes the role of economic 
cooperation and integration while ignoring the integrating role of the Basin’s 
biophysical world. Furthermore, the MWRAS report calls for cooperation in managing 
impacts, an approach that seems to contrast with the political reality of hydropower 
development. Hydropower is often debated in non-transparent political spaces that 
exclude ideas such as cooperation. As a ‘contested’ form of development, 
hydropower sparks fundamental debates over its necessity. However, its impacts and 
benefits must be established transparently before any actors can achieve real and 
open public support. 
 
The WB and ADB aprooach supports private sector involvement in mainstream dams. 
By encouraging private sector investment in dams, the ADB and WB used the strategy 
to reposition their roles away from key funding and development agencies to that of 
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leaders and actors in capacity building. This is underscored by the MWRAS report that 
emphasizes the ADB and WB leadership in the Basin and their “multilateral character 
and stature, ability to mobilize global knowledge and experiences, and operational 
involvement in investment programs” (MWRAS, 2006:52). 
 
Highlighting the ADB and WB’s leadership skills may be an attempt to reassert their 
authority in the Basin. As Middleton et al. (2009) states, the ADB and the WB have 
been forced to reframe their role in hydropower development as knowledge experts 
and public-private partnership builders. This reframing began to emerge during the 
1990s with a phase in the neo-liberal era that encouraged heavy private sector 
involvement. Emphasising the WB’s view on private sector investment, Briscoe 
(1999), a former Senior Advisor with the World Bank, writes that the rapid shift to 
private sector investment improves performance, and reduces demands on public 
funds creating space for essential services. 
 
Escobar (1996) reminds us that the WB has attempted, however unsuccessfully, to 
restructure underdeveloped societies since the 1950s. This restructuring has emerged 
through its export of Western development economics, its definitions of poverty, and 
its exporting of expert knowledge and discourses. Escobar (ibid) argues that in fact 
these policies and agendas have created poverty. The WB has used the definition of 
poverty, under a neo-liberal discourse and Western market framework, as a 
justification for its activities. Cornford and Matthews (2009) demonstrate how the 
ADB’s policies in the Mekong are closely aligned to those of the WB by highlighting 
specific ‘claimed mandates’ of development. The ADB’s economic transformation of 
the Region exacerbates the difficulties faced by the most vulnerable people, such as 
ethnic minorities and natural resource dependant groups. While neo-liberal agendas 
that champion private land rights, commercial fishing and logging, and 
interconnectivity, shift poor communities from their traditional areas of food security 




Many of the MWRAS report’s conclusions are open to criticisms of bias because they 
emphasize the benefits of hydropower based on WB and ADB hydrological modelling. 
According to the MWRAS strategy, 
“The development scenarios modelling exercise demonstrated that the 
Mekong River system has significant tolerance for development, including 
for hydropower and water diversion for irrigation” (MWRAS, 2006:33). 
 
This modelling has been criticized as purposely designed to support the conclusions of 
the report. Adamson’s (2006) study argues that the report’s modelling does not 
consider the changes hydropower dams place on the river. The modelling ignores key 
environmental considerations such as sediment loads, fisheries and river ecology, 
water quality, the flood pulse nature of the river, and climate change issues, all of 
which have been shown to be vital to the Basin ecology (Kummu and Varis, 2007; 
Dugan et al. 2010). As Käkönen and Hirsch (2010) state, the models and data behind 
the statements suffer from a lack of transparency that undermines their validity and 
their purpose. 
 
The claims of bias in the reports are also supported by fisheries experts in the Basin. 
As one expert has stated, “the models were completely inadequate for the 
conclusions drawn throughout the report that stated the Basin was able to handle 
lots of dams” (F1, 2011). The WB and the ADB used the modelling in the MWRAS as a 
tool to support and legitimize their policy recommendations and strategies 
surrounding hydropower. Through the use of expert knowledge, they have 
constructed and shaped the risks of hydropower to be subservient to the benefits. 
Dean (1999:177) states that defining risks “is a way of representing events in a certain 
form so they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques 
and for particular goals.” By defining the impacts of hydropower as easily governable, 
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the ADB and the WB are able to support their neo-liberal agendas and legitimize their 
own activities in the Region. 
 
World Bank policy statements from Thailand espouse similar framing of hydropower 
impacts to those of the MWRAS strategy. In a 2007 statement, the World Bank 
explained that "Thailand is helping its neighbour make the best use of its resources" 
(World Bank, 2007). This statement is a political value judgement with many 
assumptions. It raises questions such as: does Thailand know what is best for the 
people and environment of Laos? Is hydropower always the best use of water? 
Considering that Thailand is the regional power that has a culture of supposed 
superiority over Laos, the assumptions underpinning this perspective on hydropower 
development in Laos potentially reflect the standing power asymmetries in the Basin. 
 
Apart from being a highly influential document, the MWRAS marked an important 
turning point in the MRC’s relationship with the ADB and the WB (Middleton, 2007). 
The MRC’s involvement and endorsement of the report signalled a shift that it was 
interested in not only the management of the Mekong Basin, but its development 
(Hirsch, 2006). A former MRC official stated that “the MRC’s involvement in the 
MWRAS was in response to member pressure asking for more involvement of the 
MRC in development projects” (MRC2, 2012). Prior to the MWRAS, both the WB and 
the ADB had stepped back from funding large-scale hydropower dams due in part to 
the findings of the World Commission on Dams Report in 2000. After construction on 
the Nam Theun 2 dam began in 2005, however, both the World Bank and the ADB 
used the MWRAS as justification to return to supporting and funding large 
hydropower dams. This timing coincided with investor reassurance and the 
stabilization of markets following the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crises. The MRC’s 
member states were keen to follow the growth patterns of other Asian tigers 
(Segerstrom, 2011). In order to capitalize on the potential of water resources 
identified in the MWRAS, the MRC was urged by its members to focus on 




The WB and the ADB have constructed narratives supporting hydropower 
development around poverty alleviation and economic growth to legitimise political 
and economic structures within a neo-liberal development discourse in the Mekong 
Basin. The WB and ADB use their power and a neo-liberal development discourse to 
define poverty and restructure underdeveloped societies. Private-sector led 
hydropower is championed as a key solution to this underdevelopment. The MWRAS 
strategy emphasises the benefits of hydropower while downplaying its potential far 
reaching negative socio-ecological impacts. These narratives further allow the WB 
and the ADB to legitimise their agendas.  
 
The MWRAS report also creates a new space for the the ADB and the WB within 
hydropower development as knowledge brokers and experts essential to the process. 
ADB plans include working closely with states and the private sector in the Region to 
develop infrastructure through the GMS Programme to facilitate hydropower 
development. The ADB recognizes that its funding is increasingly less appealing to 
states in the Region, due to its “strict environmental and social policies, which 
governments increasingly see as a nuisance” (ADB 1, 2010). Recent evidence of the 
shift away from ADB funding can be seen in the Nam Ngum 3 dam. On 18 December 
2012, the ADB agreed to finance the Nam Ngum 3 dam in Laos stating that “Earnings 
from clean energy exports are vital to poverty reduction efforts in landlocked Laos, 
where one in every three people survive on less than US$ 1.25 a day,” (Vientiane 
Times, 2012d). In July 2013, however, the dam is showing as cancelled on the ADB 
website and rumours around Vientiane are that Shino Hydro is now funding the 
project (ADB2, 2013). 
 
The dominant narrative from the ADB and the WB, influenced by a neo-liberal 
development discourse is that hydropower is essential for the economies of the 
Lower Basin. This narrative ignores the negative impacts of hydropower and 
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emphasises its benefits. The ADB and WB have shaped this narrative to serve their 
own agendas and create new roles for themselves in the hydropower space. The ADB 
and WB narrative have increased the role of the private sector in hydropower 
development. The influx of private sector investment in hydropower was also enabled 
by the rapid development of the economies of the Mekong Basin over the past 
decade. 
 
5.3 The State and Private Sector 
 
Many examples of the alignment of private sector and state interests occur in 
developed and developing countries. They occur in industries such as defence, 
energy, pharmaceuticals and in food and agriculture. As outlined in Chapter 2, from 
the early development of the Basin to the present day, the lower riparian states have 
had both conflicting and harmonious interests in water resource and hydropower 
development. State-owned enterprises are the main actors involved in hydropower 
development in contemporary communist countries like Laos, China and Vietnam. As 
Studwell (2007) points out in his analysis of money and power in S.E. Asia, one of the 
ways in which powerful actors in Asia were able to amass wealth was through 
political connections and the collusive, non-transparent links between the state and 
private sector. Although state and private sector collusion is not unique to the 
Mekong or developing countries, the history and strength of these ties has created 
fertile ground for corruption (ibid). 
 
Another key element of hydropower development has been globalization and the 
often-associated neo-liberal agenda that encourages private sector involvement in 
areas that were previously dominated by the state. As Studwell (ibid) demonstrates, 
the key difference between developed and developing countries is the pervasiveness, 




Within the riparian communist countries of the Mekong Basin there have been 
further changes in the relationship between states and private sectors. Laos, Vietnam 
and China are one party communist states, yet they have been moving towards free-
market economic reforms since the late 1980s (Molle et al., 2009). These economic 
reforms, pushed forward by neo-liberal policies, have opened up space for private 
sector involvement in the electricity sector and in hydropower development. This in 
turn has created opportunities for public-private partnerships to be established. In 
Thailand, one of the main hydropower developers in the Region, these reforms have 
resulted in the establishment of a number of Independent Power Producers (IPPs). 
Despite Thailand’s independent status, Thai IPPs are often partially owned by state 
companies. Due to the close relationship between the state and the private sector 
across hydropower development this requires an integrated analysis of both actors. 
 
The statements of the aforementioned ADB official and the development of the Nam 
Mang 3 dam both illustrate how private sector investment in hydropower appears to 
be potentially more attractive to developers and states than development bank-
funded projects. This outcome has three explanations. First, private sector 
investment is able to mobilize resources and investment quickly. In the rapidly 
developing Mekong Basin, the ability of governments to act quickly on opportunities 
is perceived as important for their growth. This demand for growth is further 
emphasized by a neo-liberal agenda that has pushed them to reach normative 
milestones characteristic of middle income countries by 2020 (Vientiane Times, 
2012d). 
 
The second explanation can be found in the ADB and the WB’s extensive safeguards 
and investment regulations. These regulations are a result of decades of advocacy 
pressure to ensure that social and environmental impacts of development are 
adequately considered. In the Mekong Basin’s regional private sector, these 
safeguards and regulations are often absent or significantly streamlined to suit rapid 
development. China, for example, operates a policy of non-interference and follows 
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the laws of the country it invests in with regards to hydropower (Hackley and 
Westhuizen, 2011). This means that Chinese investments are not required to meet 
the international investment laws and policies with which the ADB and WB comply. 
 
Finally, private sector investment in Mekong hydropower development is primarily 
from within the Region. This regional investment may be more attractive to states 
business culture and in terms of potential opportunities for regional alliances and 
collaborations on wider trade and security related issues (Shankleman, 2009; 
Grumbine et al., 2012; ADB1, 2011). The modes and mechanisms of private sector 
investment that allows investors and developers to circumvent laws on the mitigation 
of Environmental and Social Impact in Laos will be explored in detail in the next 
chapter. 
 
In general, within the Mekong Region, the state and the private sector often work 
closely together in hydropower development. This may be due to the political nature 
of tightly controlled communist states that require many private sector actors to be 
linked to and regulated by the Government. 
 
Private sector involvement in hydropower across the Basin tends to happen in an 
unfettered way, attracting little attention from NGOs and the media. This may be due 
to the fact that NGOs and the media tend to focus on Government actions in terms of 
hydropower development. Although the private sector can offer funding and 
resources for dam construction, the state makes the ultimate decision on whether it 
proceeds. Nevertheless, in the Mekong, the blurred lines between the state and the 
private sector mean that private sector may be unduly influential on the progression 




This section used a political ecology approach to critically examine hydropower 
narratives from China, Thailand and Laos to uncover the often hidden motivating and 
influential factors behind the policy statements. State and the private sector in the 
Mekong Basin construct narratives as a way to legitimise their activities and disguise 
their agendas. These narratives have consequences for the environment and local 
people because they tend to downplay the socio-ecological costs of dams. The 
narratives also demonstrate the shifting roles of actors within the Basin’s hydropower 
development.  
 
In many of the Mekong countries, there is very little transparency in both the 
activities of the state and the private sector. Hydropower development is especially 
opaque because of the political nature of water management and the large cost and 
potential impacts of dams. Although transparency in private sector activities is an 
issue in many parts of the world, in the Mekong Basin, the private sector is arguably 
less open to public scrutiny. This is due to a number of contributing factors, including 
the weakness of civil society, a lack of transparency and accountability and the tightly 
controlled nature of the state. These mechanisms will be further explored in Chapter 
6. Due to the non-transparent nature of hydropower development, narratives are 
examined through the state-controlled press and in official reports. These are then 







As highlighted in Chapter 2, China is the largest and most powerful actor in the 
Mekong Basin with five existing dams on the Upper Mekong mainstream and three 
planned. China is involved in the Mekong Basin hydropower in two important ways: in 
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its development of the Lancang cascade as discussed in Chapter 2, and in its 
increasing involvement in the hydropower development and funding in the Lower 
Basin. 
 
China is currently the world leader in hydropower construction. In its 12th Five-year 
Plan (2011-15), it announced its intentions to develop eight hydropower zones with 
over 60 large-scale hydropower projects bringing the total installed capacity of 
hydropower within the country to 284 GW (CBI, 2012). China’s hydropower 
development, however, is not confined to its borders. State-owned hydropower 
companies such as Sinohydro Corp., Lancang Hydro and Dongfang Electric Corp. (all 
financed by Chinese banks) are constructing approximately 300 projects in 72 
countries worldwide, with over 30 in the Mekong Basin (Macdonald et al., 2009). 
 
China has employed a number of domestic and regional narratives over the past 
three decades to legitimize and drive its political and economic agendas in the Basin. 
The domestic narrative of hydropower emphasizes it as a modernizing development 
with little or no costs. For example, policy statements surrounding the transfer of 
electricity west from Yunnan were part of China’s policy to “open up and develop the 
backward people of Western China” (Magee, 2004:24). Other statements included 
referring to hydropower in Western China as “opening the door to prosperity” (Q. 
Chen, Liu Liu, and Ying Zhang, 2005 cited in Magee, 2004). Chinese power company 
document titles from this period, e.g. “Send Western Electricity East bears a strong 
soldier” or constructing an “electricity mother ship”, highlight conceptions of Chinese 
ingenuity and domination over nature through hydropower development (Henan 
Province Electric Power co. 2004 cited in Magee, 2004). These statements 
demonstrate a development discourse of water and ecosystems as resources that 
need to be utilised and controlled to provide benefits. This discourse is similar to the 
neo-liberal hydropower narratives promoted by the Mekong Committee in the 1970s 
and 1980s (see Chapter, 2). The use of these narratives by hydropower companies 
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also signifies the shifting role from state-led to private sector led hydropower 
development.  
 
In early 2000, policy statements from China promoting hydropower development 
designed for international audiences began to increase. These statements coincided 
with China’s construction of dams on the Upper Mekong mainstream. They marked a 
shift away from the focus on modernization and domination to one of hydropower’s 
benefits. An article published in China’s Xinhua news agency (2002) quotes an official 
Chinese hydropower expert on dam construction on the Lancang5, “Establishment of 
the power station will benefit all countries along the river…[and] the experience of 
building power stations on international rivers has proved that they exert no negative 
influences on the environment" (Xinhua news, 2002). These early Mekong Basin 
narratives appear to be mainly directed towards international concerns about China’s 
mainstream hydropower ambitions and the potential transboundary impacts of these 
dams. 
 
Chinese international and domestic policy statements surrounding hydropower speak 
to a particular neo-liberal development discourse prevalent in China, S.E. Asia and 
much of the rest of the world. They emphasize hydropower as modern and essential 
for electricity to power economic development. They further coincide with the 
educational background of many of China’s top politicians. Hu Jintao, President of 
P.R. China and former Chairman of the Communist Party of China is a graduate of 
Tsinghua University’s Water Conservancy Engineering Department. A number of 
other members of the Politburo are water engineers. It follows that the leadership of 
China would be naturally inclined towards engineering-led development in water 
resource management, of which hydropower would be a key component. 
 
                                                          
5
 The Mekong River is known as the Lancang within China.  
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Chinese policy statements are unequivocal in terms of the positive outcomes of 
hydropower development, going so far as to declare that hydropower will have no 
environmental and social impacts. These views demonstrate an indifference to or a 
deliberate rejection of  hydropower’s proven environmental and social impacts and a 
complete disregard for science. Studies show that China’s cascade of dams on the 
Lancang will impede vital sediment flows, reduce water levels by as much as 30% 
during the rainy season and could impact rivers and the environment as far as 
Vientiane, the capital of Laos. Increases in salinity intrusion in the delta, for instance, 
can seriously impact fisheries in both Thailand and Laos (He et al., 2006; Kummu and 
Varis, 2007; Räsänen et al., 2012; etc.). By ignoring these studies, the Chinese 
Government evinces a desire to control the narrative of hydropower development, 
using its political power to cast hydropower in a light that suits its policy agendas and 
international and domestic strategies. 
 
Although Chinese foreign policy previously revolved around the position that 
“whatever action China takes to exploit the Mekong’s potential is purely an internal 
matter”, it has now begun to move away from these unilateralist positions (Dupont, 
2001:129). Since 2000, following the development of the mainstream dams and its 
increasingly ambitious domestic and regional hydropower plans, China has couched 
its rigid policy stance in ‘peace’ rhetoric, highlighting the ‘win-win’ outcomes for 
downstream riparian states. Although China still rarely discusses the negative impacts 
of dams it is more communicative with the Lower Basin states. Liebman (2005) argues 
that in communicating with the Lower Basin, China has used a number of pious 
statements that frame the benefits of hydropower as being shared so as to avoid 
appearances of being a hegemon within the Region. 
 
Examples of this position can be seen in Chinese political speeches. During a speech 
at the MRC in 2010, H.E. Song Tao, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China stated that “hydropower development of the Lancang River can 
improve navigation conditions and help with flood prevention, drought relief and 
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farmland irrigation of the lower reaches” and that the development would include 
“equal consultation, stronger cooperation, mutual benefit and common 
development” (MRC, 2010c). The speech made no mention of potential negative 
impacts or how they would be mitigated.  
 
The narrative that China is ‘helping its neighbours’ and that hydropower will ‘benefit 
everyone’ in the Basin is further emphasized in the National Development and 
Reform commission’s Country Report on China's Participation in Greater Mekong Sub-
region Cooperation (Xihuan, 2008). From the outset, the executive summary of this 
report constructs and directs the narrative of ‘win-win’ with the following statement: 
“China is willing to work with the other GMS countries to bring GMS 
cooperation to an ever greater depth, so as to speed up infrastructure 
construction, push forward facilitation and liberation of trade and investment, 
and try to realize regional interconnection in the GMS; to boost ability building 
and mutual exchanges [sic], strengthen the integral competitiveness, promote 
the overall economic and social development, and raise the living standards of 
the people of the Region; further consolidate and develop China's traditional 
relationships with the other GMS countries and jointly create a regional 
environment characterized by peace and stability, mutual trust, and win-win 
cooperation. “ (Xihuan, 2008) 
 
These ‘win-win’ narratives can also be found in the English version of the People’s 
Daily, the official Chinese online newspaper. An article entitled What to do after 
becoming a big power (People’s Daily, 2004) discusses how other ASEAN countries 
can “have a share of the benefit from China's rise” and that the benefits of China’s 
dams will include flood control and will even help water use and drought downstream 
by storing water during the flood season and releasing it during the dry season 




Attempts by China to frame hydropower as beneficial to all reflect more than a desire 
not to appear as the hegemon. This narrative hides a regional agenda of state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) to develop economic ties with the Lower Basin and to serve security 
energy reserves for the growing Chinese economy. Following the increasing use of the 
narrative that promotes hydropower as a ‘win-win’, China’s role as a funder and 
developer of tributary dams in the Mekong Basin in Laos and Cambodia has increased 
significantly (Middleton, 2008). The distribution of large-scale Chinese dams in the 
Region is as follows: Myanmar 30, Laos 13, Cambodia seven and Vietnam 3 (Urban et 
al., 2009). These projects are financed, developed, constructed, and contracted out 
primarily to Chinese SOEs. The increase in hydropower development has also 
followed a rapid rise in Chinese investment in the Basin.  
 
Between 2003 and 2008, Chinese trade with S.E. Asia more than tripled (Moore, 
2009). On a country-by-country basis, the value of trade with China in 2010 came to 
$46.0 billion for Thailand, $27.3 billion for Vietnam, $4.7 billion for Myanmar, $1.3 
billion for Cambodia, and $1 billion for Laos. China is the largest trading partner for 
Myanmar, Vietnam, and Laos, and is Thailand's second largest, and Cambodia's third 
(Gronholt-Pederson, 2013; Chen Y.W., 2012; Heng, 2012). China is currently 
Cambodia’s largest aid donor and foreign investor and has built much of its 
infrastructure. Furthermore, China's aid programs to Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar 
are currently greater than those of the U.S. (Kurlantzick, 2007). In order to paint a 
clear picture of China's influence on Lower Mekong Basin trade, aid and investment 
must be viewed as a package, rather than as separate initiatives. Urban et al., 
(2009:312) describe how these elements are packaged together: 
“The Chinese practice is hence often to bundle aid, trade and investment by 
providing, for example, both investments and concessional loans for dam 
building and linking this to the export of electricity coupled with the import of 




The spread of Chinese investment into the Lower Mekong Basin is important for 
China’s energy security. In terms of hydropower, Lower Mekong Basin development 
offers more benefits to China’s energy security when compared to dam building 
projects abroad. One of the crucial differences between Chinese hydropower 
development in the LMB and projects in Africa or South America is connectivity to 
China's electricity grid. The close proximity of the Lower Mekong Basin allows for 
electricity to be imported into China's rapidly growing urban centres (Urban et al., 
2009). Energy security is a major concern for Chinese decision-makers, who have set a 
goal of having 15% of the energy portfolio to come from non-fossil fuels by 2015, of 
which half is planned to come from hydropower (CEP, 2012). These aggressive energy 
goals outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) have spurred a flurry of large dam 
construction and cascade projects in China and regionally. 
 
The political ecology analysis shows that Chinese Government uses the narrative of 
hydropower as ‘win-win’ with little environmental or social negative impacts as a tool 
to disguise China’s political and economic agendas in the region. Lower Mekong Basin 
hydropower development is important to the growth of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises and China’s broader energy security. These narratives also hide the 
environmental and social costs of dams. In this way, narratives not only disguise 
growth they also shape the way hydropower is developed in the Basin. Thailand also 
uses narratives surrounding hydropower development to mask political and economic 





Thai state interests in hydropower are expressed through activities of the state-
owned EGAT. EGAT uses narratives to entrench its power and shape the way dams 
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are built in neighbouring countries. Hydropower development is justified by the 
securitization of energy and policy statements that frame hydropower as a win-win.   
 
EGAT has a monopoly over electricity generation and distribution within Thailand, 
and actively invests in hydropower and natural gas projects in its neighbouring 
countries of Laos and Burma (Wisuttisak, 2012a). Despite EGAT’s considerable power 
and influence over state and private energy investments, strong civil society 
opposition to domestic hydropower has also shaped Thai energy policy outside and 
within the country. 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, from 1960 to 1990, Thai state energy policies focused on 
domestic hydropower projects.  As a consequence of the unpopularity of the Pak 
Mun Dam, however, domestic hydropower became politically unrealistic from the 
late 1990s (Hirsch, 1995). According to the Thai EPPO, existing potential for 
hydropower in Thailand is 15,155 MW with only 3,438 MW of installed capacity 
(EPPO, 2010 cited in Sawangphol and Pharino, 2011). Despite this latent hydropower 
potential there are currently no plans to develop any large-scale hydropower dams in 
Thailand. Thai civil society has been successful in ensuring that Thailand’s energy 
policies do not adversely impact on Thai natural resources and local people 
(Sukkumnoed et al., 2006; Foran, 2006). 
 
With hydropower a politically sensitive issue in Thailand, EGAT and Thai IPPs have 
used policy statements to justify hydropower investment in neighbouring countries 
where they do not encounter civil society opposition (Matthews, 2012). These 
investments and their potential profits have created opportunities for new actors to 
emerge in hydropower development. Thai banks and construction companies are 
increasingly active in hydropower development in Laos (Middleton et al., 2009). The 
monopolistic structure of the Thai energy sector combined with the potential profits 
available from hydropower development have contributed to Memoranda of 
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Understandings on power purchases being signed with Laos for 7000 MW by 2015. 
The majority of this supply comes from hydropower. As of 2011, Laos hydropower 
projects were supplying approximately 1450 MW (Foran et al., 2010b; Cruz-del 
Rosario, 2011). 
 
Narratives from the Thai state and EGAT are less common than in other countries. 
This may be due to the negative image of domestic hydropower. Nevertheless, they 
do occasionally emerge. In 2005, the governor of EGAT, Sitthiporn Ratanopas, 
described the Mekong Basin’s power development plans and hydropower generation 
as a “win-win game for everyone” (The Nation, 2005). In 2007, the Thai Minister of 
Energy, Piyasvasti Amranand stated that “Hydro-projects in Laos have shown the 
world that hydro-projects can be environmentally-friendly" (The Nation, 2007). Like 
China, Thailand constructs a hydropower narrative that positions hydropower as both 
essential to the Thai economy and having little or no environmental impacts. This 
narrative allows EGAT and the Thai private sector to justify its investments and profit 
from development and externalise the costs of development in neighbouring 
countries, such as Laos.  
 
Thai narratives are largely driven by EGATs dual role as both supplier and distributor 
of electricity and the power this dual role gives it in the Thai state. EGAT’s dual role 
gives it a vested interest in high energy demand, which ultimately drives hydropower 
investment and development. EGAT’s vested interest has resulted in a number of 
policy positions to justify hydropower investment and development. Thailand’s 
hydropower investments in the Basin are often labelled as an important component 
of Thailand’s sustained growth and energy security. For example, Thailand’s power 
Development Plans (PDP), which forecast the country’s power growth, securitizes 
energy supply, and states that extensive investment in renewables (primarily 





Greacen and Greacen (2012) argue that hydropower narrative and supporting policy 
statements from EGAT are constructed for the purpose of profiteering and 
accumulating power. Greacen and Greacen’s extensive analysis of the Thai energy 
sector illustrates how, from 1992 to 2007, EGAT’s Power Development Plan over-
projected demand 12 years in a row (Greacen and Palettu, 2007: Greacen and 
Greacen, 2012). By over-projecting demand, EGAT is able to justify further 
investments in hydropower development. This ‘overstating narrative’ at the same 
time emphasizes the need and benefit of hydropower, justifying and enhancing 
EGAT’s rise in Thai political power and resulting in positive political and economic 
outcomes. 
 
Cheap power for consumers and industry is important for the success of political 
parties. In Thailand, electric power has been at the centre of national politics for the 
last three decades and continues to play a prominent role. Over the past 30 years, 
Thailand’s annual electricity demand has grown by 3-7% (Jarvis, 2010). Much of this 
growth has been spurred by Government policies to scale up investments in the 
industrial sector and by the growing consumption of electronic goods by increasingly 
affluent households. Thailand currently relies on natural gas to supply 70% of its 
electricity demand (Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO), 2007). With 
approximately 30 years of supply left, hydropower is increasingly prioritized by EGAT 
as an essential source to meet this demand and provide a clean source of renewable 
energy. At the same time, EGAT has ignored calls for electricity saving plans which do 
not offer potential profits or increased influence (Greacen and Greacen, 2012). 
 
Since 1969, EGAT has been responsible for all electricity transmission and the 
majority of electricity production in Thailand. EGAT has striven to remain the top 
player in the Thai energy sector keeping its dominant bureaucratic control despite 




In the 1970s and 1980s, EGAT struggled under massive costs and burgeoning debt. A 
series of reforms were proposed as part of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank conditional structural adjustment loans. These reforms included calls for 
the privatisation of EGAT, and the introduction of privately operated IPPs (Wisuttisak, 
2012b). In spite of the implementation of these reforms, the enterprise remained 
state-owned. 
 
In fact, these initial reforms resulted in very little real change in the power structure 
within the Thai energy sector. EGAT entrenched its position by purchasing significant 
interests in many of the emerging IPPs. For example, EGAT currently owns a 45% 
share in Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding Public Company Limited (RATCH) 
and a 25.5% share in Electricity Generating Public Company Limited (EGCO) the 
country’s two largest IPPs (EGAT, 2009). Furthermore, many IPP board members were 
former EGAT employees. The IPP model in Thailand exists in name, but not in 
practice. In reality, EGAT and the IPPs are closer to a public-private partnership with 
the Thai state wielding considerable influence (Wisuttisak, 2012b). 
 
Instigated by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the IMF initiated a bailout package for 
Thailand. Once again, the IMF, pushing a neo-liberal agenda, called for major reforms 
to the Thai electricity sector including regulation and a stronger move towards 
privatisation. These reforms were met with staunch resistance by EGAT and much of 
the Thai population. Consumers feared increasing prices, unionists feared job losses, 
and nationalists feared foreign ownership. The unpopularity of these reforms and the 
weak state of the economy paved the way for political change. With the election of 
populist Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, privatisation reforms were halted and 
EGAT became a 'national champion', a protected state-owned company, regaining the 
full political backing it had once enjoyed and further solidifying its influential position 




Calls for electricity sector reform were once again prioritized after a 2006 military 
coup overthrew Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. EGAT lost its status as a national 
institution and it appeared that regulation and increased privatisation were inevitable 
(Wisuttisak, 2012a). In 2007, the Energy Industry Act was implemented and 
established the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) (ibid). The ERC’s mandate was to 
independently regulate the energy sector and provide a check to EGATs dominance. 
In reality, little has changed since 2007, in part due to political instability in the 
country and the institutional entrenchment of EGAT holding the reins of power for 
over 30 years (Wattana et al., 2008; Wisuttisak, 2012a, 2012b). With the 2011 
election of populist Prime Minister Yinluck Shinawatra (Thaksin’s sister) EGAT’s 
influence and power appears to be continuing to expand. 
 
In the case of Thailand, the neo-liberal agenda of private sector investment and 
reform has been staunchly resisted by EGAT. EGAT has been able to protect its power 
within the Thai state by controlling reforms and using narratives to justify its 
invesments. EGAT has further been able to control private sector investment in 
hydropower through its domination of Thai IPPs. 
 
EGAT’s power to shape Thailand’s hydropower strategies in neighbouring countries 
has also been driven by the public-private nature of the IPP model. EGAT faces a 
conflict of interest in that it desires low-cost electricity but also aims to bolster the 
profits of the IPPs, of which it is a shareholder. As EGAT has interests in the IPPs, it 
can encourage them to use their capital as its own development arm. Many of the 
IPPs in Thailand are signalling their desire to acquire companies abroad in South-East 
Asia (Wood, 2010; G2, 2012). These investments have many advantages for EGAT. 
They pass the risks and administration associated with complex hydropower projects 
to the IPPs. If the investments are successful they increase boost their share prices 
thereby increasing EGAT’s profits. They also dilute investments away from the Thai 
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state to the private sector thereby decreasing potential regulatory hurdles that may 
be placed on EGAT investing in Laos.  
 
The political ecology analysis shows that EGAT is able to use narratives emphasising 
the importance of hydropower as a tool to entrench its power within the Thai state 
and avoid reforms. As discussed above in China, these narratives are not only used as 
tools to hide political and economic agendas, they also shape the way dams are built.  
 
IPP’s and EGAT’s focus on the provision of cheap electricity and the construction of 
dams to increase profits have shaped the type of dams that are built in Laos. The 
focus on profits and energy production has led to the construction of dams that have 
a singular purpose of power generation instead of incorporating multi-use benefits 
(PS1, 2012). Hydropower dams can be constructed to integrate a number of non-
electricity benefits including irrigation, sediment transfer, and reservoirs that provide 
habitats for fish and can be used as man-made lakes. As stated by a former employee 
at the Theun Hinboun Expansion Project: 
“I pushed for a multi-purpose dam that incorporated irrigation, but I was 
told by the developers that hydropower can generate ten times the earning 
potential of irrigation, so it would be better to use the money generated 
from hydropower to help farmers... The problem is that the money 
generated from hydropower never reaches the farmers.” (IN1, 2012). 
 
A 2002 ADB report on lessons learned from large dams in the Mekong Basin 
reinforces the statement from the Theun Hinboun senior manager. The report states 
that the “operation of Nam Ngum1 was initially aimed at meeting various national 
demands, but that approach was later changed to maximize the power benefits” 
(ADB, 2002:111). Exact numbers are difficult to obtain, but it is estimated that over 
90% of the large dams constructed in the Mekong Basin are solely focused on power 
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generation (G1, 2011; MRC, 2012). The ADB and the WB continue to support the 
development of these single-purpose dams despite the same report stating that: 
“the ‘lessons learned’ from the four case studies and the review of 
international literature shows clearly that the era of single-purpose dams, 
common before about 1970, is essentially over. Henceforth, planning for all 
new large dams will have to give in-depth attention to multi-purpose needs.” 
(ADB, 2002:111). 
 
Furthermore, post-construction modifications of the hydro to allow irrigation or other 
multiple uses are generally considered unfeasible. EGAT’s use of narratives to justify 
policy statements has also allowed new actors to enter into hydropower 
development.  
 
Over the past five years, the Thai private sector has increasingly been involved in dam 
construction and financing (Middleton, 2008). Ch. Karnchang Public Company, a Thai 
construction company, is leading the construction of the Xayaburi and Nam Ngum 2 
dams. The construction of the Xayaburi dam has already significantly benefited the 
company with its stock price reaching a six year high on 7 December 2012, a month 
after the dam’s official ground breaking ceremony (Reuters, 2012). Moreover, the 
four Thai banks are financing the construction of the $3.8 billion dollar project - The 
Bangkok Bank, Kasikorn Bank, Krung Thai Bank, and Siam Commercial Bank - had not 
previously been involved in hydropower financing. Clearly, the private sector in 
Thailand is being enticed by the high potential returns on investment in hydropower 
projects. Chapter 6 will show how these returns are enhanced by an enabling 
environment in Laos that allows developers to maximize profits by circumventing 





The Thai state, through EGAT promotes a narrative of hydropower as essential to the 
future security of Thailand’s economic growth. EGAT’s entrenched power is a result of 
its ability to resist neo-liberal reforms during the 1990s. The narrative EGAT uses to 
promote hydropower and secure its own political power downplays any potential 
costs of development. The narrative not only serves EGAT’s political and economic 
agenda in Thailand, it creates space for new actors to profit from hydropower 
development in neighbouring countries and further shapes the way dams are built. 
 
Although Laos is downstream of China and Thailand and stands to bear many 
environmental and social costs of hydropower development within its borders, the 
Government of Laos (GoL) follows the neo-liberal agenda pushed by the WB and the 




Hydropower development has been a key focus of the policy agenda in Laos for the 
past 35 years. As mentioned above, since the 1980s the WB and the ADB have 
promoted hydropower development as a vital step for Laos to move out of poverty 
and reach middle income status. Up until the 1990s, regional instability resulted in 
relatively few hydropower projects coming online in Laos. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the environment for developing hydropower changed rapidly after the 1990s with the 
introduction of private sector investment and a more stable political climate. In 
communist Laos, Electricité du Laos, the state-owned electricity provider and 
producer, supported a narrative and policy agenda similar to Thailand and China, one 
that emphasized the benefits of hydropower development while downplaying its 
environmental and social impacts. The narrative of hydropower in Laos hides an 
agenda of political and economic power similar to China and Thailand. Laos’ 
welcoming of the WB and ADB’s neo-liberal development discourse has also shifted 




Policy positions and strategic directions surrounding hydropower in Laos have been 
heavily influenced by a neo-liberal agenda promoted by the WB, the ADB, China, and 
Thailand. The main narrative emerging from Laos is that hydropower development is 
essential for the country’s development, poverty alleviation, and its emergence onto 
the global scene. Although Laos’ policy statements contain elements similar to those 
of Thailand and China, they tend to revolve around three specific and often 
interlinked themes: the first is Laos’ potential to develop hydropower and its 
willingness to attract investment; the second is the importance of hydropower to 
economic growth and poverty alleviation; while the third theme de-emphasizes 
hydropower’s environmental impacts.  
 
The first strategic theme is a result of neo-liberal influences from the WB and ADB 
(Kaisti and Käkönen, 2012). This influence has led to the creation of policy statements 
from the Laos government that demonstrate Laos’ openness to development and 
investment. This theme underpins Laos’ desire to become “the battery of S.E. Asia” 
(Bardacke, 1998) and, more recently, supports Laos’ plans “to become the battery of 
ASEAN, as it has abundant water supplies and mountainous terrain suited to 
hydropower development” (Vientiane Times Online, 29 August 2012). 
 
Hydropower investment in Laos has been primarily regional and led by Thai, Chinese, 
and Vietnamese developers and banks. It is difficult to determine the exact amount of 
foreign investment coming into the country (particularly investment in the 
hydropower sector). According to the GoL’s 7th National Socio-Economic 
Development Plan from 2011 to 2015, however, Laos is seeking to attract $7 to 8 
billion in foreign and private investment (GoL, 2011). Considering the importance of 
hydropower to the country’s development strategy, it is reasonable to assume that 




The GoL repeatedly emphasizes its hydropower potential as an important component 
of attracting developers and investment. Examples include statements from the Laos’ 
Deputy Prime Minister stressing “the development potential of Lao hydropower 
thanks to an abundance of rivers and streams in the country” (Vientiane Time Online, 
2012b). The influence of a neo-liberal agenda promoting hydropower development as 
a key solution to Laos’ economic development continues in ignorance of the fact that 
the country may not be well suited to hydropower development.  
 
On paper, Laos appears to be an ideal location for hydropower development. Its 
dozens of rivers are located in mountainous areas with a heavy and consistent 
monsoon. The geology of the country, however, is in fact not well suited to 
hydropower. Laos’ mountainous areas are dominated by karst limestone, a soluble 
and porous rock known for its inability to retain water. As one leading consultant 
stated, “Laos hydropower potential appears excellent, but once you look carefully 
into the geology of the country, a number of the proposed dam sites are not feasible 
or simply dangerous” (PS3, 2011). 
 
Another important aspect to consider in assessing the suitability of Laos’ hydropower 
is the potential impact of sediments to dams. The Mekong River and its tributaries 
move as much as 1000 tonnes per kilometre of sediment through the Basin each year 
(Wang et al., 2010). Sediments can be detrimental to dam developers. Dams are 
highly efficient at trapping sediment and an overload of sediment can reduce their 
lifespan by filling reservoirs and damaging turbines. Studies on the Mekong have 
shown that dams on its tributaries and the mainstream could trap up to 50% of its 
sediment loads (ICEM, 2010: 77; Kummu et al., 2010). Consultants working on EIAs in 
the Region have admitted that these sediment loads are not factored into 
hydropower construction. According to a senior EIA consultant: 
“The Mekong and its tributaries are so heavily laden with sediment that dams 
constructed will have significantly shorter life spans than the EIAs and 
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planning documents declare. This sediment will greatly reduce the power they 
can generate, thereby impacting their financial viability” (PS4, 2011). 
 
Sediments are also important to the ecosystems, hydrology, and agriculture of the 
Basin. They transport nutrients and toxins through the Basin, providing food for fish, 
and rejuvenating fields (Morris and Fan, 1998). Changes in sediment load and flow 
can be especially detrimental to coastal and offshore zones, increasing saline 
intrusion, and irreversibly damaging crops (MRC, 2011; MRC, 2009). 
 
The second theme used to promote hydropower development in Laos revolves 
around its need to reduce poverty in the country through economic growth. This 
theme is also influenced by a neo-liberal led development discourse that promotes 
natural resource development as a way to reduce poverty. These policy statements 
ignore or downplay the environmental impact of dams. Examples of this theme are 
seen in the following three quotes from the state run newspaper: 
“Over the past five years, Laos has maintained an economic growth rate above 
7.5%. The Government plans to maintain this rate at a minimum of 8% over 
the next five years, with mining and hydropower as the main drivers of 
growth” (Vientiane Times Online, 13 July 2012). 
and 
“The Government has a clear policy to attract foreign investment for 
hydropower to Laos and generate jobs for Lao people as a way to free Laos 
from the UN’s list of least developed countries by 2020” (Vientiane Times 
Online,  9 October 2012). 
and 
 
In an article entitled “Please give us a chance to rise above poverty”: 
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“Laos is one of the least developed countries in Asia but its people never stop 
thinking about how they can change this situation. Today we are discovering 
that hydropower is one of the keys to graduating from the UN's list of least 
developed countries by 2020, thanks to the abundance of rivers and 
mountainous land. These natural assets provide us with the essential 
ingredients for creating wealth by building dams” (Vientiane Times Online, 27 
November 2012). 
 
Policy statements associating hydropower development with economic growth have 
been especially prevalent in the Vientiane Times since 2010. These narratives emerge 
in spite of controversy and criticism surrounding the environmental and social 
impacts of a number of large-scale dams in the country including the NT2, the Theun 
Hinboun Expansion Project, and the Xayaburi. 
 
These policy positions, however, are not unfounded. The NT2 hydropower plant 
contributes approximately $50-100 million per year, or 3% of projected Government 
revenues (WB 2004). Stone (2011) states that if all the proposed mainstream dams in 
Laos are constructed they could generate an estimated $25 billion in foreign direct 
investment and 70% of electricity export revenues, or $2.6 billion a year.  
 
The third and final set of policy statements that appear in the Vientiane Times (which 
is the main Government mouthpiece), are those that downplay the potential 
environmental impacts of hydropower dams or frame hydropower as a green 
renewable energy. These statements tend to disregard expert studies that show 
hydropower development’s significant environmental impacts. 
 
The narrative that describes hydropower as a ‘green energy’ has been increasingly 
employed by pro-hydropower actors as global concerns about the impact of fossil 
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fuels on climate change increase (Pittock 2010; Matthews et al. 2012). The green 
hydropower narrative has been supported by the WB and the European Union among 
other international organizations. The World Bank’s support of hydropower in Laos is 
aligned with the Bank’s aim of reducing fossil fuel emissions. In response to this, Laos 
is now rebranding itself as a “green and low-carbon battery” (Kaisti and Käkönen, 
2012: 11). The World Bank’s strategy in the Region from 2007 further states that 
large-scale hydropower “maximizes environmental benefits through the displacement 
of fossil fuel thermal generation with renewable energy” (WB 2007, p.xv). Aligning 
with the WB’s view on the matter, the charge d’affaires of the European Union 
Delegation to Laos, Michel Goffin, stated that hydropower development is 
environmentally-friendly and that Laos has huge potential to develop hydropower 
(The Nation, 2013). 
 
The green hydropower theme is further supported by statements from the GoL that 
explain how “a run-of-river dam has the advantage that outflow equals inflow so 
there is less impact on the environment and the lifestyle of people who live along the 
river.” (Vientiane Times Online, 30 October 2012b) and that “Laos will look at 
developing its green energy sector – particularly hydropower – to meet current and 
future demands” (Vientiane Times Online, 2 November 2012c). 
 
Studies have shown that, over the life of a project, hydropower can emit less 
greenhouse gasses than coal-fired plants or natural gas (Barros et al., 2011). Recent 
research on tropical Basins, including specific research on the Mekong, suggests that 
dams are not as environmentally-friendly as once suggested. The energy and material 
used in the construction of large hydropower structures contributes significantly to 
greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, anaerobic decomposition of flooded 
biomass in subtropical and tropical Basins releases substantial amounts of methane, 





The policy positions employed by the GoL to promote hydropower development in 
the Basin are part of a three-pronged strategy by the Government. First, through 
emphasizing Laos’ hydropower potential and its openness to investment; Second, by 
underscoring the importance of hydropower to Laos’ poverty alleviation and third by 
emphasizing hydropower as a green energy with little or no environmental or social 
impacts.  
 
The political ecology analysis demonstrates that the policy statements promoted by 
the GoL hide a number of agendas and political and economic influences. The neo-
liberal discourse has defined Laos as a least developed country and promoted 
hydropower as a solution to move the country out of poverty. This discourse has 
encouraged the GoL to open its doors to private sector investment creating 
opportunities for new actors from the private sector in Thailand and China to ‘help’ 
Laos move out of poverty and ‘make the best use of its water resources.’ The WB and 
the ADB have also used narratives and the influence of the neo-liberal development 
discourse to reinvent their role and activities within Laos’ hydropower development 
space. Finally, the emphasis by the GoL on hydropower as clean energy with little or 
no environmental impacts creates little incentive for hydropower developers to 
mitigate the costs of development. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the GoL is also 
able to significantly benefit from the rapid hydropower development within its 
borders through the use of meso-scale political and economic mechanisms that lend 
it power. Finally, by aligning policy statements around internationally-agreed norms 
of ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘climate change alleviation’, the GoL is not only 
legitimizing the WB, ADB, and neighbouring countries’ strategies and agendas in the 






Narratives are more than a disagreement about knowledge and perceived value of 
development. They embed organizing frameworks that contribute to the 
establishment of motivations and inspire political and economic agendas. Actors 
frame narratives within geographical scales that emphasize particular benefits or 
impacts while downplaying others (See Figure 5-1). Narratives are used to support 
and camouflage political and economic interventions and geopolitical strategies; they 
also create space for new actors and shape the way hydropower is built. 
 
Political ecology helps to illuminate the ways in which power, politics and economics 
influence the construction of narratives. Forsyth and Walker (2008:228) suggest that 
“a more politicized account of how environmental knowledge is formed is necessary 
before assuming that it provides an accurate basis for explaining environmental 
problems or for indicating appropriate regulatory responses”. In the contested space 
of Mekong Basin hydropower development, it is necessary to analyse the politics 
behind the formation of policy statements and narratives. 
 
Historically, hydropower narratives were influenced by outside actors involved in the 
early development of the Basin. The Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of 
Reclamation, who were active in the Mekong in the 1950s, exported a discourse of 
hydropower as essential to the Region’s development (Baghel and Nusser, 2010). To 
meet these Western development objectives, foreign investment in state hydropower 
was encouraged by ESCAFE and the UN from the 1950s and advanced by the WB and 
the ADB to the present day. 
 
A strong neo-liberal development development discourse has emerged through WB 
and ADB policies. These policies support private sector investment in hydropower as 
a valuable means to bring economic development to the Basin and to reduce poverty. 
In order to reassert themselves in the hydropower development space, the ADB and 
the WB have used this discourse and their own narrative surrounding hydropower 
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development to reinvent themselves as knowledge experts able to assist with the 
complex laws, regulations, contracts, economic modelling, and infrastructure that this 
development requires. 
 
Over the last decade, the investment environment has shifted to regional developers 
and financiers. These new investors espouse similar neo-liberal views of hydropower 
as a requirement of a modern, industrial society (Rist, 2002). The regional actors also 
use these discourses and narratives to obscure their political and economic 
strategies.  
 
China’s narrative frames hydropower as a ‘win-win’ approach which helps to 
legitimize its geopolitical strategy in the Basin. Policy statements that emphasize its 
peaceful rise help to defuse its image as a hegemon and reassure international and 
domestic states that it has only the best of intentions. The narrative that posits that 
its upstream dams reduce flooding illustrates how China acts ‘in the best interest’ of 
the Basin. In reality, however, China’s construction of dams on the Lancang gives it 
considerable power over the water resources within the Basin. At the same time, 
Chinese interests downstream are extremely profitable for Chinese companies, 
creating jobs, investment opportunities, and economic ties, while also generating 
energy for its own growing industry and population. 
 
In the case of Thailand, the Government and EGAT present hydropower development 
in Laos as essential for Thailand’s energy security and future growth while acting ‘in 
the best interest’ of its neighbour, Laos. By securitizing hydropower and delineating it 
as essential for the future of Thailand, the state and EGAT frame these developments 
and their impacts as necessary and fundamental. In reality, EGAT’s monopoly and 
power within Thailand allows hydropower to be used as a tool to empower EGAT, 
numerous IPPs and the Thai private sector. The hydropower narrative from EGAT has 
also shaped the way dams are built in Laos. The narrative of hydropower as essential 
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for electricity security creates dams that are solely focused on energy provision, 
disregarding their potential multiple uses. 
 
The GoL promotes hydropower as the only solution to poverty alleviation. 
Paradoxically for a Marxist entity, the GoL deems economic growth as the only way to 
poverty alleviation.  This narrative places environmental and social impacts as 
necessary outcomes, although in most cases these are downplayed or dismissed. By 
stating that hydropower is a ‘clean’ energy and is essential for poverty reduction, the 
Government uses internationally accepted priorities such as climate change and 
poverty alleviation to legitimize its decisions. The narratives from the GoL open up 
space and opportunities for Thai and Chinese investors to profit from Laos 
hydropower development. The narrative from the GoL’s that hydropower creates 
little or no social and environmental impact further dis-incentivises developers from 
mitigating the impacts of development.  
 
In analysing narratives and their construction, it is also important to consider the role 
of the media. Although many of the Basin states exert some degree of state influence 
on the press, the media themselves also play an active role in polarizing narratives. 
Policy statements from key actors are often picked up by media to emphasize conflict 
in the Region. According to a Bangkok Post reporter, the media “look for statements 
with colour that emphasize the different positions around a story” (M1, 2012). These 
polarizing narratives often create a battleground around hydropower development. 
While they may help to sell stories, they can intensify the debate and encourage a 
lack of transparency in decision-making and development. 
 
Although the political ecology analysis of policy statements and narratives provides 
useful insights into the actors and influencing factors driving agendas, narratives, and 
discourses in the Region, a more holistic analysis is required in order to fully illustrate 
the drivers and enablers of hydropower development. The next chapter will examine 
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the mechanisms within Laos that drive these narratives and allow the GoL to benefit 
from hydropower development in ways that creates significant negative impacts for 





















6 Mechanisms and Structures and their Impact on Hydropower 




The previous chapter demonstrated how actors in the Basin construct narratives as 
political and economic tools to legitimize their decisions and their hydropower 
development activities. These frames and narratives were shown to influence the 
hydropower development process. The previous chapter further demonstrated that 
the phase of hydropower development up to 1990s, led by multilateral banks, has 
shifted with actors taking on new roles. For example, the World Bank (WB) and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) have used the hydropower narrative to create a new 
role for themselves in the hydropower space as a primarily supporting and 
knowledge-development organisation. This new phase of development can be linked 
to historical discourses that emerged in the Basin in the 1950s. 
 
One main research question guides the analysis in this chapter. What are the key 
institutional structures and mechanisms at the national and regional basin scale that 
have empowered certain actors over others in the Impact Assessment process, 
project approval and construction of hydropower development projects? 
 
It is hypothesized that meso-scale mechanisms such as a lack of accountability 
compounded by weak civil society, poor transparency and a tightly controlled press 
shape the way hydropower is built and the way it addresses its social and 
environmental impacts. These mechanisms enable alliances between state and 
market forces to profit disproportionately from hydropower development. These 




This chapter will use a political ecology approach to examine the meso-scale political 
and economic mechanisms within Laos that have enabled some hydropower 
development to proceed while ignoring its social and environmental costs. 
Mechanisms help to illuminate key processes, asking “what produces change, what 
makes things happen and what allows or forces change” (Sayer, 1985:161). For the 
purpose of this research, mechanisms are analysed in the social, political and 
economic contexts in which they operate. Sayer (ibid) argues that actors derive 
power from and act according to the structures in which they are situated.  
 
In Laos, powerful actors involved in hydropower development have derived power 
from the social and political structure of the tightly controlled autocratic state. The 
lack of transparency and weak accountability that has existed within Laos has created 
and shaped the types of institutional behaviours that have emerged in hydropower 
development. Furthermore, these meso-scale mechanisms have influenced the space 
in which civil society has operated. Consent has been manufactured in the INGO 
sector through tight Government controls of civil society and in a context where the 
press does not enjoy freedom. These conditions in turn have created opportunities 
for powerful actors to disregard ecosystems and prioritize profit taking. 
 
Political ecology posits that mechanisms create boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
within institutional contexts (Lawson and Staeheli, 1990). In Laos, the boundaries of 
participation and transparency in hydropower development have been shaped by the 
political and economic structures of the state. These structures have controlled the 
type of participation that has emerged and the way in which neo-liberal market 
forces have influenced the hydropower development process. Laws and policies that 
are designed to regulate development and protect people and the environment can 





Using a political ecology approach, Staeheli (1989) argues that mechanisms operate 
differently between both macro and local scales. Steaheli (ibid) states that at the 
macro scale mechanisms tend to be dominated by the demands of capital and at the 
local level they are characterized by the needs of both production and consumption. 
Mechanisms have also been influenced by scale in hydropower development in Laos. 
This chapter will show that in Laos’ hydropower development, mechanisms are 
influenced strongly by macro and meso-scales. Mechanisms at macro-scales are 
influenced the neo-liberal development discourse, while mechanisms such as lack of 
transparency and accountability influence hydropower development in ways that 
meet powerful actors’ individual needs at the meso-scale. 
 
Understanding these mechanisms is important in hydropower because dams and 
water resource management are highly politicized. Hydropower is interwoven with 
ideas of modernity, technological advancement and economic growth. Powerful 
actors are able to use state apparatus and the ideologies behind hydropower to push 
forward potentially environmentally and socially devastating decisions and policies. 
These decisions benefit the state and also increase the wealth and power of the key 
actors involved in the alliance of the political class and the international private sector 
investors. At the same time they have the potential to seriously negatively impact the 
biodiversity and livelihoods of millions of people in the Mekong Basin. 
 
Despite their importance, the existence and examination of meso-scale political, 
economic and social mechanisms has rarely been explicitly addressed (Hedstrom and 
Swedberg, 1998). Existing geographical and political ecology literature on Laos’ 
hydropower development examined macro scale mechanisms and their links to local 
scale and vice-versa (see Molle et al. 2009; Hirsch, 2006 etc.) Meso-scale political, 
economic and social mechanisms such as corruption and weak transparency and their 
impacts are often discussed by journalists and academics at a cursory level (see 
Chapter 3). This study uses a political ecology approach to engage directly with meso-
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scale mechanisms to uncover evidence of the degree to which they directly influence 
hydropower development and the winners and losers of environmental change. 
 
The examination of meso-scale agents and structures in social, political and economic 
systems is complex and often the data and especially the politics that determine the 
outcomes are inaccessible. Smits and Bush (2010) use a political ecology approach to 
examine meso-scale mechanisms in Laos to understand what had driven and enabled 
the neglect of pico-hydropower policy within the state. They found that the policy 
environment had promoted a strong centralisation tendency in hydropower, and that 
electrification of rural areas was wrapped in the agendas of multilateral development 
actors who sought large-scale developments rather than small scale ones. These 
mechanisms within the state are important drivers and enablers of hydropower 
development. They illuminate how hydropower development is linked to Regional 
and international political and economic structures and local level environmental and 
social impacts. The mechanisms described by Smits and Bush (ibid) have allowed 
dams to be built in ways that benefit powerful actors while environmental and social 
impacts have been largely ignored. The power that these mechanisms cede to actors 
further entrenches and protects them from change. 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part uses a political ecology analysis to 
explore the political, economic and social structures and mechanisms of 
transparency, accountability and the weak civil society that have existed within Laos. 
The Chapter examines how the influx of private sector investment and a neo-liberal 
discourse on development has combined and entrenched the mechanisms and 
structures within the Laos state. The second part of the chapter uses a political 
ecology approach to examine case studies to exemplify these political, economic and 
social structures, showing the ways in which they have shaped dam construction, the 
Impact Assessment process and the environmental and social impacts of dams. The 




6.2 Transparency, Accountability and Weak Civil Society 
 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) (2000) Report placed transparency, 
accountability and participatory decision-making as three of its five core values 
emphasizing their importance in hydropower. As highlighted by the WCD Report, 
however, very few, if any, large-scale dams have been guided by these practices. 
 
For example, MacDonald’s (2001) study showed that the World Bank (WB) repeatedly 
failed to adhere to its own policies on transparency and accountability in funding 
large-scale hydropower projects around the globe. Reisner (1986) details how the 
American West’s hydropower development was guided by top-down decision-making 
with little or no accountability or transparency. The development of hydropower in 
Laos has been no different. Poor transparency and accountability are sanctioned by 
political structures, and laws and policies empower and insulate influential actors in 
hydropower development. 
 
Due to the sensitive nature of transparency, accountability and freedom of the press 
the topic has been difficult to research and analyse, however, some indicators and 
statements have provided very useful evidence. In the 2011 Economic Freedom 
World Ranking, Laos was ranked 141st out of 179 countries for its economic freedom. 
This ranking examined ten benchmarks that include, freedom from corruption, 
Government spending and property rights. The Economic Freedom Ranking statistics 
are reinforced by Transparency International’s Index, which measures the violations 
of press freedom, places Laos 165 out of 179 countries for its freedom of the press. 
The country is in the sixth percentile rank for ‘voice and accountability’, which 
measures the degree to which citizens are able to participate in Government, and the 
degree to which they can express themselves and associate freely. Molle, Foran and 
Käkönen’s (2009) study into hydropower development supports this analysis by 
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stating that a lack of transparency within the hydropower sector continues to be a 
serious problem. 
 
Stuart-Fox (2006) posits that weak transparency and accountability permeates Laos’ 
institutions and organizations. The banking sector, for instance, has been heavily 
impacted by non-performing loans to state-owned enterprises and politically 
connected individuals. Furthermore, a World Bank (2004) report stated that loans 
from state-owned banks in Laos are often given for political and non-commercial 
reasons. 
 
The lack of transparency and accountability in Laos is exacerbated by the tightly 
controlled press. All newspapers in Laos are state-controlled and journalists are 
required to seek authorization from relevant Government organizations before 
reporting on corrupt practices (Keuleers, 2004). An interviewee who worked for the 
state-owned English language newspaper, the Vientiane Times, explained that “All 
the articles published are strictly edited to remove any criticism of the Government or 
military. Because of the political nature of hydropower it is reported often and always 
with a positive spin” (R1, 2011). 
 
For weak transparency and accountability to be kept in place, however, they must be 
accompanied by authoritarian control of society with restrictions on grassroots civil 
society. Grassroots civil society is defined as “a sphere of social interaction between 
the household and the state which is manifest in accepted modes of community 
cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public 
communication.” (Bratton, 1994:3). Gramsci (1949) points out that grassroots civil 
society can play an important role in challenging or moderating state power. For 
example, grassroots civil society influenced the emergence of democratic opposition 
to authoritarian states in Europe (Havel, 1985; Rau, 1991). 
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Grassroots civil society, however, is more than a substitute for governments. As 
Douglas (1982) argues, civil society also helps to moderate the power of business and 
development’s negative environmental and social impacts. While grassroots civil 
society can be the voice of the environment, it must not be considered as a 
homogenous community. It has a variety of its own agendas and politics. 
Nevertheless, grassroots civil society’s potential to change governments and 
influence policy and business makes it a potentially extremely powerful solidarity in 
hydropower development. 
 
Although grassroots civil society in Thailand has been effective at influencing 
Government agenda and private sector investment surrounding hydropower within 
the country, the same cannot be said of Laos. Lao’s lack of transparency, state-
controlled press and its authoritarian Government have curtailed the existence of 
grassroots civil society movements. In what appeared to be an opening up of 
Government policies, in 2009 Laos signed the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights establishing a legal framework to allow the licensing of NGOs (UNTC, 
2012). Although this treaty allows the formation and existence of civil society, the 
Government of Laos (GoL) has used political mechanisms within the state to impose 
strict rules under which INGOs can operate, and continues to supress and prohibit the 
formation of grassroots civil society (Case, 2011). 
 
The terrain of civil society in Laos is predominately represented by the dozens of 
International NGOs (INGOs) working in the Region. The Directory of Non-Government 
Organizations in Laos, supported by the World Bank, states that there are 69 INGOs 
working in the country. Many of these INGOs are working on hydropower and water 
management issues. The political ecology analysis demonstrates that their 
effectiveness in influencing hydropower development has been delimited by meso-
scale mechanisms in three key ways. First, mechanisms within the state including 
laws and policies control their actions. Second, the GoL uses mechanisms to shape 
the emergence of good water governance principles such as participation and 
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transparency that INGOs promote to its benefit. Third INGOs effectiveness is 
hampered by a disconnect between Western funded environmentalism and regional 
agendas. The following paragraphs will explain these points in further detail. 
 
First, the GoL uses political mechanisms in the form of laws and policies to control 
INGOs movements. INGOs have been required to submit the information they publish 
to the Government and they are forbidden to travel freely in the country and talk to 
people unchecked. As one interviewee working at a major INGO stated, “We are 
required to submit any reports or press releases from our office to the Government 
for approval before they can be published” (CS4, 2012). Although the rules in which 
INGOs operate are determined by the Government, they are followed to different 
degrees by INGOs and activists in the Region. For example, as one INGO official 
stated, “Yes, we are required to submit our internal press releases to the Government 
for censorship, but we usually do it just before we publish them, so the Government 
has little time to react.” (CS5, 2012). 
 
At the beginning of this research in 2010, the only reported Western activist or 
academic associated with hydropower or civil society that had been expelled from the 
country was Martin Stuart-Fox. He had written extensively on corruption in Laos. 
Government restrictions on INGOs and civil society have, however, dramatically 
tightened since 2010. This tightening has coincided with the debate and development 
of the Xayaburi Dam and the general expansion of private sector hydropower 
investment (see Chapter 7). In November 2012, Anne-Sophie Gindroz, an NGO 
director from Helvetas was given 48 hours to leave the country after she penned a 
personal letter to development practitioners working in the country criticizing the 
Government’s lack of transparency, accountability and restrictions on freedom. In her 




“Real freedom of expression and assembly are not afforded, and those who 
wish to exercise their constitutional rights and dare to try, often do so at their 
own peril faced with intimidation, false accusations and increasingly unlawful 
arrest. The media are censored and, people are forbidden to hold peaceful 
assembly/demonstration. Even in Burma – this is no longer the case … There 
are serious constraints on freedom of expression. Those raising critical issues 
are considered as opposing the Government. A climate of fear is maintained 
to ensure self-censorship”. 
 
The expulsion of Gindroz in November 2012 was followed by the kidnapping of Lao’s 
most prominent grassroots civil society activist in December 2012 (Pearce, 2013). 
Sombath Somphone, founded the Participatory Development Training Centre which 
educated rural people in a variety of skills including fish farming and microcredit. In 
2005, he was awarded the prestigious Ramon Magsaysay prize for social activism. 
Sombath’s ability to work within the country and his international prominence was 
considered by many to be a sign that the Government was perhaps willing to engage 
with grassroots civil society, at least on some level. 
 
Although the Government has denied any involvement in the case, Sombath was last 
seen on video footage being pulled over at a police stop before his jeep was then 
driven away by an unknown person. He was then escorted into another vehicle. The 
video shows that the police made no attempt to intervene (Pearce, 2013). 
International organizations and states such as the United States have offered 
assistance in the investigation, but the Government has rejected all help (Pearce, 
2013). At the time of writing in 2013, the Government of Laos (GoL)’s investigation 
had yet to uncover any leads. Rumours around Vientiane stated that Sombath was 
kidnapped due to his instrumental role in organizing the Asian-Europe People’s 
Forum. This high profile meeting provided a rare forum for Lao community leaders to 
discuss issues such as universal social protection and sustainable energy production 
including hydropower (AEPF, 2012). Whether the Government was involved in 
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Sombath’s kidnapping or not, both of these events have increased the culture of fear 
in the country. According to a Mekong River Commission employee familiar with NGO 
issues, “Locals are leaving work early now to get home before dark. People are 
scared.” (CS6, 2013). 
 
Huerlin (2009) argues that Laos’ decision to allow civil society to operate while at the 
same time tightly control it has been underpinned by the fact that it is a socialist state 
with little financial resources. The State has not had the financial means to implement 
social development projects. The Government therefore has used political 
mechanisms within the state to allow INGOs to operate and fund social projects while 
tightly restricting the grassroots organizations that could pose a threat to its rule. 
These mechanisms allow INGOs to serve the state, but the state is still able to avoid 
criticism and accountability that grassroots civil society may promote.  
 
The second factor that has impeded INGO influence is the way the Government, 
legitimized by the WB and the ADB, has used meso-scale mechanisms to shape the 
emergence of good water governance principles such as participation and 
transparency. The MRC, its donors, INGOs and the WB and the ADB’s Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS) programme have supported Laos in developing and improving a 
number of its environmental and social policies surrounding hydropower 
development. For example, the National Policy on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability in the Hydropower Sector calls for high levels of disclosure, including 
the protection of ‘project affected people’ and the inclusion of free prior and 
informed consent in the development (NPES, 2005). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Mekong Committee has focused on developing the 
water resources of the Basin primarily through infrastructure such as hydropower and 
irrigation projects. Following the establishment of the MRC in 1995, donors 
introduced a different set of governance objectives that moved away from the heavy 
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focus on hydropower development to one that contained principles based on 
“sustainable development, utilization, management and conservation of the water 
and related resources of the Mekong River Basin” (MRC, 1995). 
 
Under the MRC, this new development agenda emphasized cooperation around 
scientific studies, capacity building and environmental protection (Jacobs, 2002). For 
donors, this narrative provided a strategic opportunity to open dialogue spaces with 
the Region’s emerging markets and at the same time allowed them to meet aid 
objectives by encouraging good governance principles in the Basin’s future water 
management (McCawley, 2001). 
 
For the Government of Laos, however, these new principles represented a threat to 
its control and power. The governance principles being introduced by the MRC and 
INGOs promote the devolution of power from Government to a form of governance 
that included the State, the market, civil movements (NGOs) and civil society. Using a 
political ecology analysis, Ribot (2004) states that this devolution of power is often 
met by strong resistance from those in power. This contention has been true in Laos 
where mechanisms empower decision makers through a lack of participation, weak 
accountability, corruption and a lack of transparency. These meso-scale mechanisms 
have sustained the power of elites. Although the Government was reluctant to accept 
these new principles, the MRC and its donors were also seen as an important source 
of much needed funding and economic stimulus for underdeveloped Laos. For 
example, from 1990 to 1995, net Overseas Development Assistance flows to Thailand 
and Indochina rose by approximately 400% from $422 million to $1.66 billion (OECD, 
1995). The potentially lucrative investments that accompanied the acceptance of 
these good governance principles may have influenced the government’s decision to 
accept them. Mechanisms within the state, however, allowed the GoL to accept these 




Enabled by mechanisms from within the state, a scalar disconnect between the 
agendas of powerful hydropower proponents in the GoL and the agenda promoted by 
the MRC has nullified the meaningful implementation of good governance principles. 
The good water governance interests promoted by the MRC’s international donors 
such as holistic participatory water management and monitoring and evaluation 
programs have been tolerated by the Lao Government to demonstrate their 
commitment to these processes, but at the same time Government policies have 
continued to focus on top-down, non-transparent rapid hydropower development 
(Suhardiman et al., 2012). In fact, to date the MRC has largely only managed to gain 
cooperation from all of its member states on apolitical issues. This disconnect allows 
governments to implement policies of sovereign interest "because the MRC lacks 
power to direct transboundary water governance issues in the Region" (ibid:12). 
 
The MRC was not the only funder espousing these principles. From the 1990s, The 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB) also promoted a brand of 
good water governance. Their approach was more closely aligned with neo-liberal 
policies that encouraged market-led development of natural resources. A centrepiece 
of this agenda was the implementation of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
Programme, a scheme strongly focused on the connectivity of markets and 
economies and private sector investment in hydropower development to advance 
economic growth and reduce poverty within the framework of good governance 
(Middleton et al., 2009). The GMS mandate has promoted interconnectivity and 
hydropower development, including private sector investment in mainstream and 
tributary dams, but still included calls for participation and transparency in the 
hydropower development process. This programme’s focus on development, 
however, appears to have been rapidly accepted by the Region with all Basin states 
signing on as members. 
 
The political ecology analysis demonstrates that the principles of good water 
governance promoted by the ADB and the WB alongside regional connectivity and 
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the agenda of the GMS programme have shifted the concept of participation and 
transparency away from individual countries and local scales to a larger Basin scale 
that creates an area of perceived harmonious community called the “Greater Mekong 
Subregion”. This scaling of participation and transparency at a Basin level has meant 
that the application of these principles can be achieved through INGO participation 
rather than local grassroots participation. By scaling hydropower development within 
the GMS, the ADB and the WB have encouraged participation from actors who have 
been able to engage at a regional scale, such as the numerous INGOs. This type of 
engagement has enabled the GoL to appear to be somewhat transparent and 
participatory in its decision-making. In reality, the GoL has only engaged with non-
local actors in a space that it tightly controls, allowing it to avoid much of the policy 
pressure of INGOs by accepting their existence and defining the shape of their 
participation within its own boundaries. By scaling participation at the Basin level and 
using meso-scale mechanisms to control INGOs, the GoL has also created the illusion 
that it was following the international policy norms promoted by the WB and the 
ADB. 
 
The third factor that delimits INGOs in the Region is that their Western-funded 
discourses and practice may not reflect local needs, and may also clash with regional 
development discourses. 
 
Like many developing countries, Lao has been a consumer of international 
development knowledge. The principles of participation, equity, and transparency in 
water governance and hydropower development that have been encouraged in the 
Region emerged from outside agendas . For example, Laos’s signing of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was strongly influenced by outside 
interests (McCawley, 2002). The introduction of the good governance principles drew 
from an international trend encouraging a new ‘softer development agenda’ focusing 
on good governance issues that emerged in the 1980s and one that was heavily 




INGOs in Laos have articulated power and legitimacy through their Western 
representation and the internationally accepted discourses and practice they 
promote (Peet and Watts, 1996). This perceived legitimacy and Western-influenced 
knowledge may be unrepresentative of local needs and clashing with regional 
development discourses. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, for example, many INGOs 
in the Region, promote hydropower as being devastating to the environment of the 
Region while downplaying its economic benefits. Sunderberg argues that INGOs 
assume ‘the moral authority to speak for nature’ (Sunderberg, 1998:14). This use of 
Western knowledge by INGOs enables them to articulate a form of power and claim 
legitimacy within environmental and social impact debates.  
 
This form of legitimacy, however, appears to be out of step with the development 
agenda of regional states. Furthermore, the INGO perspective of the 
environmentalism has also not always been accurately representative of local level 
needs (Sunderberg, 1998). This clash of agendas has created tensions between states 
and developers and INGOS. A former employee with IR stated that “although IR’s 
official stance is not anti-dam, they do not support any large-scale hydropower 
development. This stance made it increasingly difficult to engage in dialogue with 
developers and governments” (CS2, 2011).  
 
The three factors discussed above: meso-scale mechanisms within the state that 
control INGOs and supress grassroots civil society, the GoL’s use of meso-scale 
mechanisms  to shape the space in which good governance principles emerge and the 
effects of diverging development agendas between INGOs and the GoL, have all 
combined to restrict INGOs effectiveness in Laos. These three factors have allowed 
the GoL to create a situation of manufactured consent with civil society in the Region. 
While the GoL has been seen to work with INGOs and to follow good governance 
principles, it in fact it controls the space and agenda in which these principles emerge. 
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At the same time, it has supressed any grassroots civil society that may have reflected 
the true will of its people. 
 
A political ecology approach demonstrates that the impacts of meso-scale 
mechanisms such as weak transparency and poor accountability that have created 
manufactured consent with civil society and controlled freedom of the press have 
also created space for corruption to emerge in hydropower development within the 
public and private sectors in Laos. 
 
6.3 Corruption and Hydropower Development in Laos 
  
Corruption is pervasive and significant around the world. In developed countries, the 
defence industry is often susceptible (Goel and Nelson, 1998). In developing 
countries, corruption may account for large fractions of the Gross National Product 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Schleifer and Vishny (ibid) argue that the structure of 
Government institutions and political structures and mechanisms including weak 
accountability, a lack of transparency, weak civil society and a controlled press are 
determinants of corruption. Furthermore, Rose-Ackerman (1999) states that 
corruption often flourishes in authoritarian regimes that create few measures that 
promote accountability and transparency. In Laos, corruption has emerged due to 
meso-scale mechanisms and structures that limit transparency and shield decision 
makers from accountability. 
 
Although Laos has labelled itself as a single party communist state that has 
incorporated the principles of good governance such as transparency and 
accountability, Stuart-Fox (2008) posits it is better understood as an “authoritarian 
one party state, in which the Party presides over a transitional market economy” 
(Stuart-Fox, 2008: 65). 
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Corruption can take on many different guises. In Laos the two main types of 
corruption that have emerged in hydropower development have been public official 
and private sector corruption. One of the most cited definitions of public official 
corruption is: 
“Behaviour which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or 
violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of rewards to pervert 
the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reason of relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation 
(illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses)” (Nye, 
1967:966). 
 
Gardiner (2002) notes that Nye’s definition of corruption and its focus on private 
gains includes situations where the goal of an individual’s corruption is to benefit his 
or her political party or group. 
 
The second type of corruption that has emerged in hydropower development in Laos 
is in the private sector. Business or private sector corruption differs from public 
official corruption because the people committing corruption are not in a public office 
with public responsibilities. Perhaps one of the most common forms of business 
corruption concerns kickbacks (Gardiner, 2002). These occur when extra payments 
are given to circumvent rules or norms. Another type of business corruption is fraud. 
Fraud typically involves deceptive statements or acts as a way of securing extra 
benefits. In the case where there is no deception this is theft (ibid). Meso-scale 
mechanisms within the state such as transparency, poor accountability and weak 
freedom of the press help to foster corruption. And likewise, corruption helps to 




Haas (2008) found that hydropower is a high-risk sector for corruption because it has 
huge budgets, complex administrative systems and multiple actors, which offer many 
opportunities for corrupt practices to emerge. While Bosshard and Hildyard (2008) 
further state that large-scale hydropower projects are more susceptible to corruption 
because the actors involved tend to be more powerful and have deeper pockets than 
smaller projects. Construction works are usually the largest budget line in dam 
development ‘making dam construction a primary target for corruption’ (ibid: 87). 
 
Haas (ibid) notes that typical hydropower projects involve a number of ministries 
including those in charge of land acquisition, resettlement, impact assessments, and 
infrastructure. Although decision-making in Laos has been ultimately vested in the 
Politburo, a typical large-scale hydropower development has involved a number of 
Government departments, ministries and agencies including those responsible for 
peripheral jobs such as access roads and related infrastructure. 
 
This condition is further compounded by complex Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) 
modes of investment and private sector norms that have involved legions of contracts 
and regulations between several companies for materials, equipment, management 
and consultancy. In the Nam Theun 2 Project, for example, there were 26 separate 
financial institutions involved in funding, each with its own accountability 
requirements (Haas, 2008). 
 
Another issue in hydropower development has to do with the way in which “vested 
interests unduly influence decisions about the mix of water and energy service 
options the society chooses” (ibid: 117). Policy capture tends to skew the benefit and 
risk analysis of hydropower in favour of powerful agendas. These mechanisms have 
had direct negative effects on social and environmental impact mitigation that 
emerge through the Impact Assessment process. Haas (ibid) and the WCD (2000) 
both emphasize that corruption amplifies the negative impacts of hydropower on 
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ecosystems. In the Mekong Basin, as in many developing countries, impacts on the 
environment have immediate consequences on people’s livelihoods, which rely on 
these ecosystem services for food and income. Figure 6-1 outlines the different 
avenues for corruption throughout the hydropower project cycle. 
 
Figure 6-1 Scope and enabling conditions for corruption in various stages of a 
project cycle.  
Source: Hass (2008:88).  
 
Corruption, although difficult to detect and often circumstantial, has been studied as 
a major issue in Laos (Stuart-Fox, 2006, 2011). Laos was ranked 160th out of 183 
countries in the 2012 Index of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions, 
suggesting it was at that time one of the most corrupt countries on earth. The same 
index ranks Laos’ public sector corruption score at 21 out of 100 (with 100 being 
perceived as very clean). This 21% ranking shows the extent to which citizens have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society – especially contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police and courts. As Stuart-Fox (2011:2) states, "[c]orruption is 
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the ogre in the woodpile of Lao politics. It extends throughout the bureaucracy and 
the police and security forces".  
 
Despite the existence of corruption in Laos, the state has strong anti-corruption laws. 
Meso-scale political, economic and social mechanisms within the state, however, 
have insulated powerful actors from these laws. In 1999, a decree issued by the Prime 
Minister’s Office emphasized the state-owned mass media’s publicizing corruption 
cases. To date there has not been a single report on the issue (Stuart-Fox, 2011). In 
2005, the Government passed anti-corruption laws by the National Assembly. Once 
again, no senior official to date has ever been indicted (ibid). According to 
Transparency International’s Index, Laos’ corruption could be getting worse as its 
ranking has dropped by 11 places from 2011 to 2012. Numerous U.S. Embassy cables 
from Vientiane released by WikiLeaks raised the issue of corruption as a serious 
problem in Laos (WikiLeaks, 2008). In fact, some people attribute the 2011 
resignation of Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh to his attempt to tackle 
corruption in the country (Stuart-Fox 2011). If this is true, it serves as an acute 
example of the grip that corruption has taken on the country. 
 
Few studies have focused on corruption in Mekong hydropower development. The 
analysis of energy security in South-East Asia by Simpson (2007) showed that 
powerful actors from Thailand’s energy sector have used the institutional and 
political structures in Laos as a mask which hides and at the same time sanctions 
corruption. The situation has enables EGAT and Thai investors to externalize the 
environmental and social costs of energy production. Foran et al. (2010) found that in 
the Lao hydropower sector decisions can be guided by profit without transparency, 
participation, or planning. Mechanisms in Lao, including a lack of transparency, create 
corruption. As one interviewee stated, “The salaries of District Officials and Electricité 
du Lao (EdL) employees are more or less token. Officials are expected to survive by 
commercialising their activities. It was no surprise to find malpractice in the Impact 
Assessment process” (PS5, 2011). 
198 
 
The meso-scale mechanisms within the Laos state that empower corruption and vice-
versa have been augmented by private sector involvement in hydropower. Next we 
shall use a political ecology approach to explore how the introduction of private 
sector investment, Independent Power Producers (IPPs), and the BOOT model in Laos 
has influenced mechanisms within the state and enabled hydropower development 
that ignores its social and environmental costs.  
 
6.4 Structures of Investment and Government Capacity 
 
The analysis so far in this chapter has analysed how meso-scale mechanisms within 
the state empower decision makers over civil society and good governance principles. 
The analysis has also highlighted how corruption is empowered by and empowers 
mechanisms.  
 
This section uses a political ecology approach to examine how new forms of 
investment have influenced and empowered mechanisms within the state and 
shaped the way hydropower is built. It further discusses how these new forms of 
investment have influenced the IA process by taking advantage of weak capacity in 
the bureaucracy. Bureaucratic capacity is important in hydropower development 
because it represents the operational arm of the state that controls the laws and 
policies that are designed to protect people and the environment, such as the Impact 
Assessment process. 
From the 1990s, the neo-liberal discourse promoting private sector investment in 
hydropower development encouraged the GoL to adopt formal market norms to 
protect the private sector from competition such as confidentiality and intellectual 
property. These norms have encouraged and legitimized mechanisms within the state 
that fortify secretive and non-transparent practices surrounding hydropower 
development. These norms and mechanisms from within the state have also 
entrenched lines of inclusion and exclusion in the hydropower development process.  
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As discussed in Chapter 5, over the last two decades, the private sector has been 
increasingly influential in leading Laos through a rapid transition to hydropower 
electricity production. This rapid transition has presented a number of capacity 
challenges for Government ministries, laws and officials in Laos that are responsible 
for regulating the various aspects of hydropower development and its impacts. 
 
One of the key challenges in Laos has been bureaucratic capacity. Weak capacity has 
contributed to accentuating and fortifying powerful interests and players. In 
hydropower development it has created opportunities for developers and investors 
to by-pass laws and regulations ultimately enabling them to increase profits. The 
analytical approach of political ecology has always been concerned with the issue of 
who has power and with what right and to what effect. In Laos, weak capacity must 
be considered in the context of the meso-scale mechanisms that has shaped and 
created it. 
 
Government jobs in Laos are considered stable and prestigious. Within the tightly 
controlled state Government employees are expected to conform to the communist 
party rules. There is little room for dissent (Stuart-Fox, 2011). This tight control results 
in very little institutional protection for employees to challenge the bureaucratic 
processes surrounding high level decisions. In the case of hydropower development, 
decisions are made at the highest level of Government and conform to a neo-liberal 
influenced agenda that has encouraged rapid private sector led hydropower 
development. Once these decisions have been made, the bureaucracy is left to 
implement the decisions. The bureaucracy, however, is often underfunded and has 
little experience or incentive to deal with private sector investors and the 
environmental and social impacts of dams. 
 
The introduction of the Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) model has compounded 
these capacity issues. BOOTs include intricate contracts, Impact Assessments in 
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English and private sector business practices such as confidentiality and intellectual 
property rights. BOOTs have also impacted the implementation of EIAs. EIAs are a 
requirement for WB and ADB funding and an important part of international best 
practice hydropower development (see Chapter 2). However, with the influx of 
private sector financing requirements, their implementation and rigor are highly 
variable. EIAs remain important to Western actors for whom they represent 
international norms, but for local developers they may be considered a foreign and 
inconvenient process that has to be completed to justify and legitimize projects in the 
eyes of Western audiences. 
 
Context is also important when considering the capacity of the GoL to regulate 
hydropower development. As one consultant pointed out when discussing the Impact 
Assessment process, “The capacity of Government to regulate private sector 
development is a serious problem, but even with proper capacity it is doubtful if it 
would change the decision-making.” (PS6, 2012). 
 
This statement provides an important insight into the influence of the neo-liberal 
development discourse, and the power that narratives and mechanisms grant elites. 
(See Chapter 2 and Chapter 5). Dam construction, electrification and rapid economic 
growth led by private sector investment have been central to this vision of 
development and modernization. Mechanisms within Laos have empowered actors 
throughout the hydropower development process and created economic and political 
incentives for them to proceed with development despite its potential social and 
environmental costs. Examples of these developments are presented below in 
Section 6.5.  
 
Furthermore, the influence of mechanisms and narratives on the IA process illustrates 
the absence of power that EIAs have to prevent or shape development. As explored in 
Chapter 2, in both developed and developing countries EIAs almost never stop 
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projects from moving forward. The EIA process does not require any changes in how 
projects are developed. EIAs are at worst a rubber stamp and at best result in design 
changes (Alshuwaikhat, 2005). 
 
For example, the Salzman and Thompson (2007) study point out that EIAs provide a 
subjective analysis of environmental impacts and alternative options, but the ultimate 
choice to move forward with the Project is up to the decision-maker. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that EIAs occur at a fixed point in the planning process has 
removed the requirement for developers to revisit the EIA. This situation has created 
circumstances where monitoring and evaluation have no priority. 
 
There have been a number of Government agencies involved in hydropower 
development in Laos (See Table 6-1). This study will focus on four key agencies of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), Electricité du Laos (EdL), the Water Resource 
and Environment Administration (WREA) and the Committee for Planning and 
Investment (CPI). 
Table 6-0-1 Overview of agencies in the Laos Hydropower Development Sector.  
Source: Department of Water Resources and Environment (2008). 
  
 
General Ministry / Agency 
 
Functions   
 
   
Direct 1. WREA 
 
management as  Department of Water Resources 
 
well as  
Department of Meteorology and Hydrology 
 
development of  
 
policies and plans  Department of Environment 
 




resources  Water Resources and Environment Research Institute 
 




 2. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
 




 4. Ministry of Communication, Transportation, Post and Construction 
 
 (now called MPWT) 
 
 5. Ministry of Public Health 
 
 6. Ministry of Trade and Tourism 
 
 7. Science, Technology and Environment Agency, Water Resources 
 
 Coordination Committee, LNMC (now 
 
 included partly or completely in WREA) 
 
Provision of water 1. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
 
and water- related  Department of Forestry 
 
services,  
Department of Irrigation 
 
development of  
 




 Functions     
 
in water- related   Department of Planning (Integrated Watershed Management  
 
sectors,   Unit)  
 
management of   National Agriculture and Forestry Extension Service  
 
watersheds   National Agriculture and Forestry Research Institute  
 
 2. Ministry of Public Works and Transport  
 
 Water Supply Authority  
 
   Department of Housing and Urban Planning  
 
   Department of Bridges and Roads (Inland Waterway Division)  
 
   Department of Transport (Inland Waterway Transport Division)  
 
 3. Ministry of Energy and Mines  
 
   Department of Electricity  
 




   Department of Mining  
 
 4. Ministry of Public Health  
 
   Department of Sanitation and Preventative Medicine (National  
 
   Centre for Environmental Health and Water Supply)  
 
   Department of Foods and Drugs  
 
 5. Prime Minister’s Office  
 
   Land Management Administration  
 
Carrying out 1. Committee for Planning and Investment  
 
functions which   Department of General Planning  
 
directly affect the 






  Department of Investment Planning  
 
   National Statistics Centre  
 
 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 
   Department of Foreign Management and Economic  
 
   Cooperation  
 
   Department of Law and Treaties  
 
 4. Ministry of Justice  
 
   Department of Law  
 
   Department of Law Dissemination and Advertisement  
 
 5. Prime Minister’s Office  
 
   National Geographic Service  
 
   Public Administration and Civil Service Authority  
 
 
Overall responsibility for power sector development in Laos has been vested in the 
MEM6 and more specifically in the Department of Electricity. MEM’s responsibilities 
have included: 
• Promotion of pipelines of projects (database); 
• Formulation of power sector policy and procedures; 
                                                          
6
 The Ministry for Energy and Mines was, until 2006, known as The Ministry of 
Industry and Handicrafts (MIH). 
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• Reviewing IPP studies and agreements; 
• Participation in tariff negotiations with foreign investors; 
• Monitoring environmental impacts and Environmental Management Plans in 
cooperation with the Science Technology and Environment Agency (STEA) and other 
relevant ministries, agencies, and local authorities; 
• Establishment and monitoring of technical standards. 
(Source: IPP procurement manual, 2006). 
 
Electricité du Laos (EdL) sits under MEM and is the state-owned corporation that has 
operated the main generation and transmission lines in Laos. It also controls the 
distribution of electricity imports and exports. EdL also works closely with the IPP 
projects. 
 
Until 2008, the Science Technology and Environment Agency (STEA) was responsible 
for coordinating the environmental planning and management of projects across all 
sectors. In 2008, Government restructuring to improve capacity, supported by the WB 
and ADB, created the Water Resource and Environment Administration (WREA). 
WREA enveloped the STEA, the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology (formerly 
in MAF), the Water Resources Coordination Committee (WRCC) and the Lao National 
Mekong Committee (LNMC). The WREA sat under the Prime Minister’s Office. From 
2008, The Lao Department of Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (DESIA) 
was created within WREA and assumed responsibility for approving Environmental 
and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA) in the country. 
 
The Committee for Planning and Investment (CPI) has been another key agency in 
hydropower development. The CPI sits within the Prime Minister’s Office and has 
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been chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and also included the Minister of Energy 
and Mining and the Minister of Finance. 
 
Although the responsibility for the bureaucratic implementation of laws and policies 
surrounding hydropower sits with a number of agencies, the ultimate decision for any 
significant project in Laos rests with the all-powerful 11 member Politburo at the top 
of the Government (Stuart-Fox, 2008). 
 
As highlighted above and in previous chapters, with the WB and the ADB pushing 
neo-liberal policies on Laos in the 1990s, the GoL began to move away from its 
centrally planned economy to one that was open to market forces and private 
investment. The first hydropower project to trial this new private sector-led model 
was the 45 MW Xeset Dam completed in 1991. The ADB supported the funding of the 
Dam as a key step in opening up of the Lao economy (Rosario, 2011). The Dam was 
also the first in the country to export surplus energy to Thailand, laying the 
groundwork for future exchanges with Thailand and the Region. 
 
Following the successful completion of the Xeset Dam, the Ministry of Industry and 
Handicrafts (later renamed the Ministry of Energy and Mines), began to receive 
dozens of MoU requests from regional and international private hydropower 
developers and IPPs anxious to profit from Laos’ newly opened hydropower industry 
(PS7, 2011). 
 
These IPPs were an important force in shaping the Lao economy. As one consultant 
put it, “The IPP program was about the only economic card GoL had to play” (PS7, 
2011). The opening up of Lao economy to IPPs represented more than hydropower 
development. The neo-liberal policies opened the underdeveloped economy of Laos 
to a host of global and regional forces. Investors were keen to profit from Laos’ 
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relatively untouched market and natural resources, including mining and forestry. 
One of the key drivers of this investment during the early 1990s was the economic 
boom in Asia. In the years preceding the Asian Financial Crisis, Asian economies were 
developing rapidly and many firms were seeking new markets and high return, high-
risk investments for large amounts of capital (Studwell, 2007). A World Bank report 
states that from 1990 to 1997 global private annual investments in developing 
country infrastructure rose from $19 billion to approximately $120 billion (Izaguirre 
and Rao, 1999). 
 
The GoL was ill-prepared for this transition. With no political risk guarantees and poor 
risk-mitigation measures, many reputable hydropower developers avoided Laos 
because the potential costs and risks outweighed the benefits (PS6, 2012). As a 
consultant with the Ministry of Energy and Mines during the 1990s stated: 
“The lack of capacity in the Government meant that the objectives were 
not defined in any quantitative sense and they did not have the people 
and institutions to control a program of such size and complexity. There 
was over-reliance on developers for the financial modelling to project 
GoL benefits and contracts needed to mobilize money from the debt 
markets. They were lambs to the slaughter in the early years” (PS8, 
2012). 
 
Huntington (1965) has pointed out that strong political institutions are 
necessary for the political institutionalization needed to regulate rapid 
modernization. Strong political institutions have the necessary scope, 
adaptability, complexity, endurance and coherence to regulate rapid 
development (ibid). Many of these principles are absent in Laos because of the 
existence of mechanisms within the state. Jarvis (2010) further argues that in 
order to attract investors, developing countries must provide political risk 
guarantees to reduce the impact of poor transparency and uncertain political 
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environments. In the early 1990s, the lack of security and high risks of 
investments resulted in a number of exploitative developers entering into 
agreements with the GoL. Commenting on the type of developers operating in 
Laos during this time, one consultant stated: 
“The GoL had no capacity to regulate the developers sweeping in to profit 
from Laos freshly opened market. There were many dodgy types around 
town and it felt as if hydropower had gone the way of the Wild West – build 
first ask questions later.” (PS9, 2011). 
The opening up to private sector investment combined with Laos weak bureaucratic 
capacity and mechanisms from the state that created opportunities for decision 
makers to benefit from development through corruption, weak transparency and no 
accountability resulted in at least 23 MoUs signed with various hydropower 
developers (See Table 6-2). 
 
Table 6-2 BOOT export hydropower projects and MoUs as of November 2003.  
Source: Interviews and Wyatt’s Unpublished PhD Thesis on BOOT in Laos and Vietnam 
(2004). 
Project Capacity Project company / lead 
Sponsor 
Type of Agreement  Power 
Purchase 
Agreement 
     





Houay Ho 150 Houay Ho Power Company 











Nam Ngum 2 980 Shlapak (US) Concession Agreement 
 
No 





Sepian/Senamnoy 390 Dong Ah (South Korea) Concession Agreement  
 
No 
Xekaman 1 468 ALP Management (HECEC – 
Australia) 
Concession Agreement  
 
No 














































30 True Assess Ltd. Memorandum of 
Understanding  
No 
Nam Bak (Cha) 
2B 
120 Nisho Iwai (Japan) Memorandum of 
Understanding  
No 
Nam Bak (Cha) 
1+2 
185 HECEC (Australia) Memorandum of 
Understanding  
No 
Xe Kong 4 528 Modular Memorandum of 
Understanding  
No 
Nam Ngiep 1 440 Shlapak (US) Memorandum of 
Understanding  
No 






These MoUs created a large list of potential hydropower developments with many 
investors. The Government and its ministries were responsible for choosing which 
project to allow and in which order they would develop. The result of this influx of 
developers was a number of dams being planned along the same river with potential 
to impact each other’s technical and economic viability. See figure 6-2.  
 
Figure 6-2  Proposed dams in Laos 2007.  
Source: International Rivers. 
 
In 2007, one consultant working at this time illustrated the influence of these new 
projects stating that, 
“This was like a dance of the MoUs. There was no capacity or willingness in 
the Government to plan hydropower across the country. MoUs were signed 
for projects upstream and downstream of other projects, where this Project 
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would flood this site etc. It was just a race to see who could get up the 
ranking list to secure funding so they could start making money.” (PS2, 
2011) 
 
Another consultant further illustrated the challenges that emerge from the projects, 
stating that: 
“At no stage have any of the strategy studies gone back to the basic 
situation, taken into account the other uses for water, and the 
environmental and social dimensions. It is just been one pathetic engineer’s 
list after another of preferred schemes which plays right into the 
Government’s hands. Another list, another name at the top, another payoff 
to change the order.” (PS10, 2011) 
 
A key enabler of this wave of private sector development and IPPs was the 
introduction of the Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) model to Laos. The BOOT 
model is well known around the world. The first BOOT project was the Suez Canal in 
1868. The model became increasingly popular, with the deregulation and 
liberalisation of market economies from the 1970s to the 1990s. BOOT model 
projects were promoted by multilateral development banks as a way to encourage 
private sector financing of large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Channel 
Tunnel and the Kansai International Airport. 
 
The BOOT model concept involves the private sector handling all the financing, 
design, construction and operation of what would typically be a public infrastructure 
project for a concessionary period of usually 20-50 years (Levy, 1996). During the 
contracted period the private operator is allowed to run the infrastructure at a rate of 
return high enough to service debts within a maturity period and afterwards to 
generate a profit of approximately 15% or more (ibid). In the case of Laos’s BOOT 
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projects, the GoL - usually with donor support, has retained a percentage of control in 
the Project throughout the concessionary period by becoming part of the consortium 
of investors. This arrangement has allowed investors and private sector contracts to 
exert a degree of control over the Project depending on what stake they take. Being 
involved in the project development further allowed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
to gain project contracts. In many dam projects, the Government has involved its 
SOEs or Government departments in the environmental and social mitigation 
measures. In the Theun Hinboun project, described below, for example, the GoL took 
a 60% majority stake in the project and a military company was involved in logging 
the reservoir. Once the concessionary period is finished the Government acquires 
ownership of the infrastructure at no cost. 
 
BOOT structures tend to be complex. Within the BOOT contract there are dozens of 
fees, guarantees, loans and contracts needed between each stakeholder. Figure 6-3 
shows a typical BOOT structure for a hydropower plant. 
 
Figure 6-3 BOOT Structure for Hydropower Plant.  




Because the nature of BOOT projects restricts investors from removing their equity 
when they please, they generally assemble a large consortium of investors, including 
state-backed banks that attempt to spread their risk exposure. The commercial 
viability of the project needs to be carefully assessed by the project financiers as they 
provide the bulk of investment and have limited recourse to recoup losses should the 
project fail. While BOOT projects should encourage careful investments, 
opportunities for investors to profit through construction or service supply may 
incentivise investments with weak returns. For example, Morris (1997) details a BOOT 
case in Australia where a private company published misleading revenue estimates 
from the Melbourne Citylink Project to attract investment.  
 
Furthermore, risk may be poorly understood by investors. This risk includes political 
instability and risk associated with complex projects such as hydropower. Handley 
(1997) claims that governments, particularly from developing countries, have been 
encouraged to absorb risks and provide private sector guarantees such as supplying 
security, water flows, fuel, or electricity. These risks are rarely adequately costed. The 
complexity of projects further results in the possibility of risks being undervalued, 
overlooked, or misidentified. In developing countries, risks may be further 
exacerbated by poor quality data or baseline studies. For example, hydropower 
projects that rely on hydrological data to predict flow rates and project viability may 
need to extrapolate conclusions from limited baseline data also affecting 
environmental and social impact mitigation measures. A political ecology analysis 
demonstrates that In Laos mechanisms within the state empower actors who are 
involved in hydropower development and create incentives for the risks of BOOTs to 
be undervalued or overlooked. As will be discussed in the Houay Ho Dam case below, 




The risks associated with BOOT hydropower investments can quickly translate into 
significant environmental and social impacts. A consultant company owner working 
during the 1990s stated that, 
“The rush of development that followed the introduction of the IPPs and 
BOOT models was a disaster in terms of environmental and social impacts. 
The dams we were asked to work on did not even have sound engineering 
behind them. In most cases our environmental and social assessments were 
ignored.” (PS11, 2011) 
 
Another consultant went further, explaining that, “By forcing the country to open up 
to private investment the WB and the ADB basically sold Laos out from under its own 
feet” (PS9, 2011). 
 
In Laos, the BOOT model was promoted by a neo-liberal agenda that emerged in the 
1990s from global actors such as the WB, the ADB, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and the private sector (Levy 1996). The purpose of introducing BOOT was 
twofold:  first, to encourage expensive development projects that were out of the 
reach of developing states thereby reducing poverty and integrating nations into the 
global market economy, and second, to reduce the exposure of the developing 
country economy to the risks of large infrastructure projects (Levy, 1996). 
 
BOOT projects have also impacted the scale of hydropower development. Using a 
political ecology approach, Bakker (1999:225) posited that BOOT, private sector led 
projects have had “a tendency to favour large-scale, capital intensive projects over 
smaller-scale initiatives” leading to “a different prioritization of hydro projects than 
that which may have been determined by the Mekong River Commission or 
Government planning agencies.” Evidence of this can be seen by the number of MoUs 
signed by the GoL in Table 6-2. Only five out of 23 MoUs were for hydropower 
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projects under 100 MWs. Larger projects, however, come with increased complexity 
and diverse risk, including, engineering, financing and social and environmental 
impacts. They also create larger opportunities for corruption through large complex 
contract processes.  
 
With the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 many projects outlined in Table 6-2 were 
placed on hold or scrapped (PS14, 2012). This period gave the GoL some breathing 
room to develop its capacity. Recognizing the lack of capacity within the GoL to 
regulate the private sector investment, and as part of their new role as knowledge 
developers, the WB and the ADB set about investing in a number of initiatives to 
improve laws and polices surrounding hydropower development. 
 
Many of these laws came with the start of the development of the Nam Theun 2 
(NT2) Dam in 1999. As discussed in previous chapters, the NT2 is currently the largest 
dam in operation in Laos. With the development of the Dam, the World Bank helped 
the GoL prepare its current EIA regulations and Environmental Laws and develop the 
contractual requirements to export electricity to neighbouring countries. Since 1999, 
seven of the ten laws regulating hydropower development have been passed. A 
summary of these is included in Table 6-3. 
 
Table 6-3. Summary of Impact Assessment Law and legislation in Lao surrounding 
hydropower 
Year Laws and legislations Key agency 




“Decree 112/PM Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment” 
 This policy requires significant investment projects operating in 
Lao to prepare an EIA, including the assessments of impacts and 




2009 “Decree of the President on the promulgation of the Environmental 
Protection Law No.09/PO” 
 This specifies necessary principles, regulations and measures for 




2007 “National Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability of the 
Hydropower Sector in Lao PDR No.561/CPI” 
 This emphasizes the requirement of EIA reporting and 
Environmental Management Plans (EMP) for all large 
hydropower projects. 
CPI, Ministry Of  
Planning and  
Investment 
(MPI) 
2005 “Regulations for Implementing the Decree on Compensation and 
Resettlement”; and 
“Decree 192/PM on Compensation and Resettlement of the 
Development Project” 
 These documents refer to social impact assessment (SIA) to 
ensure that people affected by development projects are 
compensated and assisted to improve their livelihoods and living 
standards. 




2003 “Environmental Standard Management for Electricity Projects 
No.0366/MIH.DOE” 









2002 “Regulation on Environmental Protection and Management”; and 
“An implementation decree for the Environmental Protection Law” 
 These emphasize that all projects that have an impact on the 
environment, including social impacts, require a completed 




2001 “Regulation on Implementing Environmental Assessment for 
Electricity Projects in Lao PDR No.447/MIH” 
 This policy guides implementation of environmental assessment 





2000 “Regulation on Environmental Assessment No.1770/STEA” 
 This refers to environmental assessment procedures and 




1999 “Environmental Protection Law” 
 This law requires all development projects that have the 
potential to affect the environment to prepare an EIA. The law 
also contains standards regarding the timing of environmental 
assessment requirements within the project cycle as well as the 




1997 “Electricity Law” 
 This law provides the basis for the environmental requirements 
for hydropower development. It requires dam developers to 
submit environmental and social studies and management plans, 





1997 “Land Law of 1997” 
 This law provides the legal basis for allocating land and awarding 
deeds and titles for resettled people in connection with 
hydropower development. 





1996 “Law on Water and Water Resources” 
 This law seeks to ensure sustainable use of water resources and 
establishes requirements for the preparation of an EIA for any 









International policies and guidelines 
2010 “Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of Hydropower on the 
Mekong Mainstream” 
 This policy is an instrument assisting and facilitating regional and 
national level decision-making on mainstream dam construction 
on the Mekong River. 
MRC 
2006 “Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability” IFC (WB Group) 
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 This policy is a sustainability framework comprising eight 
Performance Standards that provides guidelines on doing 
business in a ‘sustainable way’. 
2002 “Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies” 
 This policy strengthens the sustainable development framework 
for the WB to ensure that environmental and social issues are 
considered and managed in the decision-making and planning of 
development projects. 
WB 
2002 “The Environmental Policy” 
 This policy was added as a further safeguard to require  all ADB 
projects to prepare a full comprehensive EIA, including the 
environmental and social soundness. 
ADB 
2002 “Safeguard Policies: Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12)” 
 This refers to procedures that seek to avoid or minimize 
involuntary resettlement as a process of development projects.  
WB 
1999 “Safeguard Policies: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4.01” 
 This policy requires Environmental Assessment to be undertaken 
for all supported projects (including hydropower projects) to 
ensure that they are environmentally sound and sustainable, and 
to improve the basis for decision-making.  
WB 
 
Source: WB, 2011; ADB, 2009; Porter and Shivakumar, 2011; IFC, 2012; King et al., 
2007; ICEM, 2010; Sadler et al., 2000; King et al., 2007. 
 
As will be discussed below and in Chapter 7, mechanisms within the state have 
allowed powerful actors to circumvent these new laws and policies and proceed with 
developments regardless of their social and environmental costs. These new laws and 
policies also did little to improve capacity issues. A 2003 report from the ADB stated 
that, ‘‘the Government’s capacity to implement large-scale complex hydropower 
projects still remains a major concern” (ADB, 2003:3). A 2004 report from the WB also 





From 2000, with the passing of the Asian Financial Crisis, private sector investment in 
hydropower development rapidly increased. At the time of writing, all of the dams 
planned, proposed, or under construction and that are larger than 50 MW involve 
some form of private sector investment. Although private sector investment can 
support strong social and environmental protection and responsible engineering, a 
number of developers have taken advantage of the mechanisms within Laos to 
circumvent the environmental and social protection laws and policies. 
 
Foran et al. (2010) study into EIAs and private sector investment in the Mekong 
Region found that Laos had a serious lack of capacity and authority within 
Government agencies to sufficiently regulate EIAs and hydropower development. A 
consultant working on current hydropower projects stated in regards to Government 
capacity that, 
“The way EIAs are reviewed is that they are split up and different 
departments and people get different sections. So, the capacity of the 
department to appraise them is limited. Also the language used in the EIAs 
is English and very technical. Because EIAs look professional, they are 
assumed to be, but the content is seriously lacking. Some are even cut and 
pasted from other projects, such as mining.” (PS12, 2012). 
 
This lack of authority within the bureaucracy to enforce laws and policies is evidenced 
by its institutional position. For example, the Lao Department of Environmental, 
Social Impact Assessment (DESIA) was established in 2008 within Water Resource and 
Environment Administration (WREA) to review EIAs. WREA sits under the Office of the 
Prime Minister, but is not a Ministry and therefore lacks any power to direct or 
enforce other ministries or project developers to follow environmental or social 
protection standards (Frankel, 2010). Although the WB has been supporting the 
Department of Environmental, Social Impact Assessment (DESIA) under WREA, it 
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suffers from “a lack of staff, funding and a complete lack of experienced staff” (PS13, 
2011). 
 
The lack of capacity to evaluate hydropower developments and risk assumptions 
extends beyond environmental ministries. A lawyer working for hydropower 
developers on concession agreements in Laos and around the world stated that “to 
me it just seems tragic that the country is signing these things. It leaves them open to 
a whole range of litigation if there are any problems, including changed water flow 
regimes” (HL1, 2011). 
 
The shift to the BOOT model and private sector investment has also empowered the 
existing mechanisms within the state such as weak transparency. Hydropower 
development agreements between the private sector and the Government have been 
subject to intelligence property rights, commercial-in-confidence, and a host of other 
legal rules that protect the competitive interests of the private sector. These private 
sector rules have restricted Government influence on developments, decreased 
transparency, and further entrenched lines of exclusion and inclusion in an already 
highly politicized decision-making environment. The influence of these private sector 
norms on transparency is evidenced in a WikiLeaks cable from 2008,  
“A number of NGOs have previously complained about the Government's [of 
Laos] refusal to abide by its own policy. When questioned about the policy, 
Mr. Seumkham Thoummavongsa, the Deputy Chief of Social and 
Environmental Management at the Ministry of Energy and Mines, appeared 
unaware of the national policy promoting hydropower transparency, and 
claimed that EIAs were private company documents.” (Wikileaks, 2008). 
 
The influx of private sector investment and the BOOT model in Laos have had 
significant implications on how hydropower is developed and planned across the 
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country.  The modes of private sector investment have used mechanisms within the 
state to exploit a lack of capacity in the bureaucracy where the laws and policies 
regulating hydropower development exist. The weak Government capacity has also 
empowered the political, economic, and social structures and mechanisms within the 
state. The second half of this chapter will use grounded case studies to analyse how 
mechanisms and structures within the state have allowed hydropower development 
to be built in ways that ignore its social and environmental costs. 
 
6.5 Impacts of Mechanisms on Hydropower Development and the 
Impact Assessment Process 
 
The second half of this chapter uses a political ecology approach to analyse case 
studies across Laos to provide specific, grounded evidence of how the meso-scale 
mechanisms analysed in the first half of this chapter influence hydropower 
development, the IA process and social and environmental impacts. Special attention 
will be paid to the impact of these mechanisms on hydropower’s socio-ecological 
ramifications. 
 
The case studies presented below were selected due to their prominence and the 
availability of data. Of the ten existing dams in Laos over 50 MWs, data were available 
for six case studies including: the Nam Theun 2 (NT2), the Thuen Hinboun Dam, the 
Thuen Hinboun Expansion Project, Houay Ho, Nam Mang, and Nam Leuk. 
 
6.5.1 The Nam Theun 2 
 
The Nam Theun 2 (NT2) began operation in 2010 and cost $1.5 billion to construct. It 
is owned by the Nam Theun Power Company (NTPC) which is comprised of a mix of 
shareholders including Électricité de France (EDF) with a 40% investment, Electricity 
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Generating Public Company Limited (EGCO) Thailand with 35%, and the EdL with 25%. 
The GoL’s share was mainly funded by donors including $20 million from the ADB and 
the World Bank, respectively. The Dam reservoir is 450 km2 with an installed capacity 
of 1070 MW of which 95% is exported to Thailand for purchase by EGAT. The annual 
income from the Project is estimated to be $100-150 million per year. 
 
The Dam involves a complex inter-basin transfer where water from the Nam Theun 
River is dammed to form a reservoir on the Nakai Plateau (see figure 6-4). The water 
from the reservoir is then tunnelled through a 348 metre vertical shaft to reach a 
power station before being diverted into a regulating dam and entering the Xe Bang 
River and finally joining the Mekong. The Dam required the resettlement of 6,738 
people from 17 villages and 1,298 households (Souksavath and Nakayma, 2012). 
International Rivers has stated that the Dam has caused significant impacts on 





Figure 6-4 The Nam Thuen 2 and the Theun Hinboun dams.  
Source: Bank Track (2012). 
 
NT2 is considered a World Bank flagship development. The World Bank states that 
the Dam objective was “To generate revenues, through environmentally and socially 
sustainable development of the NT2’s hydropower potential, that will be used to 
finance priority poverty reduction and environmental management programs” (WB, 
2005:16). Along with sustainable development, participation was earmarked as a one 
of the five key themes in the official framework to guide project implementation 
(World Bank and ADB, 2006). As part of the WB’s development of the NT2, the 
Government of Lao was required to revise and establish new laws surrounding 
environmental and social protection (See Table 6-3 above) and to participate in a 
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range of consultation activities (Singh, 2009). The NT2 Social Development Plan 
emphasizes and defines the issue of ‘participation’, stating that the development 
“require[s] that affected groups (especially villages), Government agencies, [locally-
based international] NGOs and all other stakeholders be consulted in a meaningful 
way” (NTPC, 2004: 11). 
 
Mechanisms within the Laos state, however, shaped the nature of participation in 
ways that protected decision makers. Sing (2009) analysis of the process found that 
there had been weak participation during the consultation process and villagers were 
reluctant to speak out against the Project for fear of Government backlash. 
Meaningful participation was impacted by the tightly controlled nature of the Laos 
state during the process (Mirumachi and Torriti, 2012). On the other hand, the WB 
stated that the GoL, with its assistance, developed the dam in a participatory manner 
closely following its laws (WB, 2005). The WB appears to have labelled the 
participatory process as excellent in order to legitimise its involvement in the Dam. As 
one consultant working for the French international corporate EDF at the time 
explained that, “Contractors said the consultation process was bullshit, but EDF and 
the World Bank said it was very well done” (PS14, 2012). 
 
With no grassroots civil society extant in the country, the World Bank’s participation 
requirements were scaled to the international level, with INGOs representing local 
people. This produced a guise for participation and manufactured consent for the 
Project which enabled both the World Bank and the GoL to meet its objectives while 
allowing mechanisms within Laos to protect decision makers and allow them to 
practising business-as-usual decision-making (Singh, 2009). 
 
Mechanisms from within Laos also impacted other aspects of the Project. The NT’s 
cumulative Impact Assessment identified the protection of 4000 square kilometres of 
Nakai Nam Theun protected area as an important component of the development. 
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The Nakai Nam Theun protected area provides key rainfall runoff to the reservoir and 
is an important area of biodiversity in S.E. Asia (World Bank, 2005). Despite the NTPC 
paying the Government one million dollars a year for protection of the area, 
extensive logging occurred (IN3, 2011). A regional water resources management 
bulletin, repeated the problem of logging during the development, stating that  
“A company run by the Lao military, Bholisat Phattana Khed Phoudoi (BPKP – 
the Mountain Region Development Company), won the contract to log the 
reservoir area...in addition to the reservoir area, BPKP also logged several 
areas of forest above the reservoir“(WRM Bulletin 84, 2004: 2). 
 
The NTPC also failed to adequately address water quality and flow releases from the 
Dam, thereby violating terms of the EIA and social and environmental laws in the 
country. A former consultant from the Nam Theun 2 gave the following reasons for 
his resignation, 
“The water quality monitoring was flawed. The NT2 did not address the 
impacts on the Theun Hinboun – especially the minimum riparian releases 
that will affect biodiversity in the Kading National Biodiversity Conservation 
Area. There was no social-economic framework survey of utilization of natural 
resources in the Xe Bang Fai River” (PS15, 2011). 
 
The impact of mechanisms on project construction and social and environmental 
mitigation are also evidenced in an internal EDF document. From 2007-2010, EDF was 
in charge of several social and environmental aspects of the project. A consultant 
who wrote the lessons learned report stated: 
“I found that the Government was generally reluctant to work with the 
WB and EDF on the social and environmental mitigations. Relations were 
very tricky behind the curtain. The Government seemed to be focusing 
on making money from the Project – they were supporting mining and 
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logging in the watershed during planning and construction. The lessons 
learned report was too controversial to be released. I got the 
impressions from my co-workers and those I talked to in the 
Government that neither would not involve itself in such a complex 
[from a social and environmental safeguard perspective] project again. 
There were also definitely some issues of corruption, but less so than 
with other projects because of the tight scrutiny. On one occasion the 
Government sent a letter requesting over a dozen expensive cars from 
NTPC. On another occasion the Government made up a fake census to 
say 500 buffalo had died because of the NTPC’s killing off of grass for 
grazing. The NTPC paid compensation to avoid a scandal.” (PS14, 2012) 
 
Although the Government stated that it would prioritize its $2 billion share of 
revenue from electricity sales of the NT2 into a national fund for alleviating poverty. 
As one interviewee who works closely with the Government through the Mekong 
River Commission stated in 2012, 
“Very little has changed socially since the Dam started producing electricity 
– everyone is wondering where the money is going, because it sure does 
not seem to be reaching the people who need it.” (MRC2, 2012). 
 
The political ecology analysis of the NT2 case demonstrates that mechanisms 
from within Laos enabled a WB flagship development dam to circumvent the 
participation process and create significant social and environmental impacts. 
Mechanisms allowed the GoL and the private sector to violate the EIA process 
and profit from the dam through illegal logging. Mechanisms also empowered 




The mechanisms that impacted the prominent NT2 Dam also influenced the 
development of the second largest dam in Laos, the Theun Hinboun and Theun 
Hinboun Expansion project. 
 
6.5.2 Theun Hinboun (THB) 
 
Like the NT2, the Theun Hinboun Power Company (THPC) which operates the Theun 
Hinboun (THB) Dam and the Theun Hinboun Expansion Project (THXP) has European 
ownership. The company is owned by Electricité du Laos (EdL) (60%), Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS) Lao (A Thai company) (20%) and Nordic Hydropower 20%. The 
Government of Lao’s share was 90% financed with support from the ADB. The income 
from the Project is estimated at $60-70 million annually. Completed in 1998, the 220 
MW THB Dam is the second BOOT project in Laos (Virtanen, 2006). As with the NT2, 
the THB is an inter-basin transfer project diverting the Theun River to the Hai and 
Hinboun Rivers through a six kilometre tunnel (see figure 6-4 above). At least 95% of 
electricity was exported to Thailand in 2013. The Dam required the resettlement of 
approximately 6,000 people.  
 
From the outset of the THB project, a lack of transparency and weak enforcement of 
laws allowed the developers and the GoL to begin construction on the dam while 
completely ignoring its social and environmental impacts. In 1993, Norplan, a 
Norwegian consulting firm released the EIA for the Dam stating that “The Project will 
have significant beneficial environmental impacts. There are no significant adverse 
sociological impacts as no resettlement is required...” (Norplan, 1993:1-7). This stood 
in stark contrast to a 1996 report from FIVAS, a Norwegian NGO, which concluded the 
EIA had been “inadequate and biased in favour of construction” (FIVAS, 1996). 
Despite the EIA findings, NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) 




FIVAS, INGOs and academics subsequently accused THPC of developing the Dam with 
no environmental baseline studies, no formal compensation policy or consultation 
with affected people prior to construction starting and an underestimate of costs 
(Probe, 1998; Hirsch, 2001; FIVAS, 1996 etc.). All these accusations were in violation 
of Norwegian and Laos law. In response to this criticism, Norplan produced a revised 
study in 1996, after construction started, that stated that there would be negative 
fisheries impacts and approximately 6000 people would be resettled by the Dam 
(Midas and Burapha, 1995). The new study also highlighted that the Hai and Hinboun 
Rivers would suffer from increased flooding and heavy erosion because of the inter-
basin nature of the Project. Norplan recommended stabilizing the river banks before 
operation began. These recommendations were rejected by the THPC, who instead 
attempted to manage the impacts through environmental mitigation measures 
(Barney, 2007). Despite the failings of the first EIA, Norplan was still appointed the 
consultant in charge of social and environmental mitigation. 
 
Due to mechanisms that removed the requirement of the government and the 
developer to follow Laos environmental and social impact policies and laws the dam 
proceeded with an inadequate EIA. After the Dam was constructed, the true 
environmental and social impacts became evident. International Rivers released a 
report in 1998 entitled Trouble on the Theun Hinboun that documented the loss of 
fisheries, impacts to drinking water, flooded vegetable gardens and lower water 
tables, illustrating how these issues were severely impacting livelihoods downstream 
of the Dam (International Rivers, 1998). The THPC and the ADB initially refused to 
acknowledge these impacts and in response they hired a fisheries expert, Terry 
Warren, to look into the allegations. Warren’s report (1999) although not released by 
the ADB identified major impacts on fisheries and fish populations arising from the 
construction and operation of the Dam (Warren, 1999). Warren (ibid) further 
identified that the loss of these fisheries was having significant impact on the 




Perhaps recognizing the seriousness of the impacts, the ADB responded to these 
reports with promises for a survey to identify fair compensation and investigation of 
impacts. The survey was conducted by the National University of Laos in 1999. An 
ADB mission later that year concluded that, 
“THPC continues to deal with the Project’s complex environmental and social 
issues on a largely ad hoc basis. As a result, some major Project-induced 
impacts have gone unmitigated for almost two years. These include no 
compensation for lost gardens and virtually no compensation for losses in fish 
catch. These impacts have had serious negative consequences for the affected 
villagers” (ADB Report, 1999). 
 
A full three years after the Project had been completed, with no compensation paid 
to villagers or local people, the ADB and the THPC commissioned Resource 
Management & Research (RMR) to design a Mitigation and Compensation Program 
(MCP). The MCP report recommended the establishment of an Environmental and 
Management Department and outlined a 10 year compensation program costing 
between $2.74 and $4.65 million. Although the report is considered a significant 
improvement from previous studies, it has been criticized for being top-down and not 
offering any local participation in compensation and the heavy allocation of resources 
to consultants instead of villagers (Shoemaker, 2000). A project report by Usher and 
Ryder (1997) found that the lack of social and environmental mitigation would allow 
the Norwegian interests alone to earn approximately 1.8-1.9 million annually over the 
30 year contract, or around a 16 per cent profit margin.  
 
Along with significant environmental and social impacts, the economic viability of the 
dam has been questioned by various consultants working on the project (PS, 17). A 
consultant who worked on the Project stated that, 
“The Dam has serious engineering flaws and the Government of Laos will be 
lucky if it is operational in 30 years. Sediment entry into the head-pond area is 
229 
 
probably between 100 to 400 tonnes per km2 per year over the catchment 
area. This should have been high on the engineers’ and planners’ agendas, but 
it was disregarded. It does not take a rocket scientist to work out that storage 
losses of this magnitude can quite quickly compromise operations!” (PS11, 
2011) 
 
In the case of the Theun Hinboun Dam, Laos’ institutional structures and mechanisms 
including weak enforcement of social and environmental laws, poor transparency and 
accountability, and weak bureaucratic capacity to understand the commercial 
viability of the Project enabled developers to push forward a project that increased 
their profits while ignoring significant negative environmental and social impacts.  
 
In early 2000, the GoL announced that it would proceed with the development of the 
NT2 Dam upstream of the THB Dam. Recognizing that the construction of the NT2 
upstream of the THB Dam would significantly reduce its operating capacity, the THPC 
quickly announced the construction schedule of the THXP. 
 
6.5.3 The Theun Hinboun Expansion Project (THXP) 
 
The THXP is a 70 metre high dam upstream of the THB Dam. It was built for a cost of 
$665 million with funding from the Export-Import Bank of Thailand, ANZ Banking 
Group (Australia), BNP Paribas (France), KBC (Belgium); and four Thai banks, including 
Bank of Ayudhya, Kasikorn Bank, Siam City Bank and Thanachart Bank (International 
Rivers, 2009). The Project is owned by EdL, the Norwegian state-owned energy 
company (Statkraft), and GMS Power of Thailand. 
 
The Dam has been built on the Nam Gnouang River, about 27 km upstream from the 
THB. The THXP created a reservoir covering an area of 105 km2 which acts as a 
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storage dam, adding 220 MW of capacity to the THB. THPC also built a 60 MW power 
station at the expansion project site (see figure 6-4). This brought the total installed 
capacity of the two dams to 500 MWs. THXP doubles the amount of water released 
into the Hai and Hinboun Rivers downstream of the THB. The THXP displaced 
approximately 4,800 people and negatively impacted another 48,441 people 
(International Rivers, 2008). 
 
For the construction of the THXP, the THPC was keen to avoid the controversy 
surrounding the impacts of the Theun Hinboun Project. An official from the THPC 
stated in 2010 that “We are following international environmental and social best 
practice mitigation measures for this project” (IN2, 2010). This commitment to best 
practice is emphasized in the THPC Inception to 2010 report that states “From the 
start of planning, THPC has been committed to the highest standards of social and 
environmental mitigation” (THPC Report, 2010). 
 
In 2004, the THPC hired Resource Management & Research (RMR) to conduct the first 
EIA of the Project. RMR submitted an incomplete EIA to the THPC in 2006, stating that 
after two years of extensive study they found that the downstream impacts of the 
THB had still not been adequately addressed over the eight years of its operation. 
They further stated that the construction of the THXP Project would seriously amplify 
these impacts. According to a consultant for RMR: 
“We found that the THB Dam was causing serious social and ecological 
impacts downstream. The company’s reports were downplaying these and 
the mitigation measures were inadequate. We realized there was no way 





The THPC dismissed this EIA as being too detailed (PS17, 2011) and went on to hire 
Norplan to develop an alternative EIA. Within one year, Norplan had developed an 
EIA dismissing the environmental and social impacts outlined by RMR’s EIA. Norplan’s 
EIA also dismissed the RMR EIA’s concerns about leakages and unstable geology in 
the reservoir area. A consultant for Norplan stated that “The RMR EIA was completely 
inaccurate. It recommended a number of unnecessary and costly mitigation measures 
and highlighted completely unrealistic risks. It was dismissed by THPC and we were 
brought in to do another one” (PS17, 2011). 
 
The owner of RMR, Murray Watson, published an open letter on the company’s 
website and sent a copy to International Rivers. The 2007 letter details Watson’s 
belief why the EIA was rejected, explaining that the Dam would most likely devastate 
fisheries, prolong floods, and create rice crop failures with severe negative impacts on 
local livelihoods and ecosystems. The last paragraph of the letter sums up Watson’s 
view of the Norplan EIA and the potential environmental and social impacts as 
follows: 
“The seriousness of these [project] consequences has not been properly 
presented in the Norplan EIA, which does not meet professional standards 
expected of scientists. The Norplan EIA seriously under-estimates the risks of 
the THXP, and understates or ignores the changes already experienced from 
the Theun Hinboun Hydropower Project. They are deceiving the Lao 
Government and enabling their client to externalize costs. The costs of these 
impacts will definitely seriously impoverish 10,000-15,000 people, probably 
will moderately impoverish a further 10,000-15,000, and add to existing deficit 
lines in the national accounts.” (Watson, 2007). 
 
Despite this letter, the Norplan EIA was accepted by the developer. The EIA 
recommended social and environmental mitigation measures approximately $20 
million dollars cheaper than the RMR EIA (PS17, 2011). Norplan were subsequently 
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hired to manage the environmental and social mitigation measures for the Project. 
Mechanisms within Laos allowed the dam to proceed despite the controversy in the 
EIA process. 
 
The high profile of the THXP and its controversy has attracted extensive INGO 
criticism. A report, by International Rivers (2009) entitled Expanding Failure details 
extensive ecological and social impacts caused by the THXP. The report confirmed the 
findings of RMR’s EIA showing that erosion and flooding along the Hai and Hinboun 
Rivers were causing massive impacts on fisheries and food security for approximately 
30,000 people downstream. A consultant who worked on both the NT2 and the THXP 
stated: 
“Neither project was designed with adequate engineering to convey the 
power station discharges to channels of sufficient capacity to absorb the 
consequent hydraulic and ecological changes without significant social and 
environmental damage. I do not think that any of these inter-basin transfer 
projects would be allowed in countries with strong environmental and 
social protection laws. Theun Hinboun and Nam Theun 2 are diverting rivers 
into different basins. It is the only way to make real money from 
hydropower on the tributaries, but the River is only designed to handle the 
hydrological process of that River. When you transfer a river to a new basin 
the hydrological pitch points cannot cope with the new flow. It destroys the 
new basin and its fisheries.” (PS8, 2011). 
 
Corruption was also a factor in the Dam’s construction. A former senior employee 
from the THPC stated: 
“We tried to keep corruption under control with the Project, but there were 
issues. I remember the deputy governor used money for a community council 
to buy a new car. No community council ever emerged. It seemed to me that 
the Government was like a black hole. They were happy to take responsibility 
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for project activities and the associated funding for social schemes, but 
nothing would ever occur.” (IN1, 2011). 
 
Mechanisms that enabled corruption, weak EIAs and the NT2, THB and THXP project 
to be built ignoring Laos and international laws designed to protect the environment 
and local people also impacted basin planning. The construction of three dams (NT2, 
THB and THXP) draining into the same river basin demonstrated a lack of planning 
from the Government and increased risk for downstream inhabitants. In 2011, this 
almost caused a disaster in the Nam Theun Basin. Due to heavy rains that year, the 
NT2 Dam was required to release a large volume of water. According to a senior 
employee at the downstream THPC, “we were only given 20 minutes warning about 
the water release from the NT2.” (IN3, 2011). In response to this the THXP Project 
stopped releasing water from its Dam, so that the downstream flow from the THXP 
would not combine with the release from the NT2 and overwhelm the THB Dam. As 
the upstream THXP Project began to rapidly fill up, all the engineers were concerned 
whether this newly-constructed dam would be able to take the pressure. As a senior 
employee stated, “We really just crossed our fingers and held our breath” (IN1, 
2011). Although the THXP Dam held, this incident provides anecdotal evidence of 
how mechanisms within the state can have potentially disastrous impacts on local 
people and the environment.7 
 
Western actors are often more accessible to INGOS and academics because of their 
strong commitments to environmental and social protection and the principles of 
transparency and accountability that they must adhere to in democratic countries. A 
number of smaller or regionally-funded dams, however, have not attracted the same 
criticism or analysis as the NT2, THB or THXP. As one consultant working for Ministry 
of Energy and Mines stated,  
                                                          
7
 Rumours from consultants working in the region are that MoUs have been signed for other 
dams upstream of both the NT2 and the THXP.   
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“International Rivers, for instance, attacked Theun Hinboun and Nam Theun 2 
relentlessly because they had the soft underbelly of multilateral agency 
involvement, an important factor in making the projects beneficial, but largely 
ignored the more rapacious developers because there was no one to lobby 
who would listen” (PS8, 2011) 
 
6.5.4 Houay Ho 
 
The political ecology analysis of the Houay Ho case shows that mechanisms 
encouraged the GoL to build the dam despite its weak hydraulic estimates. 
Mechanisms also enabled the developers to significantly profit from the dam’s 
construction and weak IA process and allowed the project to cause significant social 
and environmental impacts. 
  
Houay Ho (150 MW) is located in the south of the country (See figure 6-5). It was 
completed as a BOOT project in 1998 with Daewoo Engineering and Construction 
Company owning 60%, EdL 20% and Loxely PLC (a Thai development firm) owning 
20%. In 1993, the Houay Ho Power Company (HHPC) was established to develop the 
Dam. EGAT were to buy 95% of the electricity which is exported to Thailand. In 1998, 
due to the Asian Financial Crisis, shortly after the Dam was completed Daewoo and 
Loxely PLC sold their shares. Tractebel Electricity and Gas International, a Belgian 
firm, and MCL, a Thai Firm, joined to purchase 80% of the Daewoo and Loxely’s 
shares for the Dam (including debts), with the GoL retaining the remaining equity 
(Houay Ho, 2011). 





Figure 6-5  Houay Ho Dam location map.  
Source: Houay Ho, 2011. 
 
The Dam was sold again in 2002 with GDF Suez buying 60% of Tractebel and MCL’s 
share. In 2009, it was sold again when a subsidiary of GDF, Glow Energy purchased 
67% of GDF’s shares (ibid). The current ownership structure sees Glow Energy with 
67.25% of shares, EdL with 20%, and Hemaraj Land and Development with 12.75% 
(ibid). Glow Energy is a Thai IPP and Thailand’s third largest energy producer 
supplying 7-8% of the country’s electricity (Houay Ho, 2011). 
 
Since its inception, the Houay Ho developers and the GoL have managed to 
circumvent all the environmental and social protection laws and policies within the 
country. Houay Ho’s EIA was completed two years after construction (Khamin, 2008). 
The project resulted in the resettlement of 4000 Heuny and Jrou ethnic minority 
people with inadequate compensation (ibid). For example, only 20% of the land 
allocated for compensation turned out to be available, as the other 80% was already 
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in use by other villages (ibid). This resulted in serious food security impacts for the 
resettled people (ibid). An observer from the former Ministry of Industry and 
Handicrafts, GoL, was quoted as saying that, "[i]t had a bad smell. We never got to 
see any studies for the project. I do not think any were done" (Khamin, 2008). 
 
Tractebel, the company that owned the Dam at the time the EIA was completed, 
denied responsibility for the failures of the Project (Khamin, 2008). INGO pressure led 
to a complaint against Tractebel in Belgium accusing them of disregarding the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, As a result, they added some weak resettlement 
improvements, including the building of a school and some wells (International 
Rivers, 2008). 
 
In 2001, in response to concerns raised by INGOs, the ADB sent Electrowatt-PA 
Consulting to the Houay Ho site to complete an assessment of Tractebel’s 
resettlement improvements. The report stated that a significant portion of the 
improvements had not been implemented (ADB, 2003). The report further 
highlighted a number of problems with the resettlement, including poor water quality 
and quantity, insufficient land for livestock grazing, illegal logging in the surrounding 
area and poorly equipped schools and clinics (ADB, 2003). A consultant who assessed 
the Dam for the ADB stated: 
“The Dam was built on a gold plated construction deal. No EIA, social or 
environmental mitigations were done. The engineering behind it was flawed. 
The Government does not make any money until the Project is completed, so 
they overestimated the hydrology to justify the build and it never filled up. It 




Interviews with an engineer from the Dam site in 2011 illustrated how the company 
had not put in place a sufficient water quality or quantity monitoring program which 
led to significant erosion downstream. Confirming the poor hydrology supporting the 
construction of the Dam, an engineer stated that “We are going to miss our targets of 
electricity for EGAT again this year” (PS18, 2011). 
 
The Dam illustrated severe failings in terms of Government capacity, and a complete 
neglect of Laos’ environmental laws and policies, leading to significant environmental 
and social damage. A number of studies found that the GoL’s weak capacity and poor 
legal representations during negotiations resulted in developers taking advantage of 
the development environment and political and economic mechanisms in the country 
to profit from the Project (Delang and Toro, 2011). 
 
The Project did not produce any royalties for EdL until 2010 although the Government 
was required to make annual interest payments of $1.8 million on its $10 million 
dollar equity from 2000 (Delang and Toro, 2011). Due to the weak concession 
agreement, Daewoo, the Project developer, made a single payment of $230,000 for 
social and environmental impacts and left the GoL to deal with any subsequent issues 
(Delang and Toro, 2011). 
 
Although the Houay Ho Dam had regional and, eventually, international ownership 
the evidence demonstrates how the developers used mechanisms to inflate the direct 
monetary benefits accrued from construction and neglected the long-term 
hydropower potential of the Dam along with its impacts on ecosystem services. 
 
Instances of construction profiteering from private sector infrastructure projects have 
not been restricted to Lao or to hydropower. Projects ranging from mass transit to 
hydropower have been studied around the world such as Africa (Foster et al., 2010), 
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United States (Reisner, 1986) and South America (Trujillo et al. 2005). Opportunities 
to profit from inflated contracts and construction emerge in areas with strong law 
enforcement. In Laos, these opportunities have been magnified by mechanisms 
within the state that have enabled powerful actors to escape any consequences of 
their actions. The political ecology approach further demonstrates how mechanisms 
create significant negative social and environmental impacts in hydropower 
development. In the case of Houay Ho, neither Daewoo nor Loxely PLC had much 
experience building large dams (Delang and Toro, 2011). With no Environmental and 
Social Impact, and inadequate engineering, the Dam was sold four times in the 11 
years following its construction. The following two case studies present further 
evidence of the power mechanisms have to influence hydropower development and 
the IA process and to protect powerful actors while the environment and local people 
absorb the negative impacts.  
 
6.5.5 Nam Mang 3 
 
The Nam Mang 3 Dam is a 50 MW dam that began operation in 2004. The Dam is 
located 80km North of Vientiane in the Nam Mang Basin, a basin that currently has 
six dams in operation and four planned on its tributaries (see figure 6-6). The Dam 
was constructed by China International Water and Electric Corporation (CIWEC) for a 
cost of $63 million. The Dam is a GoL-owned BOOT Project with a loan from the 
Export and Import Bank of China. CIWEC owns 80% of the Dam and EdL has a 20% 
stake (EdL, 2006). Thailand has agreed to purchase 95% of the electricity from the 
Dam with 5% to be used domestically. The Dam reservoir filled an area of 10 square 
kilometres and required the relocation of two Hmong villages made up of 166 




















Figure 6-6  Existing and planned dams in the Nam Mang Basin. 
 
Nam Mang 3 was built without any Impact Assessment process (Mainusch et al., 
2009). CIWEC did not commit to an EIA because the costs and responsibility for 
environmental mitigation was left to EdL (RMR, 2000). To circumvent environmental 
and social laws and policies and save money, EdL applied for Emergency Procedure 
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status for the Dam, allowing it to proceed to construction without any EIA (Sayatham, 
2013). 
 
According to the executive summary of the project’s environmental completion 
report (2004), the project economic viability was solely based on a 1993 Feasibility 
study carried out by Lahmeyer-Worley for ADB, and later modified by Sogreah 
engineers and CIWEC. No engineers were appointed to act as consultants and there 
was no proper engineering design (RMR, 2004). 
 
The Project required the inundation of about 1000 hectares of the adjacent Phou 
Khao Khouay National Protected Area (PKKNPA) including the construction of roads 
and labour camps. A consultant working on the Project explained that “The 
Contractor developed a relationship with the Park authorities which effectively 
reduced the level of interest of this agency in enforcing the regulations for protecting 
the PKK National Park” (PS16, 2011). This resulted in extensive illegal logging 
facilitated by new access roads for the Dam (PS16, 2011). 
 
In violation of Lao laws and policies surrounding the IA pcoress, construction began in 
2001, without any public consultations or participatory planning or mitigations. Due 
to these factors, the Project attracted the attention of the World Bank and the ADB. 
These agencies applied pressure on EdL, which in turn applied pressure on CIWEC to 
follow the recently reformed EIA process through the strengthened national 
regulator, STEA (RMR, 2004). 
 
In 2002, two years after construction began, CIWEC hired consultants to develop an 
EIA and Emergency Management Plan (EMP) for the Dam. The EIA estimated that 
2745 people would be affected and mitigation costs would reach $6.6 million putting 
into question the financial viability of the Project (RMR, 2002). CIWEC refused to 
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assume responsibility for the costs leaving EdL to implement mitigation measures. 
After one year, the implementation measures of the EIA fell short and RMR was then 
hired by CIWEC to advise and manage the EIA. The 2003 RMR consulting report 
identifies a lack of capacity within the government bureaucracy to manage the IA 
process by stating that "there is no doubt that EdL’s capacity to manage the Project’s 
social and environmental impacts, and GoL’s capacity to monitor and enforce national 
environmental regulations need to be much expanded". (RMR, 2003:23). 
 
RMR’s evaluation of the EMP in 2004 rated 45 out of 58 indicators as either bad-poor 
with nine indicators as moderate and one as good. This evaluation report examined 
values such as erosion, fisheries and habitat protection, water quality, and 
conservation. RMR’s evaluation of the social action plan component of the EIA 
examined 130 indicators including health and safety, property loss and compensation, 
public health and river bank use. Of the 130 indicators, the evaluation determined 
that 92 indicators were graded both ‘bad’ to ‘poor’, 33 were ‘moderate’ and only 
three were considered ‘good’. 
 
The report goes on to state that, 
“One factor dominated in creating the circumstances which prevented EdL 
from carrying out most of the measures of the EIA to reach satisfactory levels 
of performance. This was the control the Contractor, CIWEC, had over the 
finance and disbursements, design, works execution and standards of the 
Project. CIWEC essentially borrowed money to pay itself for the construction 
works, and EdL agreed to repay the loan with interest over a certain period. A 
final decisive factor responsible for performance problems was the low level 
of stakeholder involvement, and the failure of stakeholders and EdL personnel 
(and their District counterparts) to develop trustful relationships and good 




The Nam Mang 3 project’s social and environmental impacts have been a 
consequence of the power that mechanisms in Laos have given powerful actors in 
hydropower development. These mechanisms have made the IA process a rubber 
stamp for development that has little or no impact on how hydropower is built.  
 
The lack of EIA process and the circumvention of Laos laws and policies has created 
significant environmental and social impacts. The dam imposed severe pressure on 
land, livelihoods and the food security of the 2,745 people. It also directly affected 
and imposed lesser impacts on up to 15,000 people living in the Nam Mang Basin 
(International Rivers, 2003). According to the World Bank, the Project will never be 
economically viable and is being financed as part of a non-concessionary loan from 
China. These outcomes contradict the Government’s attempts to reform its financial 
sector (International Rivers, 2003). Moreover, a spokesman for the World Bank 
quoted in the International Rivers Report (2003) estimated that the equipment 
purchased in China by CIWEC was overpriced by $5 million. 
 
The EIA report went on to make the following observations about mechanisms within 
Laos and the Impact Assessment process: 
“The EIA process has been enlarged to take on too large a socio-political 
burden. The regulations require standards of equitability and distribution, 
and rights to property ownership and economic and livelihood opportunity, 
for families and groups by gender and ethnicity which are far in advance of 
the current situation. As targets for society they are admirable, but as a 
requirement for a developer they almost guarantee non-compliance. Any 
developer following the regulations would find himself trying to force 
political changes at rates far greater than is possible without severe social 
dislocation. He would be at odds with the officials and administrators, and 
would threaten their livelihoods more severely than his project threatens 
the livelihoods of rural stakeholders. The EIA process is much too frail an 
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instrument to carry these additional purposes. It is in any case doubtful 
how much social change can be generated from external pressure. More 
progress could be made with regulating environmental damage, a much 
more important and long-term topic, with higher potential for success, if 
the social elements were to be removed, and placed back into the general 
context of the entire relationship between lenders, investors, donors and 
the developing country.” (RMR, 2004:20) 
 
The statement draws important attention to the limits of the IA process and the 
power of mechanisms within the state. The rules and policies that emerged 
through the IA process in Laos are the result of Western-influenced 
development norms. As Sundberg (1998) argues, the values embedded within 
the IA process reflect the goals and global environmental agenda of multilateral 
institutions. The GoL has demonstrated its willingness to support these agendas 
through the ratification of the laws and policies, but the political and economic 
mechanisms entrenched within the state have made the implementation of 
these values impossible. The power of mechanisms to influence development is 
also wrapped in the historical contexts of hydropower and the types of regional 
and global relationships that are formed between states, developers and 
investors (see Chapter 5). 
 
The RMR statement (above) also raises questions about the expectations of 
private sector developers, particularly with regards to social and environmental 
mitigation. Mechanisms within the state allow the Government of Laos to 
control the way its policies and laws are enforced. In this way, the GoL is able to 
use the environmental and social agendas imposed on them by international 
organizations as a tool to empower actors and create further lines of inclusion 




Laws may be applied or circumvented depending on the whim of the official and 
bureaucracy that is responsible for them with little fear of accountability or 
transparency. Developers are also able to benefit from these mechanisms by 
avoiding the true costs of development. In this way, the political ecology 
analysis shows that when these international norms are operationalized in 
hydropower development within the political and economic mechanisms of the 
state, they legitimise the decision making process and spawn corruption, poor 
engineering and weak social and environmental mitigation. 
  
A final grounded example of how mechanisms in Laos empower actors over others 
and shape the hydropower development process is presented in the case of the Nam 
Leuk Dam.  
 
6.5.6 Nam Leuk 
 
The Nam Leuk Dam is a 60 MW dam build by CIWEC in 2000 for a total cost of $112 
million. The Dam is located north of Vientiane in the Nam Mang Basin (See Figure 6-
6). The Dam project involves inter-basin water transfers, diverting water from the 
Nam Leuk reservoir into the Nam Xan River and exporting surplus power to Thailand - 
that is, until domestic demand exceeded the downstream Nam Ngum Dam’s supply 
capacity. Like the Nam Mang 3, the Dam was constructed in the Phou Khao Khouay 
National Park (PKKNP). At the time of writing it was solely owned by EdL with 
financing for the Project provided by the ADB and the Japanese Government. 
 
In 1990, a pre-feasibility study was completed with ADB assistance. Following from 
this, a 1995 feasibility report was conducted that concluded that the Project was 
technically and economically viable (ADB, 2004). International consultants were then 
hired to develop a detailed project EIA in 1995, leading the GoL to ask the ADB for 
assistance in financing the project. A fact-finding mission from the ADB in 1995 stated 
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that it was initially reluctant to support the Dam because it had not previously funded 
a dam inside a National Park, and that the potential economic costs of the Dam 
appeared to outweigh its benefits (ADB, 2004). In 1996, a second mission to the site 
by the ADB revised their position recommending the support of the Dam saying that 
the financial rate of return was sufficient and that the Government had agreed to 
improved guarantees to improve transparency to private sector investors in 
hydropower. The contradictions in ADB reports regarding the financial viability of the 
Dam seemed to have ceased when the Government offered promises to improve its 
transparency. 
 
The EIA for the Dam promised the following: 
"Unlike traditional hydropower projects, the Project aims not only to provide 
economic benefits while mitigating adverse social and environmental impacts, 
but also aims to address the need for long-term environmental enhancement 
measures. Consequently, the Project will support, through the provision of 
technical assistance and a sustainable source of funds, improved protection 
and management of Phou Khao Khouay protected area to reverse current 
trends toward increasing environmental degradation within the area….” (Nam 
Leuk EIA Report, 1995: 24-26) 
“…Long-term impacts to fisheries in the Nam Mang system, of which the Nam 
Leuk is a part, are not expected to be significant. The major social benefit will 
be electrification of Paksane and nearby villages in Bolikhamxay province. 
Approximately 30,000 consumers will be served. The Project will also provide 
rural electrification, a health centre, roads, and other services to villages in the 
vicinity of the Project area. On balance, the Project design provides an 
acceptable level of environmental protection, serves the country’s desire for 
indigenous and clean power, and contributes to national income.” (Nam Leuk 




The contractor hired by the GoL to develop the Dam and implement the social and 
environmental protection measures was CIWEC. Mechanisms within Laos allowed 
CIWEC to underbid other developers and win the project in a non-transparent way. 
According to the ADB, CIWEC fell far short of the EIA and engineering objectives of 
the Project. An ADB report on the dam stated (2004:18),  
“The civil works contractor was responsive in prequalification and tendering 
procedures—but his performance did not match his well-prepared tender. The 
contractor performed extremely poorly in management, quality of work, and 
scheduling. The first six months of construction was a disaster. All activities 
were behind schedule, and workmanship was poor.”  
The report concluded that the contractor's bid of $35.9 million was about 28% lower 
than the consultant engineer's estimate, and 25% lower the second-lowest bidder 
(ADB, 2004). 
 
A consultant evaluating the Dam for the ADB after construction stated that “CIWEC 
underbid ADB, got the Project and then occupied the site until they got increased 
fees. The work they did was unsafe and the conditions of the labour camps were 
appalling” (PS15, 2011). 
 
In order to encourage the contractor to improve engineering works, social and 
environmental mitigation, and health and safety, payments were eventually withheld 
until the contractor promised improvements would be made. The ADB (2004:18) 
report stated that despite the measures, “the continuing quality of work was far less 
than satisfactory, and required continuous intervention of the consultant engineer.” 
 
The major problems with the Dam can be broken down into three areas: first, health 
and safety; Second, protection of the National Park, and third, social mitigations. In 
terms of health and safety, reports from the field showed that the conditions 
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provided to both the Chinese and Lao labourers were appalling (PS17, 2011). CIWEC 
was able to save costs and increase profits by never adequately addressing key 
workplace issues during the construction of the Dam.  
 
As a consultant who visited the Project stated, “The labourers were left to survive 
from the land. CIWEC provided them with nothing.” (PS17, 2011). The Nam Leuk 
Construction Environment Report (CER) (2000), prepared by the Ministry of Industry 
and Handicrafts (now the Ministry of Energy and Mines) states that the Project’s 
labour camps were well below international standards (CER, 2000). The report 
concluded that there were no toilets, no rubbish collection and Chinese workers 
refused to wear any safety equipment. The contractor also refused to supply 
sufficient food for the workers. This caused them to exploit the National Park for 
food, firewood, timber, and other forest products (CER, 2000). 
 
Like Nam Mang 3, the Dam was built within the PKKNPA, a key area of biodiversity 
north of the Vientiane. The Park was identified as important to the hydrological 
sustainability of the Nam Mang Basin and prioritized for protection. As part of the 
Project’s commitment to protect the Park, a component of the EIA stated that 1% of 
electricity revenue generated from the Dam would be used to fund the protection of 
the Park. 
 
In reality, corrupt practices and nepotism allowed powerful actors to benefit from the 
Park’s designated revenue while the Dam severely impacted the park’s natural 
resources. Before construction began, EdL hired the Lao military’s logging company, 
BPKP – the Mountain Region Development Company), to clear the reservoir. BPKP is 
the same company that later logged the area surrounding NT2. ADB estimates that 
the value of timber logged from the area, to be approximately $2-3 million. Apart 
from the reservoir area the BPKP illegally logged over 1,000 trees inside the Park 
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(CER, 2000). Due to mechanisms in Laos, the ADB, was effectively funding illegal 
logging inside a National Park. 
 
ADB’s 2004 audit report makes no mention of the money from the logging or whether 
the BPKP was penalised in any way for breaking the law. Villagers reported that the 
BPKP logged good quality trees, but reported the timber as being of low quality, 
allowing BPKP and Government officials to make illegal profits (CER, 2000). Villagers 
further questioned why Government officials were allowed to benefit from cutting 
large areas of forest, while villagers are not even allowed to cut small trees for their 
own use (CER, 2000). 
 
Apart from the illegal logging, the increased access roads into the Park surrounding 
the Dam caused augmented hunting and provided access to poachers. According to a 
consultant working on a project for the ADB: 
“The Park authority was likely profiting from allowing illegal loggers and 
poachers to use new access roads. Almost all of the Park staff had military 
backgrounds, so they were obliged to help out the BPKP and other interests. 
NGOs often state that increased access automatically means increased 
degradation of conservation resources – my experience supports that 
conclusion.” (PS17, 2011) 
 
Although the Project committed 1% of its electricity sales to the Park to improve 
protection it appears that a lack of transparency in the process allowed this money to 
be absorbed by Park staff and it did not translate into protection activities on the 
ground. In 2001, Park staff expenses were $13,000, but in 2002 they unexpectedly 




The social impacts of the Dam can be summarized by ADB’s 2004 audit which states 
that “implementation of environmental and social mitigation measures after power 
plant completion was inadequate” (ADB, 2004:19). After the contractor had failed to 
implement adequate social and environmental mitigation measures the responsibility 
for these was passed to EdL. EdL had no budget for any further measures and no 
monitoring or evaluation occurred (ADB, 2004). A consultant working on the Project 
stated that, “EdL at the outset of this Project had no experience in mitigation and 
compensation works. It has almost no funds and no control over budgets.” (PS16, 
2011). 
 
Social impacts of the Dam were extensive including inadequate resettlement 
compensation or policies, impacts on aquatic systems, fish populations and water 
quality. The ADB Audit (2004:52) stated that after the Dam was completed, water 
quality caused villagers to develop rashes and livestock died. 
 
The report went on to state that fisheries, which were considered abundant before 
the Dam, had severely declined. Drinking water quality was also impacted. According 
to the report: 
“The reservoir water shortly after impounding was toxic and smelled of 
sulphur when released from the depths to the atmosphere—mainly after 
passing through the powerhouse. The reservoir water also corroded concrete, 
iron, and steel products, including steel wire on the gabions in the tailrace.” 
(ADB, 2004: 27). 
 
Although reduced water flows and water quality issues were identified as possible 
impacts in the 1995 EIA, the installation of functioning water pumps and standpipes 
only came into effect in April 2003, three years after the Dam was completed. 
According to the ADB Audit, water pumps were installed, but were dysfunctional 
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because there was no electricity (ADB, 2004). Furthermore, electricity, which was to 
be supplied to the surrounding villages, never materialized (ibid). Despite these 
problems the ADB Audit concludes that the Nam Leuk Dam is a ‘success’. 
 
The construction of the Nam Leuk Dam provides another example of how 
mechanisms shaped the IA process and allowed developers, the Government and 
industry to benefit from hydropower development that causes significant social and 
environmental damage. Despite the numerous problems with the Dam, the ADB 2004 
audit is extremely positive. The approval of the report by the ADB illustrates the 
influence of a neo-liberal development discourse that promotes hydropower as 
essential to the growth of nations regardless of its social and environmental costs. By 
labelling the Dam a success the ADB has legitimised the weak environmental and 
social mitigation carried out by the Government and the developer. The ADB’s label 
of success also legitimised the GoL and developers complete disregard for laws and 





Using a political ecology approach, Sneddon and Fox (2007) argue that the influence 
of political and economic mechanisms is one of the central challenges to 
implementing hydropower development in ways that are transparent, participatory, 
and addresses its social and environmental impacts. In this chapter, political ecology 
helped to illuminate how meso-scale mechanisms within Laos are influenced by 
broader political and economic forces and vice-versa. The political ecology analysis 
also showed how meso-mechanisms influenced the hydropower development, the IA 
process and the social and environmental imapcts. Through the analysis that was 
grounded by case studies, the political ecology approach demonstrated that meso-
scale political and economic mechanisms have significant negative impacts on social 




In Laos, mechanisms such as weak transparency, poor accountability, corruption, a 
tightly controlled press and weak civil society have combined with rapid private 
sector investment to shape the IA and hydropower development process and 
empower actors over others.  These mechanisms allow powerful actors to build dams 
that ignore their social and environmental costs. The neo-liberal discourses of 
development that drives rapid hydropower in Laos has become a tool for the 
Government and industry to constitute and articulate power (Peet and Watts, 1996). 
For example, powerful actors have used market norms, such as confidentiality within 
private sector investment, to legitimize and strengthen state mechanisms such as 
weak transparency and lack of accountability. These mechanisms have created 
corruption and have undermined capacity within the bureaucracy that is responsible 
for regulating the social and environmental impacts of development. In this way, 
mechanisms latched on to imported development discourses such as neo-liberal 
influenced private-sector investment to create a guise of change, but in reality 
promote business as usual decision making. 
 
Weak bureaucratic capacity creates significant impacts on hydropower development 
because the bureaucracy is responsible for the regulation and enforcement of the 
laws and policies in the IA process that are designed to protect local people and the 
environment.  
 
In Laos, mechanisms nullify the potential of the IA process to mitigate and regulate 
social and environmental impacts. The IA process is an alien, imported, development 
tool that has served the interests of international donors such as the WB and the 
MRC. These interests can clash with the agendas of regional governments who see 
hydropower as essential for economic development and also as a source of power. 
Mechanisms within the state create opportunities for developers to circumvent the IA 
process and profit from hydropower, ignoring social and environmental impacts. 
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Ultimately, the way the IA process has been deployed in Laos has proved it is too 
weak to regulate development under the combined weight of state mechanisms and 
neo-liberal discourses. 
 
The lines of inclusion and exclusion in hydropower development are also impacted by 
some other unhelpful mechanisms. The GoL subscribes to the principles of good 
water governance such as participation and transparency, but nullifies the 
operationalization of these principles by controlling the space in which they have 
been implemented. For example, the government’s National Policy on Environmental 
and Social Sustainability in the Hydropower Sector and other environmental laws call 
for a high level of disclosure and participation. Such processes include the public 
release of EIAs and free prior and informed consultations with local people. Yet these 
outcomes have never been realized in meaningful ways as the Government tightly 
controls INGOs, and the freedom of the press and has forbidden grassroots civil 
society. 
 
The political ecology approach illuminates how mechanisms are also scaled to benefit 
the powerful. Good governance principles are designed in relation to the state. The 
WB and the ADB legitimize the GoL’s control of civil society by scaling participation at 
the regional level where only INGOs represent civil society. In this way, while the WB 
and ADB purport to protect social-ecological concerns and promote transparency, in 
reality they grant a privileged role to the same actors who hold the responsibility over 
their implementation and design. 
 
The GoL has been able to use its engagement with INGOs as a form of manufactured 
consent. INGOs are permitted to engage in the hydropower space. Yet, mechanisms 
within the State undermine civil society, circumvent meaningful participation and 
stymie the devolution of power. Through these mechanisms the Government gives 
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the appearance of engagement, but in fact continues with business-as-usual decision-
making. 
 
INGOs submit to these rules in part because it legitimizes their presence and activities 
in the hydropower space. Their activities in the Region also serve the interest of 
capital from abroad and are influenced by Western notions of sustainability and 
development that may be unrepresentative of local level needs. The control of good 
water governance principles and manufactured consent ultimately subverts prospects 
for sustainable development in the future by promising procedural norms that create 
incentives for short-term decision-making. 
 
The impact of this inadequate decision-making is evidenced in the case studies. From 
large to small scale dams, the evidence demonstrates how powerful actors are able to 
purport to follow best practice when in fact they develop hydropower that is 
inefficient or poorly designed and severely impacts livelihoods and the environment. 
Weak transparency, poor accountability, weak capacity and corruption all emerge 
and nullify the laws, policies and processes in place to protect the people and 
environment. The next chapter will apply the analysis of mechanisms and narratives 
to the controversial Xayaburi Dam, the first mainstream dam in the Lower Basin that 








7 Mechanisms and Narratives Surrounding Mainstream Hydropower 




This chapter uses a political ecology approach to examine the actors, policy 
statements, narratives and mechanisms that emerged and influenced the debate and 
process leading up to the official start of construction of the Xayaburi8 Dam in 
November 2012. The Impact Assessment (IA) process is used as a starting point for 
much of the analysis by focusing on the debates surrounding the dam’s potential 
social, economic, and environmental benefits and negative impacts. This chapter 
answers the following two research questions:  
 
First, what are the key narratives that legitimize the political and economic structures 
that drive and enable hydropower development in the Mekong Basin at the national 
and basin scale? 
 
In the case of the Xayaburi Dam, it is hypothesized that narratives significantly shaped 
the development process and were used by developers as a tool to hide the drivers 
and enablers of the Dam.    
 
Second, what are the key institutional structures and mechanisms at the national and 
regional basin scale that have empowered certain actors over others in the Impact 
Assessment process, project approval and construction of hydropower development 
projects?  
 
                                                          
8
 The Xayaburi dam is also spelt Xayaboury. For the purpose of this research the Xayaburi 
spelling will be retained unless it is quoted differently.  
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It is hypothesized that in the case of the Xayaburi Dam mechanisms within the state 
protected decision-makers and enabled the process to proceed, ignoring laws, 
policies, and regional agreements designed to protect people and the environment.  
 
Chapter 5 used a political ecology lens to critically examine how narratives are 
constructed to legitimize or construct hydropower development and decision-making 
within the Basin. It was argued that actors use narratives and policy statements as a 
tool to justify their involvement in the hydropower development arena and hide their 
political and economic agendas. For example, the World Bank (WB) and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) have redefined their role in hydropower development by 
emphasizing a neo-liberal agenda that promotes private sector led hydropower as 
essential for economic growth.  This resulted in the private sector and regional 
developers moving to occupy much of the funding and development roles. To 
reposition itself in the development of the Region, the ADB and the WB have created 
new justifications for their involvement. These justifications include the development 
and funding of infrastructure such as roads and power transmission lines to facilitate 
energy trade, and build capacity as knowledge experts.  
 
Chapter 6 used a political ecology approach to analyse the role of political and 
economic mechanisms and how they impact hydropower development and decision-
making in Laos. Mechanisms within the state create spaces of inclusion and exclusion. 
They allow actors to circumvent the laws and policies designed to protect the state, 
its people and the environment. For example, in the case of the Houay Ho Dam, the 
developer was able to build the Dam without any Impact Assessment, and in spite of 
the fact that the hydrological assessment behind the Dam proved to be inaccurate. 
 
This chapter begins by discussing the early history of the Xayaburi Dam. It then 
examines the ways in which the mechanisms and narratives within the state 
empowered and protected powerful actors involved in the Xayaburi Dam’s 
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development.  The chapter then explores how regional cooperation influenced the 
outcome of the process. The conclusion highlights the social and environmental 
implications of these narratives and mechanisms in mainstream dam development.  
 
7.2 The Lead-up to the Xayaburi 
 
As of July 2013, the Xayaburi Dam is approximately 20% complete. The lead up to the 
start of construction provides important exemplification of the extent to which 
narratives and mechanisms, and their hidden agendas, impact mainstream dam 
development. Mainstream dams have been a consideration of the Lower Basin’s 
development since the 1950s to the present day. Discussions surrounding the 
construction of mainstream dams in the Lower Basin were first highlighted by the 
Mekong Committee in the late 1950s (See Chapter 2). In the Mekong Committee’s 
Indicative Basin Plan (1970), four mainstream structures were identified with dates to 
finish construction: Pa Mong (1983), Sambor and Strung Treng (1985), and Tonle Sap 
(1987).  
 
Like many development plans in the Basin, these projects were delayed due to 
conflict, financial costs, and potential social and environmental impacts (See Chapter 
2). From the 1980s, tributary dam development began across the Lower Basin with 
support of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and other international 
investors. Mainstream dams remained on the sidelines for two key reasons. First, The 
White Report’s (1962) analysis of the potential social and environmental impacts of 
mainstream dam development was influential in delaying mainstream projects until 
more lessons could be learned from tributary dams (White 1998). Second, under the 
Mekong Committee agreement, mainstream development was not legally possible 
without prior approval from all the members. These restrictions led to delays because 
Cambodia was unable to approve development plans because it was embroiled in the 




Plans for mainstream dams re-emerged with the tide of private sector investment 
that began in the late 1990s and, more rapidly, from the turn of the millennium. In 
1994, the Mekong Secretariat, with the assistance of Acres International Limited9, a 
Canadian consulting company, and Compagnie Nationale du Rhone (CNR), a French 
hydropower developer, published an influential study entitled Mekong Mainstream 
Run-of-River Hydropower. This study explored potential sites that had previously been 
earmarked for development. This report attempted to circumvent previous concerns 
about the potential environmental and social impacts of mainstream dams’. It 
recommended a series of run-of-river hydropower projects that would “avoid or 
minimize impacts” (1994:1). The report states that (1994:1), 
“Past studies have shown that economic optimization of possible projects on 
the Lower Mekong River almost always leads to consideration of large 
reservoirs with commensurate scale of impacts. Increasingly it has come to be 
recognized that such large-scale social and environmental effects are 
unacceptable, no matter how great the economic rewards would be…” 
 
The study identified 12 sites for run-of-river mainstream hydropower dam 
development. Preliminary design concepts were developed for ten of the sites, with 
the two remaining sites, Don Shaong and Tonle Sap considered for preliminary 
screening. The 12 identified sites with their estimated capacity in order of 
recommended priority include: First priority sites Don Sahong (MW undetermined), 
Ban Koum (2,000 to 3,500 MW), Xayaburi (600 to 1,200 MW), and Pak Beng (1,000 to 
1,800 MW); second priority sites  Sambor (2,500 to 4,000 MW), Luang Prabang (1,300 
to 2,600 MW), Pak Lay (1,200 to 2,000 MW), and Pa Mong Upper (1,300 to 2,600 
MW); and third priority sites Strung Treng (MW undetermined), Chiang Khan (500 to 
1,000 MW), and Tonle Sap (MW undetermined) (ibid)  (see figure 7-1). 
 
                                                          
9
 Acres International Limited was debarred by the World bank in 2004 for bribing the head of 




Figure 7-1 The Mekong Basin Mainstream Reservoirs and Dams.  
Source MRC SEA (2010). 
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In order to better understand the potential impacts of mainstream development on 
fisheries and public health, the report highlighted some key social and ecological 
impacts and recommended a number of further studies. The report, however, made 
no mention of potential transboundary impacts or cumulative impacts of the dams, 
nor did it consider livelihood impacts due to resettlement.  
 
The lack of consideration of transboundary and cumulative impacts is a recurring 
theme in Lower Basin Development. Tributary dams and the Upper Lancang 
mainstream dams focus primarily on localized impacts while ignoring or downplaying 
potential transboundary or cumulative impacts (See Chapter 5). This may be due to 
the complexity in measuring transboundary impacts across the large Basin, but it 
more likely due to the politics within the Basin.  
 
A political ecology approach highlights that Identification of any significant negative 
hydropower impacts would likely open, a country like Laos, to heavy criticism from 
powerful states in the region. As outlined in Chapter 5, Thailand and China have 
considerable political and economic interests in Laos’ hydropower development. Any 
report supported by the MRC’s members that recognised the social and 
environmental impacts of dams would jeopardise the neo-liberal led development 
discourse that is supporting many powerful actors agendas. 
 
Furthermore, identification of any potential transboundary impacts would open up 
the country hosting the dam to a number of potential legal and economic measures 
from downstream countries. By focusing on manageable national level impacts, 
developers and states have been able to scale the impacts of hydropower 
development within their individual nations where they can be obfuscated by their 
own political, economic and institutional mechanisms. This scaling of impacts helps 
support powerful actors agenda’s by controlling the debate around the benefits and 
impacts of mainstream dams. For example, by only examining proposed run-of-river 
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dams, the study purported that these dams will vastly reduce environmental and 
social impacts. This emphasis shifts the discussion away from the impacts of 
mainstream dams to focus on benefits of run-of-river projects, which creates space 
for powerful actors to bring mainstream dams to the development agenda. 
Furthermore, this approach creates lines of inclusion and exclusion in the 
hydropower development process by excluding controversial topics such as 
transboundary and socio-economic impacts.  
 
Another key obstacle to mainstream dam development was removed during the mid-
1990s. With the 1995 signing of the Mekong Agreement, the requirement of all 
member states to approve mainstream dam development was eliminated. This 
requirement was replaced by the Prior Notification and Prior Consultation 
Agreement. The PNPCA guidelines were formally adopted in 2003 (MRC, 2003). The 
PNPCA has applied to mainstream dam development and inter-basin transfers (MRC, 
2003).  The notification clause of this agreement requires member states, intending 
to build a dam on the mainstream, to give the MRC Joint Committee at least one 
month’s advance notice of intended implementation. The notification is designed to 
allow for distribution of the announcement to other member states (MRC, 2003). The 
consultation clause requires that the member state intending to build the project 
must allow at least six months for the other member states to review the project and 
consult with the state prior to project commencement (ibid). Importantly, this new 
agreement is not legally binding (see, Chapter 2).  
 
The 1995 Agreement states that “Prior consultation is neither a right to veto the use 
nor a unilateral right to use water by any riparian without taking into account other 
riparians' rights.” (1995:4). The MRC Agreement and the PNPCA has attracted 
widespread criticism from academics who point out that the agreement lacks any 
legally binding measures to stop a member state from unilateral mainstream dam 
development (Hirsch et al., 2006; Dore and Lazarus, 2009). Although the 1995 MRC 
agreement was influential at breaking down existing barriers for mainstream dam 
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development, the onset of the Asian Financial Crises in the late 1990s placed 
mainstream development on hold. In 2005, after the recovery from the Asian 
Financial Crisis, mainstream dams once again became a priority for regional states 
and investors (Hirsch, 2010). 
 
7.3 Narratives and Mechanisms in the Xayaburi Dam Debate  
 
From 2005, a number of factors influenced the renewed push for mainstream dam 
development and the associated increase in policy statements from hydropower 
proponents and critics. First, as discussed in Chapter 5, the Mekong Water Resources 
Assistance Strategy (MWRAS) posited that the Region had large scope for 
hydropower expansion. Second, the development of the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) in 2005 
provided much of the legal and business frameworks such as contracts, laws and 
agreements to increase investor confidence in large hydropower projects. These 
conditions coincided with the rapid development of mainstream dams on the Lancang 
River (See Chapter 2). The development of the Lancang cascade increased dry season 
flows thereby making mainstream dams in the Lower Basin more economically viable 
and attractive to investors (ICEM, 2010). Third, an argument began to emerge in the 
Region that capture fisheries in the Mekong were in a rapid state of decline from 
over-fishing and poor management (Friend et al., 2009). By removing or lessening the 
degree to which mainstream dams might impact fisheries, this argument helped 
diffuse the potential environmental impacts of development and further bolstered 
the narrative that promoted hydropower development as essential for poverty 
alleviation and economic growth. Finally, all of these developments coincided with 
increasing fossil fuel prices, global concerns about climate change and rising 





As discussed in Chapters 5, narratives are purposely constructed by different actors to 
support their agendas. Narratives also shape the way hydropower development 
occurs. In Laos, mechanisms within the state protect hydropower proponents and 
allow them to ignore critical voices. As per the research questions outlined at the 
beginning of the chapter, this section will use political ecology to examine how 
narratives and mechanisms have impacted the development of the Xayaburi Dam.  
 
In 2007, the Government of Laos (GoL) signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) with Thai company Ch. Karnchang to develop the Xayaburi Dam, the first 
Lower Basin Mainstream dam. In 2009, in response to Laos’ plans to build the 
Xayaburi, the MRC commissioned the International Centre for Environmental 
Management (ICEM) to prepare a Strategic Environmental Assessment of Mainstream 
Dams (SEA). The report process included a participatory element that involved an 
intensive consultative process with International NGOs (INGOs) and international 
development organizations (primarily MRC donors). By scaling the report and 
participation at a Basin level and only involving INGOS and international donors, the 
report worked within existing political and economic mechanisms within Laos. By 
diverting participation away from grassroots civil society or local level participation to 
outside interests the report allowed decision makers in Laos to once again circumvent 
a meaningful participation process while appearing to meet international norms. This 
scaling and control resulted in an influential Basin development report being 
dominated by outside interests, representing Western views of development and 
environmentalism (Escobar, 1996). By scaling participation at a Basin level, the report 
not only allowed decision makers in Laos to circumvent meaningful participation, it 
also protected the MRC and its member states from the need to respond to local level 
concerns over regional development trajectories and their potential benefits and 
impacts of hydropower. 
  
The report, which was published in 2010, concluded that mainstream dams would 
have significant serious and irreversible impacts on fisheries, agriculture and 
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ecosystems across the Basin. Impacts included large reductions in the flood pulse 
nature of the river, a 17% loss of wetlands and up to 50% sediment load reduction 
with significant impacts on Tonle Sap and the Vietnam Delta.  The total monetary 
losses from reduced fisheries and agriculture were estimated at $501.1 million per 
year excluding the impacts on coastal and delta fisheries, which were not studied 
(ICEM, 2010). This was compared to gains in fisheries and irrigation estimated at 
$29.9 million per year.  
 
The report also estimated the potential economic gains of mainstream dam 
development in terms of export revenue. It concluded that if all 12 projects were 
completed, Laos would receive 70% of export revenues equivalent to $2.6 billion 
dollars a year, leading to a significant economic stimulus (ibid). In terms of economic 
impacts, the report stated that in the short- to medium-term poverty would worsen 
due to the dams’ impacts on food security and livelihoods with more than two million 
people being affected (ibid). The report concluded by recommending a ten year 
moratorium on mainstream dam development until further studies of their potential 
impacts could be determined.  
 
Although the MRC had previously avoided much of the controversy surrounding 
hydropower development, this report represented a proclamation of the MRC’s 
position on mainstream dams agreed to by its members. The MRC designed the 
report to provide a balanced, evidence-based account of mainstream development. 
Furthermore, it was considered significant that the MRC member states including 
Laos agreed to the findings of the report, especially the recommendation of a ten 
year moratorium (MRC1, 2012).  
 
In 2010, the MRC also released the second phase of its Basin Development Plan 
(BDP2). Like the SEA, the BDP2 was a milestone report, defining the MRC’s position 
on hydropower development. The BDP was prepared internally by the MRC and was 
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designed to “ensure that the use of the basin’s water and related resources 
contributes to sustainable economic development, with poverty alleviation as a 
primary goal.” (MRC, 2010:8). The BDP plan evaluated tributary dams and 11 of the 
proposed mainstream dams. Although both the BDP and the SEA were endorsed by 
MRC member states, the BDP2 contradicted many of the findings of the SEA report. 
The BDP2 (ibid:26) stated that mainstream dams will have “acceptable transboundary 
impact” and fisheries and wetlands will not be significantly affected. Furthermore, the 
BDP2 discussed a number of energy scenarios that appear to promote mainstream 
dam development.  
 
An independent panel of experts that was commissioned to review the BDP2 stated,  
“Whilst the SEA draws on the BDP2 scenarios to inform their analysis there are 
obvious discrepancies in the analysis, assessment and conclusions in the BDP2 
and SEA reports. There are currently no results from the SEA findings included 
in the BDP2 Strategy whilst one of the goals of the SEA was to inform the 
BDP2 Strategy.” (POE, 2010:25).  
 
The two divergent reports demonstrate a scalar disconnect between the MRC donors 
and its member states. The SEA report, which called for a moratorium on mainstream 
dam development for ten years, was prepared by outside consultants. The BDP2 plan 
was prepared internally within the MRC with influence from individual basin states. A 
member of a panel of experts hired to review the BDP2 stated, 
“The BDP2 was a much clearer representation of what the member states 
wanted in terms of development. While the SEA pointed more to the donor 
wishes. One of the reasons why the SEA recommended a 10 year stay on 
mainstream dams was so it could try to align its member’s positions with 
those of the international experts and donors who were stating that the dams 
would cause large impacts.” (MRC3, 2011).  
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A political ecology analysis posits that when agreeing to the MRC’s BDP2 and SEA 
reports, Laos and other member states appear to have been using these reports as a 
device to re-package existing agendas under new labels. It can be argued that Laos 
used the narrative of the SEA and BDP2 report to demonstrate to donors its 
willingness to participate in the MRC’s activities, but as demonstrated in the BDP2 
Plan, the underlying agenda was to develop mainstream dams. Furthermore, the fact 
that both contradictory reports were approved by all member states indicates the 
limited level of influence the MRC had in the development of the Basin.    
 
The effectiveness of RBOs’ to manage the development of a basin is dependent on 
financial, technical, cognitive and geopolitical issues (Breitmeier, 1997; Schmeier, 
2012). It is common for member states to pursue their own self-interests regardless 
of the RBO’s agendas and policies (Lindermann, 2005). For example, Swatuk (2003) 
states that on the Okavango River, which is shared by Angola, Namibia and Botswana, 
the RBO the OKACOM (Okavango River Basin Water Commission) is ineffective 
because the states are chiefly concerned with national interests and sovereignty. In 
the case of the Zambezi Rivers, ZACPLAN (The Zambezi River Basin Action Plan) is 
equally constrained and ineffective because of an “arena of different national 
interests in which the various riparian states are developing diverging policies and 
plans that are usually not compatible” (Chiuta, 2000: 153). 
 
The political, economic and securitized nature of hydropower in the Mekong makes it 
exceptionally difficult for RBOs’ to allocate and manage water effectively 
(Suhardiman, 2011). Suhardiman (ibid) argues that a scalar disconnect exists between 
national and regional level (i.e. MRC) decision-making processes. This disconnect 
reproduces itself through the divergent development agendas of the MRC and the 
Basin States in terms of hydropower. As discussed in Chapter 5, the development 
agenda of the member states is heavily influenced by a neo-liberal development 
discourse and political and economic agendas which are often hidden within a 
narrative of hydropower as development with little negative impacts. The MRC’s 
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agenda is driven by its donors and revolves around IWRM and good water 
governance principles (see Chapter 6). These divergent agendas limit the MRC’s 
effectiveness in the Region’s water governance. This effectiveness is also limited by 
the structure of the MRC and mechanisms from the Region. Schmeier (ibid) identifies 
that information sharing, well-functioning dispute settlement mechanisms and 
sustainable funding, can significantly improve the effectiveness of RBOs. Although the 
MRC is well funded by outside interests, its dispute settlement mechanisms are non-
binding and its information sharing is constricted by mechanisms from within Laos 
and the Region that entrench weak transparency in hydropower development (See 
Chapter 6).  
 
The failure of the MRC to regulate Laos’ hydropower development is demonstrated in 
two examples surrounding the release of the SEA and BDP2 reports. First, the GoL 
already had extensive plans to develop at least five mainstream dams before agreeing 
to the ten year moratorium in the SEA report. As stated in a WikiLeaks cable from 
2008, 
“Over the past year the Government of Laos has signed 5 Memoranda of 
Understanding with companies from China, Vietnam, and Thailand to develop 
large dams on the mainstream of the Mekong River where both banks are 
within Laos. Four of the dams are estimated to individually produce more 
megawatts (MW) than Nam Theun II, currently the largest foreign investment 
and largest dam in Laos with an estimated future output of 1070 MW. An 
additional mainstream dam is estimated at between 600-1000 MW. A sixth 
dam, planned for a "finger" of the mainstream as it flows into Cambodia, is 
currently undergoing a review of its Environmental Impact Assessment.” 
(Wikileaks, 2008).  
 
Second, on 20th September 2010, after the MRC released both reports, the GoL 
submitted a proposal for the Xayaburi hydropower project (Xayaburi barrage) to the 
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MRC’s PNPCA process (MRC 2010b). The ability of the MRC to manage the 
hydropower development of the Basin is restricted by mechanisms within Laos, 
including a lack of accountability within the state. These mechanisms empowered the 
GoL over the MRC in the region’s development plans. The GoL was able to agree to a 
ten year moratorium on mainstream dam development while proceeding with plans 
to extensively develop the mainstream including the announcement of the Lower 
Basin’s first ‘barrage’.  
 
The political ecology analysis demonstrates how the use of the term ‘barrage’ is an 
example of the way proponents of the project carefully attempted to promote a 
narrative of sustainable hydropower development to hide their political and 
economic agendas. In 2008, a Thai company, TEAM Consulting Engineering and 
Management Co. Ltd (TEAM), was contracted by the GoL and the developer to 
conduct a feasibility study and the social and environmental impact assessments of 
the Xayaburi Dam. The TEAM reports classify the project not as a dam with a 
reservoir, but as a barrage with a river pond (TEAM 2010). According to the report, 
because the Xayaburi is a run-of-river project, it is not a dam and therefore it does 
not have a reservoir. This terminology is part of a broader narrative promoting 
hydropower as a development with little or no environmental impacts. The term 
barrage is used to justify the development agendas of Laos and Thailand while 
emphasising the Dam’s minimal impacts. In this way, the dam proponents are able to 
scale the debate on the project away from its potential transboundary and socio-
ecological impacts to that of very localised impacts, which are easily manageable.    
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), a dam is defined as “a barrier 
constructed to hold back water and raise its level, forming a reservoir used to 
generate electricity or as a water supply.” This is in contrast to a barrage, which is 
defined by the OED as “an artificial barrier across a river or estuary to prevent 
flooding, aid irrigation or navigation to generate tidal power.” The OED further 
defines a reservoir as a “large natural or artificial lake used as a source of water 
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supply.” Finally, according to the OED, a ‘pond’ is “a small body of still water formed 
naturally or by artificial means.” The design of the Xayaburi project clearly shows it is 
a dam that has moveable gates allowing it to hold back and manipulate reservoir 
levels (MRC, 2011). Furthermore, the reservoir for the project has a capacity of 1.3 
km³ and covers a surface area of 49 km² suggesting that it is not a pond.  As will be 
discussed below, in 2012, ‘dam’ and ‘reservoir’ eventually replaced the use of 
‘barrage’ and ‘pond’ when referring to the Xayaburi.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the political ecology analysis demonstrates that narratives 
do more than hide agendas; they also influence the shape of hydropower 
development. Defining the project as a ‘barrage’ with a ‘river pond’ shaped the IA 
process. The EIA avoids the word dam in the report instead referring to it as a project. 
The EIA concluded that because the project is using run-of-the-river technology and 
fish passages, the environmental impacts will occur in the barrage area with only 
minor impacts extending 10 kilometres downstream (TEAM, 2010). The EIA states,  
“Transformation of the habitat from a river with rapids into a standing 
ecosystem due to impoundment will not occur for Xayaburi Hydroelectric 
Power Project due to run-of-river scheme…fish species which live in running 
water habitat […] will not be negatively impacted to new conditions… [instead 
the project will] improve the overall natural fish production capacity.” (ibid: 
5.11-12).  
 
The EIA stated that the Dam would meet best practice environmental and social 
standards, goes on to posit that water quality and sedimentation will also not be 
impacted because of the project’s design. The design of the Dam further impacted 
the type of SIA that was developed. The SIA stated that only 46 villages will be 
affected by the project. The possibility of impacts extending further upstream or 
downstream was not considered. The terminology used in the IA studies is 
constructed in ways that justify the decision-making process and overall political and 
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economic agenda of powerful actors. The narrative also creates lines of inclusion and 
exclusion, by attempting to define the space in which the dam will be discussed. By 
stating that impacts will be localised and minimal, the EIA and SIA removed the 
requirement for the developers and the GoL to have a large participatory and 
detailed EIA and SIA process. By pushing forward the idea of the dam as having little 
or no impacts they also attempted to legitimise their activities and clear a path for 
quick development of the project.  
 
The importance of IAs to justify proposed projects and meet requirements for foreign 
imposed best practice is common around the world and not confined to Laos 
(Alshuwaikhat, 2005). IAs are often viewed as a rubber stamp for developments 
(ibid). As stated in Chapter 1, IAs are political documents that are often subject to 
bias and manipulation by developers (Beattie, 1995). The Xayaburi dam IA is no 
exception. What is contrasting in this case, however, is the degree of bluntness to 
which the narratives and mechanisms within Laos are able to shape a development 
process and protect decision-makers despite the potentially significant local and 
regional impacts. 
   
Although Laos and the developers attempted to control the space and boundaries 
surrounding the dam’s debate, the regional and international reaction to the dam 
was very critical. Downstream states, INGOs, concerned scientists and international 
donors all stated their opposition to the project.  
 
Concerns from regional states appeared through the MRC’s PNPCA process and in the 
regional press. In March 2011, the final PNPCA report was released by the MRC with 
no agreement between its members. Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand had on-going 
concerns with Laos about the lack of adequate environmental assessment and public 
consultation on the process. These concerns included the fact that the EIA only 
looked at impacts ten kilometres downstream, had weak baselines studies and that 
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the public consultation process only encompassed 8% of the people to be directly 
impacted by the project (Lanza, 2010; Stone, 2011).  
 
Concerns from Vietnam and Cambodia also emerged in the regional media. In April, 
2011, Lim Kean Hor, Cambodia’s water resources minister, sent a letter of protest to 
the Lao Government calling on them to “halt all preliminary construction and respect 
the Mekong spirit of friendship and international cooperation.” (Economist, 2012). 
Vietnam was more vocal in its protest, perhaps due to the potential impacts of the 
dam on the Mekong Delta, the breadbasket of Vietnam. In 2011, the Vietnamese 
MRC Representative stated "The building of a dam on the mainstream will cause a 
degeneration of river water, leading to a reduction of fish output in the Mekong 
Delta." (Tuoi tre news , 2011). The Standing Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and 
Environment Nguyen Thai Lai asserted that "If built, Laos' Xayabury dam will greatly 
affect Vietnam's agricultural production and aquaculture," (Tuoi tre news, 2011). In 
perhaps the boldest statement, Thuong Tan Sang, the Vietnamese President said,  
"Tensions over water resources are threatening economic growth in many 
countries and presenting a source of conflict especially given the efforts of all 
countries to step up economic development. Dam construction and stream 
adjustment by some countries in upstream rivers represents a concern for 
many countries and an implicit factor affecting relations between relevant 
countries." (AFP, 2012) 
 
Both Vietnam and Cambodia have also employed a narrative of hydropower a clean 
energy to justify their development agendas. In the case of the Xayaburi, the 
downstream position of Cambodia and Vietnam required them to adjust their 
hydropower narrative to suit their economic and political concerns. While criticising 
the Dam, both Vietnam and Cambodia were continuing with extensive hydropower 
development in the Basin. The fact that both Cambodia and Vietnam opposed the 
Xayaburi Dam while continuing with plans for their own extensive hydropower 
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development in the Mekong Basin, demonstrates how narratives can be constructed 
to promote conflicting agendas and the Janus face of hydropolitics. 
 
After the PNPCA process was finished, the United States Government also became 
vocal about its opposition to the Xayaburi Dam. On 1st December 2011, the United 
States Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested US representatives at 
multinational banks to suspend financial support to projects along the Mekong River 
that were “environmentally questionable” (Lynch, 2011). It also called for continued 
support of the PNPCA process and for the GoL to improve the Xayaburi’s impact 
assessments. This and subsequent interventions by the US have been led by Senator 
Jim Webb, who is the Chair of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.  
 
The US’s involvement in the Xayaburi debate is a component of its active re-
engagement in Southeast Asian development. In 2009 the US entered into ASEAN’s 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and launched the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). As 
part of this ‘rebalancing’, the US boosted its military presence in the Region and 
recommitted to remaining engaged in the Region’s economic growth (Chang, 2013). 
The LMI involves all riparian countries except China. Its aims are to assist countries in 
the Basin on long-term issues including Government capacity building and general 
equality (Clinton, 2012). In 2012, following Clinton’s visit to the Region, the US 
announced $50 million in additional funding to the Initiative.  
 
The US stance against the Xayaburi draws from its “[o]wn experience…of the 
economic, social and environmental impacts that large infrastructure can have over 
the long-term.” (USDoS, 2012). Sustainable development emerged as a US foreign 
policy concern in the 1980s and 1990s with the growth of the environmental 
movement and increased public concern about the impact of overseas oil production 
(Farhar, 1994). As with other actors, the US’s concern over the Xayaburi’s 
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environmental and social impacts helps to promote its own political and economic 
agendas in the Basin.   
 
US Embassy cables from 2008 confirm that the US government was trying to help 
American companies to sign MoU’s to develop the Xayaburi Dam and a number of 
other mainstream dams (WikiLeaks, 2008). Attempts by the US government to be 
involved in the Region’s development are part of its geopolitical strategy to increase 
its trade and economic ties to these rapidly developing economies (see Clinton, 
2011). Since no US companies were involved in the lucrative construction deals of the 
Xayaburi Dam or other mainstream dams, the political ecology analysis of narratives 
shows that the US is using criticism of the process as a leverage point to serve its own 
agenda in the Region in two ways.  
 
First, the Xayaburi debate provided a conduit for which the US could assert itself into 
the development agendas of the Lower Basin states. Hillary Clinton and other US 
politicians have stressed the importance of Asia to the US’s economic future (See. 
Clinton, 2011). By involving itself in the Xayaburi Dam debate, the US is able to use 
the opportunity to rebuild relationships and appear engaged and legitimized to be 
involved in the Basin’s development. One of the key objectives of rebuilding ties with 
regional states is to allow US companies to enter the growing markets of the Mekong 
Region.  
 
This agenda is contradictory to its purported stance on environmental protection. By 
participating in these emerging markets US companies will require electricity that is 
slated to come from hydropower development. Furthermore, the US is a staunch 
promoter of the neo-liberal agenda that is currently pushing forward the rapid 
hydropower development of the Basin. The US dominated Mekong Committee and 
the World Bank both played a key role in encouraging Laos to rapidly develop its 




Second, the US’s stance against the current wave of mainstream dam development is 
part of its attempt to buffer China’s geopolitical ambitions in S.E. Asia (Chang, 2013; 
Le, 2013). Although the Xayaburi does not involve Chinese actors, China is heavily 
involved in hydropower development in Laos including signing MoU’s on mainstream 
dams. Richard Cronin, from the Stimson Centre, a US policy think tank and research 
institute, argues in numerous publications that the US must strongly respond to 
China’s hydropower expansion in the Region. He states that China’s motives in the 
Region, which include a disregard for the environmental and social impacts of dams, 
are counter to the best interests of the US and the Lower Basin States (See Cronin 
and Hamlin, 2010; Cronin, 2009). Chang (2013) argues that in response to the US’s 
renewed engagement with the Region, China has taken a more assertive view, 
offering soft loans and economic development opportunities to strengthen 
relationships. Domestic pressures from the US to expand its economy require that it 
finds new markets for trade. By involving itself in the geopolitics of the Xayaburi, the 
US is protecting its interests and ensuring that, like China, it is a key player in the 
development agenda of the Basin. The motivating factors behind the US’s 
involvement in the Xayaburi demonstrate that it is using the dam to legitimize its 
political and economic activities in the Basin.  
 
Despite the pressure from the US on Laos to follow the MRC’s recommendations and 
commit to the PNPCA process, member states were unable to reach any agreement 
on the Dam. Due to the impasse in the PNPCA process, in April 2011, the MRC Joint 
Committee decided to table the process at the ministerial level. At the same time the 
GoL claimed that the PNPCA process was now finished. The GoL further stated that it 
would make a final decision on whether to proceed with the project in October 2011.   
 
The PNPCA process had always been seen as a litmus test for the MRC’s legitimacy 
within the Basin (Molle et al. 2009).  In December 2011, the WWF stated that, “As the 
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first dam project to enter the MRC’s formal consultation process, the Xayaburi project 
will test the effectiveness of the MRC” (Lynch, 2011). Despite the level of pressure on 
the MRC for the PNPCA to effectively develop cooperation around the first 
mainstream, the impasse was considered a failure. As a senior official for the MRC 
stated at the time, “Moving the process to the ministerial level was not something 
that we ever planned for. As per the 1995 Agreement, no country has a unilateral 
right to declare the process finished. We expect Laos to keep to this agreement.” 
(MRC4, 2011). Regardless of the impasse in the process, the GoL’s decision to declare 
the process finished is a further example of the ineffectiveness of the organization in 
dealing with the politics surrounding hydropower development and the power to 
which mechanisms within Laos protect decision makers from legally binding 
agreements. 
 
Although the PNPCA process was incomplete by MRC rules, the GoL and the 
developer were already rapidly proceeding with dam construction. In April 2011, a 
Bangkok Post Investigative report entitled “Xayaburi Work Begins on Sly” revealed 
that the GoL and the developer had already begun implementing the project in 2010 
and that some villagers had received as little as $15 dollars in resettlement 
compensation (Bangkok Post, 2011). Pictures from a light plane that passed over the 
area in May 2011 reveal that construction of power transmission lines to the site, 
access roads and a camp were already completed (See figure 7-2 and 7-3). A 
consultant and amateur pilot who took these pictures stated “Judging by the amount 
of work on the ground, the developer has already invested at least $30 million into 




Figure 7-0-2 Transmission lines from town to site already constructed for the 
Xayaburi dam  
(Source Anonymous, 2011). 
 
Figure 7-3  Work camps and construction for the Xayaburi Dam  
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The unilateral decision to proceed with the Dam and offer insufficient compensation 
to resettled villagers further illustrates how mechanisms within Laos empower 
decision-makers and shape the hydropower development process. The GoL 
demonstrated a complete lack of concern about NGO, MRC, and downstream states 
opposition to the dam as well as its own laws and policies. The protection that 
mechanisms provide to decision-makers allowed them to ignore laws and policies 
within the country (see Chapter 6).  
 
As Herbertson (2013) argues, the GoL seemed to be able to completely disregard the 
PNPCA process, the 1995 agreement and its own laws and policies promoting 
transparency and participation in the IA process.  
 
INGOs and academics also heavily criticized the GoL for proceeding with the dam. The 
first major report was released by WWF in 2011. This report prepared by Baran et al. 
(2011) posits that the EIA had a number of failings. They stated that the proposed 
structure is, by most international standards, not a barrage or run-of-the-river 
project. They argued that with a height of 49 metres and a width of 930 metres it 
would be a large dam. They further claimed that the term river pond is inaccurate. 
They argued that with an inundated area of 49 square kilometres stretching 60 
kilometres upstream, the dam would create a medium sized reservoir. The report 
went on to conclude that the EIA does not meet international standards and that the 
project would alter water quality, fisheries and sedimentation across a large area 
both upstream and downstream (ibid).   
 
In May 2011, in response to these criticisms, the GoL agreed to re-examine the 
Impact Assessment and its compliance with the MRC’s policies. The GoL initially 
contacted Aqua Energie LLC (Aqua), an international consultancy firm that has 
worked on a number of hydropower projects around the world, to review the project. 
Aqua declined to do the review due to concerns that they were being misled by the 
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GoL regarding the EIA and due to concerns that other plans were already in place for 
future developments. A senior employee with the company stated,  
“We were asked to review the EIA. We refused because we were not 
convinced we were looking at the real EIA and there were inconsistencies in 
terms of the technical configuration of the Dam. It did not add up. Whether 
there was going to be a part two or not?”  (PS19, 2012).  
 
The concerns from the Aqua employee demonstrate the power of meso-scale 
structures and mechanisms within Laos to influence development. The employee, 
who is has extensive experience in Laos, recognised that the GoL and developers are 
able to tightly control the hydropower process and circumvent laws and policies 
within the country designed to protect local people and the environment (PS19, 
2012).  
 
In May 2011, the GoL hired Finnish engineering company Pöyry10 to evaluate the EIA 
and the Dam’s compliance with MRC policies. At the same time Pöyry was hired as 
the Dam’s engineering consultants. In August 2011, Pöyry released its report entitled 
Xayaburi Hydroelectric Power Project Run-of River Plant. The avoidance of the word 
‘dam’ and ‘reservoir’ when referring to the Xayaburi project throughout the report 
demonstrates that the GoL and the developer were still trying to manipulate the 
image of the project to serve their agendas. The report recommended a number of 
changes to the Dam design to mitigate potential environmental impacts on fisheries 
and sedimentation (Pöyry, 2011). The report also concluded that the GoL had 
complied with the PNPCA process. In October 2011, EGAT signed an agreement with 
the Xayaburi Power Company to purchase electricity from the Dam.   
 
                                                          
10
 In 2012, Pöyry parent company was blacklisted by the World Bank for unrelated corruption 
charges and its CEO resigned. 
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Akin to the first EIA, the Pöyry Report attracted widespread criticism from NGOs and 
MRC member states. In November 2011, Cambodia and Vietnam stated that they 
disagreed with the findings of the report and called on Laos to properly address the 
potential transboundary impacts of the dam (Global Post, 2012). This criticism 
coincided with the MRC Council recommending the project be postponed until 
further studies could be conducted (MRC, 2011). In December, the GoL agreed to 
suspend the project pending further studies on its impacts to be led by Japan 
(Reuters, 2012).  
 
In January 2012, instead of a Japanese led study, the GoL hired CNR, the same 
company that produced the 1994 report entitled Mekong Mainstream Run-of-River 
Hydropower, to conduct an independent review of the Pöyry Report. The CNR report 
was the first to properly label the project as a ‘dam’ with a ‘reservoir’. The CNR report 
concluded that, “[t]hat the project globally can comply with MRC guidelines and with 
worldwide hydropower best practices, regarding hydrology, sediment transport and 
navigation issues, after taking into account proposed improvements in this report.” 
(CNR, 2012:20). One of the main recommendations from the report was to improve 
sediment flushing. The report also stated that it did not attempt to address “fish 
migration issues and other environmental impacts.” (CNR, 2012:13).  
 
By using CNR, the GoL was able to manipulate the “independent” nature of the 
review requested by critics of the project. CNR’s (1994) study on run-of-river 
mainstream dams recommended a number of run-of-river projects for the 
mainstream stating that these dams were able to minimize environmental impacts. 
Furthermore, the CNR report does not examine the potential environmental or social 
impacts of the dam. By ignoring the impacts on fisheries the GoL used the report to 
appease downstream states and MRC concerns while continuing to circumvent its 
own laws and policies regarding the environmental and social impacts of the project. 
Furthermore, while arranging for the additional studies, the GoL continued to build 
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the Dam, demonstrating its lack of concern for the outcome of the PNPCA process 
and criticism from its neighbours.  
 
7.4 The Build-up to the Ground Breaking Ceremony 
 
In 2012, over 39 Thai, Cambodian, and Vietnamese NGOs with international 
counterparts protested against the construction of the Xayaburi dam (STM, 2012) 
(see Figure 7-4). This protest was led by International Rivers (IR) who was extremely 
critical of the Dam throughout the process. IR stated that the dam would impact the 
food security and livelihoods of 202,000 people along the River (IR 2012). In 2011, IR 
formed the Save the Mekong coalition to pressure the GoL and Thailand to cancel the 
Dam. The coalition is comprised of Thai and international members, although 
Cambodia and Vietnam representatives are also active. Lao members are notably 
absent. As an INGO representative stated, “this is the first time we have seen a 
regional campaign by domestic NGOs in the Mekong” (CS1, 2012). In August, 2012, a 
group of Thai NGOs filed a complaint with the Thai courts over Thailand’s 
involvement in the Xayaburi dam and the potential impacts on the Basin. Thai civil 
society also protested at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in November 2012 (INGOs 





Figure 7-4 Thai NGOs protesting against Xayaburi Dam decision 
Source: International Rivers, 2012c 
 
The power of INGOs to influence change has been extensively studied. Hardt and 
Negri (2000:312) state that INGOs are “the newest and perhaps most important force 
in the global civil society”. While Khagram et al. (2002: vii) posit that,  
“Transnational networks, coalitions, or movements … have the potential to 
transform both domestic political systems and international politics, especially 
by creating issues, mobilizing new constituencies, altering understandings of 
interests and identities, and sometimes changing state practices.”  
 
Despite these impressive claims, the influence INGOs on Mekong Basin hydropower 
development has been limited by political and economic mechanisms discussed in 
and the influx of private sector investment (see Chapter 5 and 6). The private sector is 
generally wary of any INGOs in the Basin and, unlike the WB and the ADB, has no 
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obligation to engage or discuss development plans or environmental and social 
mitigation strategies. 
 
A political ecology analysis illustrates that INGOs have also used their narrative of the 
Dam as destructive to the entire Basin as a way to legitimise their own agendas in the 
Region and the hydropower development space. Many of the INGOs in Laos are 
backed by significant funding from the West and have global networks of employees 
and supporters. They have been increasingly vocal in regional development and 
engaged in stakeholder dialogues. INGOs often present a counter-narrative to pro-
hydropower development. For example, INGOs reject the narrative of hydropower as 
‘nation building’, stating that it destroys the environment and livelihoods. They 
present hydropower as a poor choice where the long-term impacts outweigh any 
short-term gains.  Perhaps the most vocal of these INGOs is the California-based 
International Rivers (IR).  
 
IR’s Mekong office contributes to numerous reports and press releases criticizing the 
development of large-scale hydropower dams in Laos and the Mekong Basin. As a 
result of these policy statements, IR has been labelled a radical anti-dam voice in the 
Lower Mekong Basin. For example, Whitington (2012) states that in 2008, although IR 
first attempted to work with the Thuen Hinboun Power Company (THPC) in mitigating 
its environmental and social impacts, its agenda was deemed too radical for the THPC 
board. IR subsequently released a number of reports criticizing the Thuen Hinboun 
Expansion Project stating that it was “a failure that had unacceptable impacts on the 
livelihoods and environment of the affected people” (IR 2008:26). 
 
IR’s critique of hydropower in Laos expanded extensively from 2010 to 2013 with the 
announcement and subsequent construction of the Xayaburi dam. A senior IR 
representative in Bangkok stated: 
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“The Xayaburi dam will have devastating consequences for the people and 
environment of the Mekong Basin. Laos has ignored studies by scientists that 
show the costs of this dam will outweigh any potential benefits. IR’s position is 
that mainstream hydropower development should be halted for at least 10 
years while further studies are conducted. We believe that dams on the 
Mekong mainstream and its tributaries are being developed in an 
unsustainable manner” (CS3, 2011). 
 
Many of the policy statements from INGOS criticizing hydropower employed an image 
of the Mekong River as pristine and untouched. These values serve the interests of 
international civil society that seeks to conserve and sometimes exclude humans from 
‘nature’ (Cronon 1995; Sunderberg, 1998).  
 
INGOs also frame the Xayaburi (somewhat misleadingly) as the first significant 
development to affect the Region. For example, a WWF statement argued that,  
“The Lao Government’s determination to plow ahead with construction of the 
controversial $3.5-billion Xayaburi hydropower dam in northern Laos puts the 
mighty Mekong River’s spectacular biodiversity, rich fisheries and livelihoods - 
vital to nearly 60 million people in grave danger.” (WWF, 2012).  
 
The pristine image of the Mekong as one of the world’s last undammed rivers was 
also employed by other INGOs such as International Rivers and Oxfam (see. IR, 2012; 
Oxfam, 2012).   
 
These interests, however, often clashed with local agendas surrounding development 
and poverty alleviation. As a Chinese academic scholar stated in a newspaper report 
entitled Western-funded green groups ‘stir up trouble’ in China, "They [INGOs] tend to 
over-emphasize the significance of environmental protection, while ignoring Mekong 
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countries' demand for economic development, threatening the sovereign rights of 
these countries." (Jing, 2013). The focus on northern environmentalism may be part 
of the explanation why INGOs tend to avoid direct critiques of domestic political 
systems. Instead of focusing on challenging the state to redefine itself or issues of 
social justice they are meeting the beliefs, values and interest of their funding bases.  
 
These policy statements promote a northern environmental narrative of the Basin 
that serves the interests of outside groups. The economic development of the Region 
and existing environmental pressures such as over-fishing are rarely, if ever 
mentioned by INGOs.  
 
There is a growing body of literature highlighting the devastating impacts of capitalist 
modes of production and consumption trends on capture fisheries and biodiversity 
around the world including in the Mekong Basin (Campling et al., 2012; Sneddon and 
Fox, 2012b).  
 
Campling et al. (2012) and Sneddon and Fox (2012b), drawing from Ostrom (1990), 
use a political ecology approach to argue that the fishers are embedded within 
existing social, political, economic and environmental systems. For example, in the 
Mekong Basin, Brooks et al’s (2007) study of snake hunting in Cambodia analysed the 
expanding negative impacts of markets and population growth on water snake 
populations in the poorly governed and under-resourced Tonle Sap Lake. Brooks et al. 
(ibid) and Allison and Ellis (2001) emphasise the need to understand and improve 
social, political and economic institutions regulating capture fisheries, which are 
essential to the livelihoods of millions of people in the Mekong and around the world 




As discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, in Laos, the social, political and economic institutions 
that regulate hydropower and water resources are shaped and influenced by a neo-
liberal development agenda that encourages private sector investment and rapid 
transitions to a market economy. Hydropower development in Laos can be viewed as 
a way of moving people into a market economy both through its production of cheap 
electricity and through its resettlement of natural resource dependant people into 
towns where they are increasingly connected to state through schools and markets. 
Mechanisms within Laos also impact the social, political and economic institutions. 
Corruption, accountability, weak grassroots civil society all contribute to poorly 
managed fisheries and ecosystem service decline.  
 
Narratives from INGOs, however, tend not to engage with the social, political and 
economic institutions or the mechanisms that threaten capture fisheries and 
biodiversity. Attempting to lobby against a hydropower developer is much easier than 
mounting a campaign against capitalism itself.  Instead, the INGO policy statements 
focus on the environmental degradation caused by hydropower. INGOs create an 
image of a Basin that is experiencing its first significant threat in the form of the 
Xayaburi Dam as a way to legitimize their involvement in the Basin’s development. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, civil society is often heralded as being both counter to and 
autonomous from the state and the market (Pasha and Blaney, 1998). Chandhoke 
(2002), however, argues that these normative expectations of INGOs often hide the 
fact that they are formed in and often bound by the neo-liberal and capitalist states 
and markets in their respective spheres.  
 
By constructing a narrative of INGOs fighting to save the pristine, untouched 
environment and traditional people of the Mekong Basin they legitimize their 
presence and activities in the Region. The image they create of the ‘last undammed 
river’ may be noble but it is also self-serving. The dramatic image of the Basin they 
construct helps to raise their profile through international media, and thereby 
increase support from their primary funders in developed countries (Martinez-Alier 
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2002). Although INGOs may purport to speak for local people and the environment, 
their interests may not always coincide with local or regional agendas. 
 
In response to criticisms from INGOs and Vietnam and Cambodia, on 13th July 2012, 
the GoL announced that it had once again suspended the Dam. Foreign Minister 
Thongloun Sisoulith stated at a meeting in Cambodia that, "The Lao Government 
decided to postpone it. We have to do further studies.” (ABC, 2012). On 16th July 
2012, two days later, the GoL reversed this decision. Viraphonh Viravong, the Deputy 
Minister of Energy, stated that the construction was continuing on the project 
(Economist, 2012). This diplomatic doublespeak provides anecdotal evidence of how 
mechanisms within Laos, such as a lack of transparency and accountability in the 
country, can shape the hydropower development process.  
 
The GoL also responded to criticism of project by releasing policy statements through 
the Vientiane Times that promoted its narrative of the dam as both sustainable and 
essential for economic growth. Many of these policy statements drew from reports 
about the benefits of run-of-river hydropower to create an image of a dam that will 
have little or no environmental impacts. In October 2012, for example, the 
Government stated that the, “Xayaboury Dam will have no transboundary impact: 
The development concept was to build a transparent dam, meaning that everything 
that enters the dam can pass through it.” (Vientiane Times, 2012). The government 
further stated that, “A run-of-river dam has the advantage that outflow equals inflow 
so there is less impact on the environment and the lifestyle of people who live along 
the river.” (Vientiane Times, 2012b). As discussed in Chapter 5, policy statements 
from the Government also link the dam to a neo-liberal agenda supporting economic 
growth. For example, 
“The Xayaboury dam is a run-of-river scheme. It means that the input flow is 
the same as the output flow. It is like having no dam there, so this is 
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considered transparent. If Laos wants to escape least developed country 
status by 2020 this is our only choice.” (Vientiane Times, 2012c).  
 
The GoL used the run-of-river label to control the space in which the dam would be 
debated and to facilitate the decision making process, and to legitimise a limited 
social and environmental impact assessment process. Although the widespread 
criticism that the Dam attracted most likely caught the GoL by surprise, it responded 
in tokenistic ways while continuing to develop the project behind the scenes. The 
disregard of both its own laws and the MRC process demonstrates how these laws 
and policies have been ineffective and how mechanisms protect actors. Powerful 
actors from the GoL are able to wield decisions in spaces that are impervious to the 
laws and policies that are designed to hold decision-makers accountable (See Chapter 
6).  
 
The Western origins of the laws and policies surrounding the IA process, and the 
criticism of INGOs, and not grassroots civil society, on the project speak to the 
ineffectiveness of imposing outside agendas on Mekong Basin development. For 
example, the WB and the ADB encouraged Laos to adopt many of laws and policies to 
regulate hydropower in order to bring it into Western market economy norms (See 
Chapter 6).  The GoL by accepted these laws and policies on paper because they have 
been tied to funding and development, but mechanisms within the state have 
allowed powerful actors to circumvent them.  
 
Late in 2012, rumours of a ground breaking ceremony began circulating. On Tuesday, 
6th November 2012, the Deputy Prime Minister was quoted in the Wall Street Journal 
stating, "I confirm that there is no ground breaking set for Wednesday [7th 
November] on the $3.5 billion Xayaburi Dam. It is not real. It is only…organizing a 
small group of media to visit, and some concerned people, scientists and other 
people." (Otto, 2012). 
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Yet, on Thursday, the 8th November 2012, the Deputy Minister for Energy and Mines 
(MEM) stated "We started working on the river yesterday after a ground breaking 
ceremony," (Bangkok Post, 2012b) (see figure 7-4). This somewhat comical second 
example of diplomatic doublespeak between Government Ministries in Laos provides 
further anecdotal evidence of the degree to which mechanisms such as weak 
transparency and a lack of accountability permeate within Laos and impact 
hydropower development. The deputy minister for energy also stated that Laos had 
addressed Vietnam and Cambodia’s concerns,  
“We can sense that Vietnam and Cambodia now understand how we have 
addressed their concerns. We did address this properly with openness and put 
all our engineers at their disposal. We are convinced we are developing a very 
good dam." (BBC, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 7-5  “No ground breaking ceremony”. 
 Source Wall Street Journal (2012).  
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Although Vietnam and Cambodia were vocal in their opposition to the Xayaburi 
throughout the process, following the announcement of the ground breaking 
ceremony neither country released any statements. The silence from both actors on a 
project that could be significantly harmful to their economies is best explained 
through the type of cooperation that exists within the Region.  
 
7.5 Regional Cooperation: The ASEAN Way  
 
This section examines how cooperation in ASEAN impacts hydropower development 
and its social and environmental costs. Within ASEAN, the 1995 Agreement is 
considered an important cross-border cooperation treaty (Hirsch and Jensen 2006; 
Dore and Lebel, 2010). Despite the importance of the treaty the ASEAN Way of non-
interference in domestic affairs acts as a mechanism to protect decision-makers and 
create space for developments to proceed despite their significant environmental or 
social costs. 
 
There is much literature promoting the value of cooperation and the value of 
cooperating institutions in water management (e.g. Savenije and van der Zaag, 2000). 
Wolf et al. (2003a) identified that the negative effects of unilateral development, 
such as a large-scale dam, can be mitigated by the presence of positive regional 
relations or an effective transboundary institution (see also Wolf et al., 2003b; Yoffe 
et al., 2004). Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008), however, usefully demonstrated that the 
realpolitik of transboundary river management is where cooperation and conflict co-
exist, and that cooperation in itself is often used to disguise powerful actors control 
over weaker ones. As Selby (2003) has pointed out in relation to transboundary 
institutions along the Jordan River, domination can be dressed up as cooperation. 
 
In South-East Asia, regional cooperation surrounding hydropower is promoted both in 
the political discourse of Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and, as 
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discussed above, in the MRC and the GMS Programme. This section uses a political 
ecology approach to examine the regional environment of cooperation’s impact on 
hydropower development. The analysis shows that the regional culture of 
economically driven water resource development wedded with mechanisms in Laos, 
including weak transparency, corruption and a lack of accountability, create an 
environment that discourages change, and entrenches the mechanisms and closed 
nature of the state. This results in a guise of cooperation that shapes the hydropower 
development process and enables dam proponents to develop projects, like the 
Xayaburi, without significant regional opposition despite their potential negative 
transboundary environmental and social impacts.  
 
The boundaries of state cooperation in South-East Asia prominently appear in 
regional hydropolitics. Since the 1970s ASEAN member states’ have produced a 
number of cooperative statements and declarations on environmental protection and 
water resource management (Litta, 2012).  For example, the ASEAN Vision 2020, 
which was signed by all the ASEAN heads of state in 1997 states,  
“We envision a clean and green ASEAN with fully established mechanisms for 
sustainable development to ensure the protection of the Region's 
environment, the sustainability of its natural resources, and the high quality of 
life of its peoples” (ASEAN, 1997). 
 
More recently, the ASEAN Charter, which was ratified in 2008, states that member 
states will  “Promote sustainable development so as to ensure the protection of the 
Region’s environment, the sustainability of its natural resources, the preservation of 
cultural heritage and the high quality of life of its peoples” (ASEAN, 2008). In 2012, 





On paper these statements seem to espouse environmental and social protection, 
however, analysis of the cultural limits of cooperation in the ASEAN by Jetschke and 
Rüland (2009) show that rhetoric and reality of cooperation are very different. ASEAN 
member states continually affirm their commitments to regional cooperation 
including those surrounding water resource management yet, "they continue to stick 
to self-interested policies to the detriment of ASEAN’s collective interests" (ibid). A 
tenet of ASEAN development and cooperation has been a commitment to non-
interference and non-intervention in domestic affairs (Koh and Robinson, 2002). 
Middleton (2012) states that “the ASEAN Way” of resolving differences through use 
of soft power and indirect policies characterized by conciliation and consultation has 
facilitated relatively stable political relations in the Region, but it lacks transparency, 
accountability, and the faculty to address urgent, complex or controversial issues, 
especially those surrounding hydropower.  
 
The theme of cooperation surrounding natural resource management in ASEAN 
draws from global trends in the commodification of natural resources (Nevins and 
Peluso, 2008; Hall et al., 2013). As discussed above, private sector investment in 
hydropower development has empowered meso-scale mechanisms that protect 
decision makers and influence mechanisms such as confidentiality and lack of 
transparency in the process. Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) argue that as a result of a neo-
liberal led agenda that promoted distinctive shift since the 1980s towards private 
sector investment, natural resources are managed in ways that reinforce existing 
mechanisms in developing countries such as weak accountability, a lack of freedom of 
the press and tokenistic participation.  
 
The ASEAN Way and the GMS Programme with its promotion of interconnectivity 
through the Mekong Power Grid, enable a brand of cooperation between the 
economies of the Lower Mekong Basin that supports rapid regional development that 
is focused on short-term decision-making with little transparency or participation. In 
Laos, this push for rapid development is used by developers as a justification to build 
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projects that ultimately profit from weak social and environmental mitigation 
requirements.   
 
The externalization of the costs of hydropower development benefits powerful actors 
such as developers, banks and Government officials. It is justified by the Lower 
Mekong Basin states through the neo-liberal influenced narratives that characterize 
hydropower as essential for poverty reduction, flood control, and economic growth 
(See Chapter 5). For example, by supporting the development of high voltage 
transmission lines between Lao and Thailand, and between Laos and Vietnam, the 
GMS Programme has enabled EGAT to develop power projects in Laos to standards 
that are below those that would be accepted by communities in Thailand (Middleton, 
2012). The ASEAN Way, of non-interference places no pressure on Laos to strengthen 
or enforce its social or environmental policies beyond the signing of declarations and 
laws. In this way, the ASEAN Way, acts as a mechanism to empower regional decision 
makers and disempower local people and environmental protection.  
 
This guise of regional cooperation further hinders opportunities for meaningful 
cooperation over water resources within the MRC.  The MRC’s lack of control to 
manage the Basin’s hydropower development demonstrates the influence the ASEAN 
Way has on institutions. For example, the removal of the veto power in the 1995 
Agreement and the non-binding PNPCA process limits is characteristic of the ASEAN 
Way of non-interference. The non-binding nature of the process and the removal of 
the veto limit the ability of any one member state to halt hydropower developments, 
no matter the potential negative impacts. 
 
Koh and Robinson (2002) posit that for ASEAN members to meaningfully mitigate the 
environmental and social impacts of development they must move beyond soft 
approaches and toward meaningful policies that are enforced across the Region. 
Mitchell (2001) argues that international and regional context impact the 
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effectiveness of international organizations. The ASEAN community has been strained 
by both historical and current foreign policy conflicts. As a result, there is little trust 
between many of its members (ex. Between Vietnam and China). This lack of trust 
and the influence of the regional context impede the implementation of meaningful 
and enforceable policies surrounding hydropower development and Basin planning.  
Furthermore, both the existing environment of regional cooperation and the ASEAN 
Way of non-interference encourage and enable regional states to externalise the 
environmental and social costs of hydropower development in Laos.  The 
externalisation of costs is enabled by mechanisms from within Laos that are 
empowered to endure and exclude with impunity.  
 
7.6 Conclusion  
 
The start of construction of the Xayaburi Dam has been analysed in order to examine 
two main research questions. What are the key narratives that legitimise the political 
and economic structures that drive and enable mainstream dam development, and 
how do mechanisms within Laos empower actors over others during the IA and 
hydropower development process.  
 
The political ecology analysis in this chapter and in the preceding chapters has shown 
how narratives, influenced by a neo-liberal led development agenda, are used by 
powerful actors as a conduit to promote their political and economic agendas. The 
political ecology analysis has also shown how mechanisms within Laos protect 
decision makers and allow them to circumvent the laws and policies designed to 
mitigate the social and environmental impacts of hydropower development.  
 
Numerous studies have confirmed that mainstream dams would have significant 
impacts on the Basin’s ecosystems and livelihoods (Kummu and Varis 2007; Barlow et 
al., 2008; Dugan et al., 2010). It is therefore, essential to understand how 
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mechanisms and narratives shape and influence hydropower development. Sneddon 
and Fox (2012) argue that mainstream dams are part of the neo-liberal and capitalist 
vision of the Mekong as a resource, which is promoted through modes of cooperation 
such as the GMS Programme and the ASEAN community. All of these elements play 
an important role in shaping the way dams are built, especially how their social and 
environmental impacts are considered and addressed.  
 
In the Xayaburi case, narratives were used by both proponents and opponents of the 
Dam as a tool to legitimize their activities. The GoL carefully constructed policy 
statements and reports around the Dam to suggest that it would have minimal 
environmental and social impact. By constructing a narrative of a sustainable project, 
with a ‘barrage’ and a ‘pond’ that would have minimal or no environmental impacts, 
the GoL was able to create lines of exclusion and inclusion in the debate leading up 
the start of construction. The GoL used the narrative of hydropower as essential for 
economic growth to legitimise its decision making. Mechanisms from within the state, 
such as weak transparency and accountability, empowered decision makers and 
allowed them to circumvent laws and policies designed to protect local people and 
the environment.  
 
The United States used a narrative of mainstream dams as harmful to the 
environment to promote its political and economic agenda such as buffering China’s 
influence in the region and strengthening its ties to the rapidly growing economies of 
S.E. Asia.  
 
The INGO sector constructed a narrative of the Basin as untouched and under threat 
from the Dam in order to serve its own agenda and legitimise its activities in the 
region.  The INGO sector assumes that it’s Western and neo-liberal influenced policies 
are the right choice for local people. At the same time, policy statements from NGOs 
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often ignore the social, political and economic forces that are already threatening 
much of the Basin’s ecosystem services. 
 
The ASEAN Way of non-interference was a regional mechanism that empowered 
certain actors over others in the Xayaburi debate. This mechanisms also empowered 
meso-scale mechanisms in Laos enabling it to proceed with the development despite 
downstream criticism from Vietnam and Cambodia. 
 
The value of the MRC and its effectiveness as the regional RBO has been called into 
question by breakdown of the PNPCA process. The evidence demonstrates that the 
MRC’s influence does not extend to highly politicised issues such as hydropower. The 
development agendas of the MRC’s donors and that of its member states are 
different. When these development agenda’s conflict, the MRC’s lack of influence 
becomes apparent. Nevertheless, the MRC’s role in the Basin to bring together 
stakeholders and provide a window into hydropower development that can be used 
by international and domestic actors to influence the process should not be 
overlooked.  
 
Despite INGOs representing outside interests and using the dam to promote their 
own agenda’s, the INGO pressure did have some impacts on the process. The 
Xayaburi debate marked the first time a regional campaign mobilized to stop a dam. 
The campaign resulted in a redesign of the project and placed the GoL on the 
defensive. It did not, however, halt the project. A lack of transparency permeated 
throughout the process with the GoL repeatedly disregarding its own laws and 
policies. The fact that the GoL was able to develop the Dam in this way, demonstrates 
the power that mechanisms and narratives wield within the Region and the degree to 




The final chapter in this study summarizes the findings of this research drawing out 
the key points and their implications on hydropower development in Laos both now 


























The study set out to offer a fresh understanding of the drivers and enablers of 
hydropower development in Laos that ignores its social and environmental impacts. 
Extensive research has been conducted into Laos and Mekong Basin hydropower 
development (see Chapter 3). The existing research examining hydropower 
development in the Mekong Basin has predominately analysed international political 
and economic structures and their links to local environmental change.  
 
This study aimed to offer new insights into hydropower development by using a 
political ecology approach to examine meso-scale drivers and enablers, in the form of 
mechanisms and narratives, and their upward and downward links to international 
and historical drivers and enablers and local environmental change. Through starting 
at a meso-scale, the study used the impact assessment process as a window into the 
non-transparent nature of hydropower development. In drawing together the meso-
scale analysis of this study with existing literature, the study provided important new 
insights and evidence into who stands to win and lose from hydropower development 
in Laos and why.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is fourfold. First, it briefly recaps the global expansion of 
hydropower and the importance of Laos and the Mekong Basin as a focal point within 
this expansion. Second, it summarises the contributions of the study by reviewing the 
analytical tools deployed including the use of political ecology, the analysis of scale, 
narratives and mechanisms and the use of the impact assessment process as a unique 
window into hydropower development. Third, it provides a brief analytical summary 
of the study by reviewing the research questions. Finally, it discusses the analytical 
and theoretical gaps and avenues for future research.  
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8.2 Laos as the Centre of the Mekong Basin’s Rapid Hydropower 
Development 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, although much of the developed world’s hydropower has 
been realized, hydropower construction in developing countries is rapidly expanding. 
On 16th July 2013, after a 20 year absence the World Bank’s energy strategy 
announced a new commitment to large hydropower projects (Guardian, 2013). Much 
of the developing world’s hydropower will be built in areas of important biodiversity 
that are populated by vulnerable natural resource dependent groups. As a source of 
cheap electricity and income generation, governments often view hydropower as a 
clean source of cheap energy that can help bring their populations out of poverty and 
away from a dependence on natural resources.  
 
The Mekong Basin and more specifically Laos are an important case study in the 
global hydropower expansion.  The Mekong Basin is rich in biodiversity and home to 
over 70 million people, significant proportions of whom rely directly on ecosystems 
for their livelihoods. It is also currently undergoing enormous social, economic, and 
ecological changes of which hydropower development is one of the most significant 
components. 
 
Laos is at the centre of the Mekong’s hydropower development. With an estimated 
hydropower potential of 26,000 MW, the GoL is aiming to bring its installed capacity 
from 2559 MW to 3856 MW by 2015. This is part of an ambitious plan to rapidly build 
over 100 tributary and mainstream dams across the country during the coming 
decades. Hydropower in Laos has significant long-distance ripple effects. These 
effects are both positive and negative. Hydropower is currently the country’s main 
source of foreign direct investment and export income. It has the potential to fund 
much needed social services such as education and health care within the country. 
However, It also threatens to significantly impact the fisheries, livelihoods and culture 




Much of the criticism surrounding hydropower development posits that hydropower 
will become a resource curse scenario in Laos (Simpson, 2007; Goto, 2011; Jusi, 
2011). Natural resources as such are, however, not responsible for 'curse scenarios'. 
As Karl (1997) points out, it is the institutional, economic and political structures and 
mechanisms that control how the benefits of natural resources are used that cause 
problems. Understanding the mechanisms and narratives that drive and enable 
hydropower in Laos helps to provide lessons learned for not only the Mekong Basin, 
but other developing countries rapidly currently involved in rapid hydropower 
development. The next section examines the contributions of the study by reviewing 
the tools used in the study’s analysis. 
 
8.3 Contributions of the Study: Political Ecology, Narratives, 
Mechanisms and the use of the Impact Assessment Process 
 
 
This study used a political ecology approach to illuminate the mechanisms and 
narratives surrounding the impact assessment process that drive and enable 
hydropower development in Laos at the meso-scale. Political ecology provides a way 
to analyse critically the power relations at play in the particular economic, political 
and environmental contexts of hydropower development in the Mekong Basin (See 
Bakker, 1999: Sneddon and Fox, 2006). The majority of political ecology research that 
involves case studies has focused on issues at the local scale (Blaikie and Brookfield, 
1987; Hecht and Cockburn, 1989; Zimmerer, 2004). Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) and 
other political ecologists ascribed agency to local people and examined their 
influence on and influence by macro-level scales.  
 
This study filled an existing gap in political ecology’s analysis of scale. Instead of 
starting at a local scale and examining how international and national politics and 
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economics are both influenced by, and attract influence from local resources and 
actors, the study began at a meso-scale. The meso-scale analysis demonstrated that 
national mechanisms and narratives have significant influence on the international 
scale and local scale and vice-versa. It further linked these meso-scale mechanisms 
and narratives to environmental change by analysing how they impact hydropower 
development.  
 
Political ecology has increasingly focused on narratives and discourses (Robbins, 
2004). This study analysed how narratives and discourses surrounding hydropower 
development are constructed by powerful actors to legitimise and disguise their 
agendas. The study also demonstrated that narratives are more than a frame of 
historical, political and economic conditions – they are a driver of change within 
themselves. Narratives and discourses in Laos have shaped the hydropower 
development process and the way impact assessments are carried out.  
 
The study analysed the social, political and economic mechanisms that operate at the 
meso-scale in Laos. Meso-scale mechanisms influencing hydropower development 
have rarely been explicitly described (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 6). The lack of 
examination of meso-scale mechanisms may be due to the highly politicised and 
securitised nature of hydropower development. Hydropower is intertwined with 
national energy security, billions of dollars of investment, nation building and political 
power. This study used extensive data collection through interviews, participant 
observation and fieldwork to directly engage with meso-scale mechanisms and 
uncover evidence of the degree to which they have directly influenced hydropower 
development in Laos and the winners and losers of environmental change. 
 
Through case studies, the study demonstrated that powerful actors involved in 
hydropower development have derived power from the social and political structure 
of the tightly controlled state. The lack of transparency and weak accountability that 
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existed within Laos has created and shaped the types of institutional behaviours that 
have emerged in hydropower development. Furthermore, mechanisms have 
influenced the space in which civil society has operated – constraining it and creating 
a form of manufactured consent.  
 
The study further showed that mechanisms are scaled to benefit the powerful. For 
example, good water governance principles are designed in relation to the state. The 
WB and the ADB legitimize the GoL’s control of civil society by scaling participation at 
the regional level where only INGOs represent civil society.  
 
Narratives and mechanisms have also shaped the role of actors in the hydropower 
development process. The World Bank and the ADB have shifted their role from 
developers to knowledge experts. The private sector has taken the lead in 
hydropower development. While, INGOs have lost influence and have also tried to 
legitimise their activities.  
 
A unique aspect of this research has been the use of the Impact Assessment (IA) 
process as a point of inquiry, and as a lens through which we can view and analyse 
the narratives and mechanisms driving and enabling hydropower development in 
Laos. The use of the IA process in the study has proved to be a valuable focal point. 
The data that has been examined from the IA process has demonstrated that it is one 
of the only instances when the non-transparent hydropower development process in 
Laos is thrust into the public sphere and exposed to scrutiny. 
 
Although the study did not set out to critique the Impact Assessment process or EIAs, 
the analysis demonstrated that EIAs are an inherently flawed process in hydropower 
development in Laos. The EIA process does not have the capacity to analyse or 
protect the far reaching ecological and social impacts of hydropower development. 
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Furthermore, the political nature of EIAs and the power of mechanisms and 
narratives in the Mekong Basin enable them to be heavily influenced by powerful 
actors. The study demonstrated that there is a need to rethink the basic instruments 
used in the environmental and social impacts of dams. Perhaps the question to ask is 
not if an EIA has been done, but who has done it and what mechanisms and 
narratives influenced it.  
 
The combination of a political ecology approach and the use of the IA process and a 
meso-scale analysis of narratives and mechanisms to explore the drivers and enablers 
of hydropower development in Laos have uncovered important insights into 
hydropower development. These insights are discussed below in the brief summary 
of the research questions. 
 
8.4 Reviewing the Research Questions 
 
Two main research questions and one subquestion guided the study’s political 
ecology analysis. The research focused on case studies from Laos, but analysis of 
other riparian states contributed to the findings. Research questions were employed 
across the three empirical chapters and the findings were grounded in various case 
studies (Chapter 6 and 7). The first main research question that guided the study’s 
analysis was:  
 
8.4.1 First Main Research Question 
 
What are the key narratives that legitimize the political and economic structures 
that drive and enable hydropower development in the Mekong Basin at the 




Narratives are important tools constructed by a wide range of actors to promote and 
legitimize their agendas and activities in Laos’ hydropower development arena. 
Actors frame narratives along scales that emphasize particular benefits or impacts 
while downplaying others. Scale is contested in hydropower debates because actors 
privilege temporal or spatial scales to support their analysis and arguments. The 
political ecology analysis demonstrated how narratives and scale are influenced and 
constructed in ways that not only legitimize actors activities and disguise their 
agendas, but also delegitimize counter narratives.  
 
China constructs its hydropower narrative as a ‘win-win’ to help legitimize its 
geopolitical strategy in the Basin. Policy statements emphasize the benefits of China’s 
mainstream dams and its involvement in Lower Basin hydropower development. 
China’s mainstream dams, however, give it considerable power over the water 
resources of the Basin and its involvement in downstream projects help boost trade 
relations and profits for state-owned enterprises. 
 
Through the Electricity General Authority of Thailand (EGAT), Thailand presents a 
securitized narrative of hydropower as essential to the future of the country. EGAT 
uses this narrative along with its monopoly over the Thai power sector to entrench its 
power in Thai politics and increase its profits.  
 
The Government of Laos (GoL) legitimizes its hydropower development by 
constructing a narrative of hydropower as essential for poverty alleviation, economic 
growth and climate change. By developing policy statements around international 
accepted agendas the GoL attempts to delegitimize both its critics and also legitimize 
the environmental and social impacts of hydropower development in Laos and across 




INGOs often present a counter-narrative to hydropower proponents. They declare 
that hydropower is a poor choice for the Mekong Basin and that its long-term impacts 
outweigh its short-term gains. INGOs, however, may not always be the best 
representative of local interest. INGOs in the Mekong are run by Western agendas. 
These Western agendas tend to focus on environmental impacts while ignoring the 
broader neo-liberal discourses that are driving development. By placing their own 
agendas into the hydropower debate and acting as the representative for local people 
in the Region, INGOs may be denying the opportunity for local people who are 
experiencing injustice to respond in their own terms. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that INGOs power has also been facilitated by the neo-liberal discourse 
(Chandhoke, 2002).  
 
The World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)’s narrative of 
hydropower along with many of the state actors has been heavily influenced by the 
neo-liberal development discourse that emerged in the Basin from the 1950s. This 
development discourse encourages the rapid development of water resources as a 
solution to the neo-liberal labels of poverty and least developed countries that have 
been applied to Laos and other Basin states. The neo-liberal discourse has also 
encouraged private sector involvement in the Basin. The narrative from the WB and 
ADB encourages connectivity and rapid development that often ignores or downplays 
its environmental or livelihood costs. The neo-liberal development discourse has also 
changed the roles of actors in hydropower development. 
 
8.4.2 Subquestion  
 
What new actors have emerged and how have roles changed in the current phase of 




Actor’s roles have dramatically shifted in Laos’ hydropower development in the last 
ten years (Middleton, 2008). With increased political and economic stability in the 
Region and new sources of financing alongside a neo-liberal agenda that encouraged 
private sector investment, the private sector has taken a lead role in hydropower 
development. The involvement of the private sector has meant that other actors 
involved in hydropower have had to shift to remain active in the development space.  
 
The WB and the ADB have responded by promoting themselves as knowledge brokers 
and experts in the Region. With the private sector now the preferred developer and 
investor for hydropower in Laos, the WB and the ADB have worked to develop 
Government capacity to regulate hydropower development. They have also helped 
facilitate hydropower development through the GMS Programme and the Mekong 
Power Grid. 
  
The shift to private sector led investment has forced INGOs to adjust their activities in 
the Region. The private sector in the Mekong Basin is less susceptible to INGO 
criticism because it operates under business norms such as confidentiality and 
intellectual property rights. As a result of this shift, INGOs in the Region now focus on 
criticizing decision making by Basin states, such as Laos, and their role in hydropower 
development.  
 
Finally, under the private sector led development, the MRC’s role in managing Basin 
development appears to have been further delegitimized. The MRC is caught 
between the short-term economic focused hydropower development agendas of the 
private sector and its member states, and the demands of its donors. Despite this, its 
value in providing a platform for issues, such as mainstream dams, to be discussed 
cannot be overlooked (Suhardiman et al., 2012). The MRC creates a window for civil 
society, academics and the media to engage with some state development agendas. 
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8.4.3 Second Main Question 
 
What are the key institutional structures and mechanisms at the national and 
regional basin scale that have empowered certain actors over others in the Impact 
Assessment process, project approval and construction of hydropower 
development projects? 
 
Mechanisms and structures help to understand what drives and enables activities and 
change (Sayer, 1985). Mechanisms and structures also create boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion (Lawson and Staeheli, 1990). The study has analysed mechanisms and 
structures in hydropower development because they empower actors and shape how 
development occurs (Sneddon and Fox, 2007).  
 
In Laos, political and economic mechanisms such as weak transparency, poor 
accountability, corruption, a tightly controlled press and weak civil society have 
combined with rapid private sector investment to shape the hydropower 
development process. Mechanisms and structures allow powerful actors to 
circumvent the social and environmental laws and policies that were designed to 
protect local people and the environment. The power of mechanisms and structures 
to shape hydropower development extends beyond local impacts into the fabric of 
decision-making.  
 
These mechanisms are reinforced by a neo-liberal agenda that promotes rapid 
development. The neo-liberal agenda is also used by powerful actors to legitimize the 
existence of mechanisms and structures that allow them to benefit from hydropower.  
 
Scale also shapes how mechanisms and structures impact development. The neo-
liberal agenda has also shaped the scale at which mechanisms impact hydropower. 
306 
 
The meso-scale analysis shows that neo-liberal discourses influenced and entrenched 
mechanisms at national scales, while mechanisms such as lack of transparency and 
accountability influence hydropower development in ways that meet powerful actors’ 
individual needs at the local scale. 
 
 The GoL and hydropower developers have used mechanisms to protect decision-
makers and shape the principles of participation and transparency that have been 
imported by the WB, the ADB and civil society. Through the use of political and 
economic mechanisms at the meso-scale the GoL gives the appearance of following 
international good governance principles, but in fact continues with business-as-usual 
decision-making. 
 
INGOs submit to the control that the GoL and mechanisms place on them because it 
allows them to participate in the hydropower development arena, thereby serving 
the interests of their Western based funding and policies. This creates a form of 
manufactured consent in the INGO sector.   
 
In the case of the Xayaburi Dam, mechanisms allowed the GoL to break its own laws 
and policies and circumvent the MRC process. INGO and downstream pressure had 
some influence in improving the development process, but ultimately, the dam 
proceeded with little change.  
 
Understanding the power and roles that new actors, narratives and mechanisms play 
in shaping hydropower development in Laos and the Mekong Basin is a key 
component in developing hydropower that follows laws and policies and gives proper 




8.5 Analytical Gaps of the Study and Avenues for Future Research 
 
By way of conclusion this section summarizes the gaps in the study and the areas for 
future research.  
8.5.1 Local Agency and Local People 
 
As outlined above, the study used a meso-scale political ecology analysis to analyse 
the drivers and enablers of hydropower development. The political ecology meso-
scale analysis analysed how meso-scale narratives and mechanisms linked and 
influenced international scales and vice-versa. The analysis also demonstrated how 
narratives and mechanisms influenced local environmental change. Although this was 
not the intent of the research, the study recognises that there is also a need to better 
understand the influence of the local scale and the agency of local people on the 
meso-scale. The study is mindful of the constraints placed on local scale influence by 
mechanisms in Laos and the Mekong Basin, such as poor freedom of press, weak civil 
society and weak accountability. Regardless of these constraints, the influence of 
local people is expanding in the Basin. For example, in the recent Cambodian election, 
hydropower was a key topic. Understanding how the local scale influences the meso-
scale could be a key step in developing a stronger grassroots civil society in the Basin.  
 
Future research also needs to be extended to natural resource dependant people in 
the Basin. The people whose livelihoods, food security and culture that depend on 
the ecosystem services will be the most severely affected by hydropower 
development and rapid economic change. The Mekong Basin is home to over 70 
ethnic minority groups (MRC 2003b). In Laos, ethnic minorities include the Tai, Mon-
Khmer, the Khamu and the Hmoung (Ireson and Ireson, 1991). Research examining 
how ethnic minorities view development and what strategies can be employed to 
reduce the impact of development on vulnerable groups is needed. A better 
understanding of livelihoods and the impacts of hydropower on culture, food security 
and water security of ethnic minority groups is needed in Laos and the Mekong Basin. 
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Research is also needed into property rights and resettlement rights of ethnic 
minorities who are often not considered citizens of the state.  
 
Methodologically, studying local communities and ethnic minorities would require 
overcoming issues of language, translation and culture. Ethnic minorities in Laos and 
the Region are also wrapped in historical issues of conflict and repression by the state 
creating access barriers (Ireson and Ireson, 1991).    
 
8.5.2 Geographical Scope 
 
The study has focused mainly on Laos and the actors involved in its hydropower 
development. The main reason behind this focus is because Laos has undergone a 
rapid period of hydropower development in the Mekong Basin from the 1990s to 
2013. This development includes the start of construction of the Xayaburi Dam, the 
first mainstream dam in the Lower Basin. The study also focused on China and 
Thailand with some mention of Cambodia and Vietnam. The second reason behind 
focusing on Laos’ hydropower development was one of practicality. The Mekong 
Basin is shared by six riparian states and covers an area over 800,000 square 
kilometres; conducting research in all countries would have been impossible within 
the resources and time available. Laos provided a useful focal point where many key 
actors were engaging in hydropower development.  
 
Future research may be refined through the inclusion of other riparian state’s 
hydropower development. At the start of this research in 2010, Myanmar was 
deemed inaccessible for research purposes. From 2012, the situation has improved. 
Although Myanmar only covers a small portion of the Basin there are plans for 
numerous hydropower developments throughout the country. Cambodia is also 
increasing its hydropower capacity with the development of the Lower Sesan 2 Dam.  
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The study only offered a cursory analysis of Vietnam’s involvement in hydropower 
development in Laos. Vietnam has been a long-time historical ally of Laos. It has been 
involved in much of its economic development (Jonsson, 2002). Vietnam was not 
analysed in more detail for two key reasons. First, the study was self-funded and this 
resulted in limits on the geographical scope. After a scoping study in 2010, it was 
decided that Thailand and China were more dynamic players than Vietnam in the 
current hydropower expansion. Second, there were limited contacts and a lack of 
data available from Vietnam in regards to its hydropower development in Laos. A 
number of Laos’ dams that Vietnam has been involved in are located along the 
Vietnamese Laos border. This area is both extremely difficult and occasionally 




A key problem with hydropower around the world is that it is developed following 
business and investment models, as opposed to water management, environmental 
or other potential models. As a result, the way in which hydropower is financed and 
who finances it are central to understanding the nature of hydropower investment 
and planning in the Mekong. This research has explored some of the key investors in 
Laos’ hydropower development. Chinese developers and Thai actors have been very 
active in pursuing both tributary and mainstream dams. Their motivations are both 
geopolitical and economic. The international players, such as the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank are forced to reinvent their roles in hydropower 
development as they are increasingly being squeezed out of dam construction and 
financing. More research is needed into who is investing in hydropower development 
in the Region and why. The financial actors and rate of returns in hydropower are 
poorly understood (Foran et al. 2010). The Equator Principles and sustainable 
hydropower initiatives have influenced some investors to incorporate more rigorous 
environmental and social plans into their construction costs and Impact Assessment 
plans. The majority of investors in hydropower, however, have not agreed to these 
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principles. Hydropower in the Mekong involves a complex web of financing 
representing billions of dollars of private and public money and little transparency. 
The lack of transparency in Laos creates a veil for unscrupulous business interests to 
operate with impunity.  
 
There are a number of methodological considerations to studying investors in detail, 
however. Hydropower is a multi-billion dollar industry and there is a high degree of 
confidentiality and national security associated with large investments. Accessing the 
data needed to understand the hydropower investment models and actors would be 
both difficult and potentially dangerous.   
 
8.5.4 Post Construction Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Finally, research into the lack of post-construction monitoring and evaluation of 
hydropower development is needed. There are a number of cases in the Region 
where post-construction impacts, or perceptions of such impacts have not been 
managed (See Chapter 6). For many hydropower projects the Impact Assessment 
process ends shortly after construction work is completed. Assistance, such as food 
(in the form of rice subsides), is given to communities usually only one year post-
construction. Many resettled communities take many years to adjust, if they are able 
to adjust at all. In some cases of resettlement, mortality rates have risen by as much 
as 40% (Romagny 2002). Environmental impacts are dynamic and variable. They may 
continue to impact a Region post-construction throughout the operational life of the 
project. Some of the mechanisms that this study has explored may explain why there 
is a lack of post-construction monitoring and evaluation, however, further research is 
needed.  
 
Although the Mekong Basin is rumoured to be one of the most studied river basins in 
the world, there is still a great deal of research needed. As is demonstrated in this 
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study, hydropower in the Mekong basin is highly dynamic. The development of the 
Region is impacted by local, regional and global economic, political and social 
structures. New and old actors adapt and shift within these structures. Future 
research can help to illuminate pathways to balance the benefits and costs of 
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